THE Indonesian government is moving quickly to create a big impact in the agricultural and food sectors. Framed within a strong food sovereignty narrative, President Joko Widodo is now imposing two big agendas for the rice sector’s development. The first is to boost rice production to achieve 100 per cent self-sufficiency. The second is to graduate from 100 per cent rice self-sufficiency (RSS) to be a rice-exporting nation in the near future.
To achieve these targets, the Agriculture Ministry recently planned to reutilise the military’s civic mission, TNI Manunggal Masuk Desa, through Village Supervisory Non-Commissioned Officers (Babinsa) as quasi-agricultural extension officers.
Amran Sulaiman, the minister, argued that “50,000 Babinsa across the country would be a big help to cover the deficit of 20,000 agricultural extension officers (AEOs)”.
In the past, this was largely inspired by security concerns (such as controlling communism and the farmers’ movement).
Joko’s food sovereignty concept has its origin in the global farmers’ movement, which allowed farmers to have greater autonomy and control over their own affairs based on their own decisions.
In fact, food sovereignty is a rather “leftist paradigm”. The military’s recent interest in backing up Joko’s agenda could be justified by its interest in controlling the implication of food sovereignty on the farmers’ movement.
One can, therefore, question the why and how regarding the government’s involvement of the military in boosting agricultural production as a temporary solution to quicken the achievement of rice production targets amid the lack of AEOs.
Some concerns remain, as this policy may have long-term implications.
FIRSTLY, one may question the urgency, effectiveness and added value of the military’s involvement in the rice field; and,
SECONDLY, the military’s presence may affect civil society’s role in agriculture because its involvement may discourage the genuine participation of farmers.
Even though agriculture work can be classified under military operations, other than war, the government should be able to explain the urgency of the military’s involvement in the food sector. This can be counterproductive for food production. It can dramatically accelerate a decline in public trust in Joko’s administration.
Food self-sufficiency has been a sacred goal that often receives high political endorsement. Despite scepticism and criticism from national and international experts, and economists, concerning the lack of rigour in its RSS policy, many governments view RSS as the most politically correct goal.
Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia have been able to achieve full RSS. These countries have maintained rice productivity above 250 to 350 kg/person/year over the last 10 years. In the case of Vietnam, apart from having less mouths to feed, the secret behind self-sufficiency is its adoption of better technology and incentives for farmers to grow rice.
Indonesia has currently achieved 180 kg/person/year rice productivity and faces serious difficulties to achieve rice productivity beyond 250 kg/person/year. Technically speaking, achieving the RSS ratio is simple.
Once the country produces enough rice for everyone (presumably above 144 kg/person/year), and has enough buffer stock in local markets and government warehouses, 100 per cent RSS can, in theory, be achieved, as we have seen in 1984/85 and 1992/93.
In fact, apart from the decline in RSS to 93.8 per cent in 2011, overall, Indonesia has been successfully maintaining a self-sufficiency rate above 96 per cent since 2004.
The Agriculture Ministry can also consider maximising pioneering farmers (Petani Pelopor), who have long been fostered by former governments to play a greater role amid the short supply of AEOs. There are more than a million Petani Pelopor who are successful farmers, as they have been equipped with adequate practical knowledge and experience that can be capitalised on.
Indonesia has the potential to achieve a rice yield above 6.5 tonnes per hectare and, potentially, it can be above seven or eight tonnes per hectare. However, it will have to deal with the continued decline in agricultural land and lack of consistency in providing incentives for farmers. Besides, the demographic pressure faced by Indonesia will not be easily resolved.
By the time Joko steps down from office in 2019, about 15 million babies would have been born. Should he win a second term and step down from office in 2024, about 31 million people — a population equivalent today to Malaysia (or Cambodia, Laos and Timor Leste combined) — would have been born.
The real agriculture and food production problems in Indonesia are a complex mixture of technology, incentives, demographic change, climate change and agrarian issues, which may not be solved solely by military engagement because some of these problems lie in many domains — from the legal system and issues of governance to a proper institutional mechanism.
Still, farmers outside Java continue to experience delays in the distribution of seeds and fertilisers today.
One problem with Joko’s policy of food sovereignty is probably not about involving the military. If the military is the solution to Indonesia’s future food security, the big question is: what, then, is the real problem?
Jonatan A. Lassa is a research fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies and Adhi Priamarizki is associate research fellow at the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
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