To hear the Obama
Administration tell it, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, is a win-win
and cure-all. It will create jobs in the U.S., improve labor and environmental
protections, improve business transparency internationally, and help consummate
a relationship with Asia that has until now been mostly an overture, the
administration says.
Many U.S.
lawmakers, however, are unconvinced. The administration needs “fast track”
authority to finish negotiating the TPP, and a key vote is likely to come up in
the Senate this week. Opposition to the deal is bubbling up across Washington’s
political and ideological spectra. In a twist, the opposition is meta-partisan.
The Republican leadership of the Senate, and most of the party, support fast
track, but the Democratic leadership opposes it. Both parties
have members who disagree on the deal.
The TPP’s
partners will include oppressive undemocratic countries like Vietnam and
Brunei, and other countries with problematic human rights records like
Malaysia, Singapore, and Mexico. Lawmakers who focus on religious freedom may
be alarmed at how Vietnam locks up leaders of
unsanctioned churches. Advocates for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) rights are horrified at anti-LGBT laws in Malaysia and Brunei.
And just
about everyone is alarmed at pledges made by the Sultan of Brunei to
operationalize a form of Sharia (Islamic law) that would mandate whipping
homosexuals and stoning to death persons engaging in sexual activity out of
wedlock.
Meanwhile,
health and human rights advocates are concerned at proposed provisions on
patent protections that would extend pharmaceutical companies’ profits at the
expense of public health efforts to improve the availability of generic
versions of life-saving drugs.
Other
groups are worried about the agreement’s provisions on investor dispute
resolution, which allow corporations to sue governments for damages when they
enact or enforce health, safety or environmental laws or policies that impact
corporate profits. Mechanisms of this type have been used, for instance,
by a tobacco company to sue Australia for passing
anti-smoking legislation, and by a metal smelting company to sue Peru after its
government took action to force the company to clean up massive pollution it
had caused.
In the
face of this evidence, the Obama administration nonetheless maintains the
agreement is top notch. The TPP, the administration says, will obligate
countries like Vietnam to improve respect for human and labor rights. The
agreement’s labor chapter, it says, will contain standards requiring countries
to protect workers’ rights, end government control over unions in countries,
and defend workers’ rights to organize. The provisions on investor disputes
will prevent the kinds of problematic cases that have occurred in the past.
There is
no way to know what is actually in the agreement, however, because negotiated
text is secret. The administration has only shared texts with congressional
members and staff with security clearances.
To the
administration’s credit, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has worked to
improve key parts of the agreement, like the labor chapter, and the
administration has attempted to use the negotiations overall as leverage to
compel countries to improve their records. From statements by the USTR and
information provided by those who have seen the agreement, it seems that the
labor chapter now provides that TPP members have to adopt core labor standards,
including the right to form unions.
The
problem, however, is that little of this will have real-world impact.
Administration officials, and President Obama himself, repeat the word
“enforceable” almost every time they talk about the TPP’s labor provisions. The
truth, however, is that the TPP’s labor chapter is not enforceable in practice.
And the administration’s broader efforts to use the agreement to leverage
improvements in human rights records—in problem countries like Vietnam,
Malaysia, and Brunei—have largely been ineffective.
The
situation with Vietnam puts the issues in sharpest relief. The United States
has been pressing Vietnam for almost four years to improve its human rights
record and labor rights record in particular, using not only the TPP but closer
military ties as the leverage. All that the United States has received in
response is a few pledges, baby steps, and a handful of political prisoner
releases. (If one can call the releases that: One released prisoner was in poor
health and died within weeks of his release, two others were only paroled into
exile in the United States.)
The
Vietnamese government still uses its penal code, which contains provisions
criminalizing free speech and freedom of association, to lock up dissidents and
critics. More than 150 have been convicted over the last four years, in the
same period in which the US was negotiating with Vietnam on the TPP.
Meanwhile,
Vietnam’s labor rights record remains abysmal. Independent unions outside the
umbrella of the government-controlled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor
are forbidden and the act of trying to organize one is punished as a crime
against the state. Labor activists such as Nguyen Hoang Quoc Hung and Doan Huy
Chuong remain behind bars. And tens of
thousands in administrative detention for alleged drug use are forced to work
for nothing, or near to nothing. The fact that this forced labor program of
supposed “drug treatment” is operated by Vietnam’s labor ministry tells you
everything you need to know.
The
administration insists that the TPP’s labor chapter will compel Vietnam to
improve its labor record, because Hanoi will need to change its laws to allow
independent unions—factory-level unions, incidentally, not sectoral unions or
federations.
But with
neither a functioning and objective labor dispute system, nor an independent
judiciary, it is difficult to imagine how these paper reforms would come to
reality.
Worse,
without additional reforms to the other problematic parts of the legal system,
Vietnamese labor organizers will still be vulnerable to prosecution under penal
code provisions that criminalize supposed anti-party or anti-government activities—which
in the government’s view has included handing
out pamphlets or having park picnics at which participants read the UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The
administration contends that the labor chapter is enforceable, but it’s not
evident how. Should the TPP come into effect and Vietnam is still crushing
workers’ rights, what will be the remedy? That non-existent unions will use
non-existent labor dispute mechanisms to bring worker complaints before
Vietnam’s non-existent independent judiciary?
At best,
international or U.S. labor rights groups may be able to petition the United
States to file a complaint against Vietnam in a trade tribunal, but this would
only get to abuses in general, not specific complaints.
What’s
lacking in the agreement is specific mechanisms to enforce commitments that
governments make on labor rights. Why would Vietnam be compelled to do anything
more, once it receives the benefits of TPP membership? The better course of
action would be to negotiate an agreement where key benefits are withheld if
Vietnam or other countries fail to meet their commitments.
The Obama
administration needs to be more realistic in describing what can be
accomplished by the TPP. It’s already bad enough to forego human rights
protections for the sake of free trade. It’s even worse to attempt to sell the
agreement by invoking supposed rights protections when they don’t exist.
The Obama
administration needs to press harder on TPP members to improve their rights
records—for real. The United States shouldn’t move ahead with the TPP until it
can demonstrate more serious commitments to creating truly enforceable
provisions on labor rights protections and better addressing human rights
concerns generally. In the meantime, Congress should focus more closely at the
specifics of the deal and exercise strong oversight. There is no need to rush,
and with flaws this big, the stakes are too high.
John Sifton
is Asia Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch.
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