To adapt and compete, American
strategy must reflect a clear understanding of the depths and origins of change
in Asia. The US cannot compete in either geopolitics or business unless it
understands the sources of its competition in the first place.
The US still looms very
large in the global economy, but in relative terms it is smaller than in 2008,
much less 1998. Those two dates are important because the second of these
financial crises bookended a tumultuous decade, further fuelling debates in
Asia about overreliance on Western economies and the utility of an
intraregional hedge against future volatility. After 2008, many Asian countries
have emphasised domestic, intraregional, and emerging market demand.
But it was the crisis of
1997–98 that left a particularly searing legacy on many Asian countries. The US
was perceived to be disconnected and aloof. Washington refused to bail out
Thailand in 1997, just three years after bailing out Mexico. Many in Asia began
looking to intraregional solutions. Asia-only currency swaps, Asia-only trade
and investment pacts, regional bond funds, and other ideas emerged and evolved
during this period. Many of these excluded the US.
Today, elements of that
impulse can be seen in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
the principal competitor to Washington’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which
includes the members of ASEAN and six regional powers but not the US.
Still, today’s pan-Asianism
poses a tougher challenge than its 1990s variant, in part because the context
has changed.
For one, India and China are
unwilling to live in perpetuity without changes to the Western-built
architecture that prevailed a decade ago.
Nor is China the only driver
of the new pan-Asianism. In the 1990s, it was Japanese bureaucrats who pushed
for an Asian Monetary Union. And today, New Delhi’s involvement with the
Beijing-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS
institutions has taken place despite growing Indian ambivalence about China and
even as India’s pursues enhanced quotas and shares in the Bretton Woods
institutions.
China seeks to leverage this
new pan-Asianism as its foreign and economic policies converge in unprecedented
ways. Beijing has pledged and spent staggering sums of money, leveraging
state-backed financial vehicles for diplomatic and economic ends. But Beijing
has more going for it than just its capital. Surrounded by rivals, China is
said to be a ‘victim’ of its strategic geography, yet it also benefits from
very favourable economic geography.
For these reasons, some
pan-Asian formations are inevitable. They will progress regardless of
Washington’s views and preferences, thus the US should approach some of what is
happening — pan-Asian dialogue mechanisms, for example — much as it supports
European institutions.
Ultimately, American
policymakers must answer three questions.
First, which pan-Asian
groups or pacts can Washington live with and which will undermine vital US
interests? Those that merit vigilance will pursue functional agendas
detrimental to US security, prosperity, market opportunities, or values.
Bloc-like trade agreements
or non-tariff barriers meet this concern. But a pan-Asian infrastructure bank
that finances bridges, roads, and rail links is not inherently exclusionary
since US firms also benefit from better infrastructure and Washington does not
itself offer large-scale project finance. The price of opposing non-vital
threats may well exceed the cost of living or working with them.
Meanwhile, Washington needs
strategic and tactical coherence. Currently it has neither: the Obama
administration first argued that exclusion from Asian institutions inherently
threatened US interests. With the East Asia Summit, mostly a talk shop, it
encouraged allies to join and ultimately did so itself. But now, with the AIIB
— a vehicle that will finance billions in infrastructure — Washington has
discouraged its allies and held itself aloof.
Second, which pan-Asian
ideas merely supplement US-preferred approaches and which aim to supplant them?
An Asian contingency reserve fund and the AIIB will most likely supplement
existing structures.
Third, Washington cannot
beat something with nothing and simply has to up its own game. The TPP is
perhaps the most glaring example. If an RCEP-like arrangement threatens US
interests, then why hasn’t the US government put its full weight behind the
TPP? The administration needs to work with Congress on the Trade Promotion
Authority and ultimately bring the deal home.
Instead of outright opposition,
Washington should at least be seeking an observer arrangement in the AIIB. If
the lack of anticorruption and environmental standards is of concern, then it
makes more sense to try to shape the new organisation’s standards than to
remain aloof.
Above all, Washington needs
to intensify its own economic diplomacy in Asia. This means encouraging a
liberal, open, market-based economic order in the region. To this end, the TPP is necessary but insufficient. A
broadened agenda would include bilateral investment treaties with China and
India, creative public-private partnerships to inject the US into
infrastructure developments in Southeast Asia, and sectoral agreements. Congress
also needs to put more weight behind reforms of international financial
institutions.
The US will remain a Pacific
power and is an essential strategic balancer. With China unsettling its
neighbours, America’s security-related role
has been reinforced in recent years.
But as Asians increasingly
rely on one another for economic public goods, Washington risks ceding
leadership and missing opportunities by tilting at ideas whose trajectory it
cannot easily halt and whose historical and ideological roots run deep.
The US has never feared
competition, but — to defend their interests — Americans must adapt to the
contours of a changing Asia.
Evan A. Feigenbaum is Vice
Chairman of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago.
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