The Islamic State [IS]
has claimed responsibility for the ghastly suicide bombing on Sunday in the eastern Afghanistan
city of Jalalabad, killing at least 33 people and injuring more than 100. The
Taliban have categorically denied any role.
Of course, it is difficult to be judgmental in such dire circumstances.
No doubt, Taliban cadres can always wear new IS robes and this might well have
begun happening, given the incipient trends toward splinter groups of Talibs
breaking off now and then and swearing allegiance to the IS.
However, whether there are umbilical cords tying such elements to the IS
Hqs in Iraq or not or instructions are being transmitted from Mosul to the
Hindu Kush or whether terrorist elements are moonlighting in a spirit of motiveless
malignity has become a moot point today.
The point is, the IS is an idea and if the idea is arresting the minds
of even a few militants in Afghanistan (or Pakistan) it becomes a terrifying
prospect. The time for hair-splitting – whether the Afghan soil is fertile or
not for the IS tree to grow – is gone.
Such mutations as could be happening within the Taliban are inevitable
and the history of popular insurgencies is littered with such things.
However, in contrast with the clear-cut assessment by the Kabul
government and many regional states (especially Russia and Iran) that the
spectre of the IS has come to haunt Afghanistan, the United States and its
allies have maintained an ambivalent stance.
This is only to be expected, because the Obama administration grapples
with more than one compulsion working on it and has to navigate its way through
with some dexterity. The main considerations are:
·
In political terms, the White House is wary that the IS’ rise in
Afghanistan might become even more grist for the mill of President Barack
Obama’s detractors and critics at home, as it highlights the colossal failure
of the US-led war (which he’d on the other hand like to project differently as
a success story and as presidential legacy.)
·
On the other hand, the IS provides the perfect alibi for the US to
establish its military bases in Afghanistan (and to bring in NATO as well) on a
long-term footing, which makes the hype of continued al-Qaeda / IS threat in
Afghanistan a realtime political necessity.
·
But at the same time, the US will be chary of any suggestion that the
IS’ rise is also to be attributed to the Afghan people’s resentment over the
continued foreign occupation of their country.
Then, there is the big, tantalizing question which looms large today as
to where exactly the US stands vis-a-vis the IS. Much remains a mystery to the
uninitiated who see the paradigm in back and white terms as a straightforward
war on terror, whereas, the unnoticed eddies are really more important here
than the mainstream. Consider the following.
One, IS surged in Syria and Iraq as a result of the misguided policies
pursued by the US and its regional allies. Simply put, in the frenzy to try to
overthrow the Syrian regime and replace it with a pro-western set-up, the US
and its allies ended up supporting extremist groups who later transformed as
the IS.
Didn’t the U.S. know with all the intelligence assets at its command
that its regional allies – Arab and non-Arab – were (and continue to be)
involved in the dangerous business of covertly supporting extremist groups? Of
course, it did. If so, why did it look away and patiently mark time until the
IS monster finally caught the world headlines by conquering Mosul?
Again, why Mosul? Everyone knows that Mosul region adjacent to Kirkuk,
awash with the great oil fields, is the nerve centre or frontline of the “Iraq
question”, where the viability of the country remaining a unified state with a
Shi’ite majority (created a century ago by Imperial Britain on the debris of
the Ottoman Empire to suit the geopolitical needs of that time) or should be
dismembered like the former Yugoslavia.
Contradictions are galore when one looks closely at the US’ much-touted
military campaign against the IS in Iraq since last year. To be sure, the US
has conducted air strikes on the IS. But then, it has refused to tackle the IS
on the ground.
To be sure, the US forces have returned to Iraq despite the popular
Iraqi opinion heavily weighed against American troop presence. But then, the US
military advisors are taking their own time to prepare the Iraqi armed forces
to take the war into the IS camp.
To be sure, the folklore says that the hydra-headed IS monster with a
billion-dollar holding and hidden sources of income cannot be vanquished
easily. But then the ramshackle Iraqi militia with the support and guidance
from Iran have shown in Tikrit that the IS mystique is probably no more than
hyperbole that can be scattered.
To be sure, the IS continues to get supplies from outside. But then, the
Iranians count the U.S. among the principal sources of supply of weapons for
the IS.
To be sure, the U.S. could be airdropping weapons by mistake behind
enemy lines. But then, Iran now is in possession of concrete
evidence that the U.S. aircraft are literally unloading arms
supplies at airports that are under the control of the IS.
Really? What is the conclusion to be drawn if there is an ounce of truth
in the Iranian allegation (which has since been picked up by Russian official
media)? It doesn’t need much ingenuity to figure out that the US is indulging
in doublespeak — staging an elaborate pantomime with a hidden agenda that
actually aims at somehow perpetuating an IS presence of some sort or the other
on the Iraqi chessboard for some time to come. The US’ objective could be
three-fold:
·
create an alibi to remain embedded militarily in a highly strategic
region where rival powers – Russia, China and Iran – have staged a comeback and
may threaten to overshadow the western presence;
·
create a permanent thorn in the flesh for Shi’ite Iran and a bulwark
against Iran’s rising regional influence;
·
work on the IS incrementally through its various mentors in the region
(who are US’ allies) and finesse it as a geopolitical tool for the furtherance
of the US’ regional strategies in the Muslim countries.
Given the above complex scenario, the appearance of the IS in
Afghanistan becomes a moment fraught with great poignancy.
We can agree that the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has no reason to lie
during a nationally televised address when he says that the IS is
responsible for the carnage in Jalalabad on Sunday. He probably
spoke on the basis of Afghan intelligence. His army chief Sher Mohammad Karimi said at the
same that terrorists are the common enemies of Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Interestingly, the IS’s appearance in Afghanistan coincides with
phenomenal shifts in regional politics. (See my article Pakistan, China, Iran and the
remaking of regional security). Equally, there are nascent signs
that the national unity government in Kabul is renewing its ties with Russia, here, and Iran, here, (which have
been in a state of drift in the recent months.)
The
US has every reason to feel nervous that a regional initiative may, finally,
take shape that challenges Washington’s monopoly to be the arbiter of any
Afghan settlement — especially with the warming up of Russian-Pakistani
ties and the upcoming summit meeting of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization in Ufa, Russia, where Pakistan’s admission as a full
member of the regional body is expected to be formalized.Asia Sentinel
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