Smaller Asian countries are increasingly finding themselves caught in an
intense battle between the major powers for friends in the region, as Vietnam
did recently
The United States has asked Vietnam to deny Russian air tankers access
for refuelling at Cam Ranh Bay, because - says the US State Department - they
facilitate "activities that could raise tension in the region". More
specifically, US General Vincent Brooks, commander of the US Army in the
Pacific, said these tankers refuel Russian nuclear-capable "Bear"
bombers that have made "provocative" forays in the region, including
circling Guam, the site of major US air and naval bases. This revelation
provides a peek at the behind-the-scenes pulling of Asian countries into the
vortex of the strategic struggle between major powers.
Indeed, the US concern regarding the Russia-Vietnam military connection
is only one example of how small Asian countries are facing critical decisions
on competition between the US, Russia and China for influence in the region. In
this case, Vietnam has to decide between offending Russia, on which it depends
for arms, and the US, which it hopes will buffer it against China. Meanwhile,
China is likely to support Russia's activities as long as they are aimed at the
US and not itself.
As part of the US "rebalance" to Asia, it is enhancing its
military relations with its allies - Australia, Japan and the Philippines - and
deepening them with Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. It is also stepping up its
intelligence collection in the region and requesting that its allies and others
assist.
All major countries collect intelligence on potential enemies. Indeed,
if one wants to know a country's intent, the focus of its intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance activities is a good indicator. A small
component of such efforts by the US is relatively transparent, or at least
deducible from the stationing and activities of its maritime, air and surface
intelligence collection platforms.
From China's perspective, the US is encircling it with them. China's
active challenge to what it sees as pesky "flies at a picnic" has led
to serious incidents and could lead to more. The US-China military relationship
is already strained by various encounters.
In the bigger picture, the US rebalancing is coming face to face with
China's naval expansion, rising capabilities and ambitions. China is developing
what the US calls an anti-access/area denial strategy that is designed to
control China's near seas and prevent access by the US in the event of a
conflict - say, between Beijing and Taipei. The US response is the air-sea
battle concept, which is intended to cripple China's command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
systems. This is the "tip of the spear" for both and each is trying
to dominate this sphere over, on and under China's near seas.
The US EP-3, and now its replacement the P-8A Poseidon, surveillance
aircraft fly out of Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. Some US Poseidons also fly out
of Pampanga in the Philippines, and Malaysia has offered to allow them to
refuel in Labuan. The US is also considering supplying Vietnam with EP-3s that
it will probably use to put Chinese activities under surveillance (and share
the results). Moreover, some US surveillance flights are likely to come out of
northern Australia and even the Cocos Islands - and overfly Indonesia, thus
drawing it into the equation.
Most of these "hosts" are defensive about the surveillance
associations, arguing the purpose is to enhance their own security, and that
each flight is approved on a case-by-case basis. Of course, China may not buy
that explanation.
The US claims its activities are a lawful part of freedom of navigation.
But China argues they are an abuse of this right and of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea that requires consent for "marine scientific
research".
The most recent publicly known incident occurred last August and
involved a Chinese J-11 fighter jet coming within 10 metres of a US P-8A
Poseidon sub-hunter some 220km east of Hainan Island. The J-11 flew past the
P-8's nose and performed a barrel roll at close proximity.
The US protested, claiming that the Chinese jet had operated in a
"dangerous, unsafe and unprofessional" manner. China said the claims
were "totally groundless", and that the incident's root cause was US
surveillance of China. The US then stated it would continue to operate in
international airspace and waters. Already, US surveillance flights average
more than one a day off China's coasts.
It is thus small wonder that China has been actively opposed to such
"provocative" probing. More importantly, China probably considers the
hosting of these irritating "flies" as an unfriendly act, probably
placing the hosts in its potential enemy category.
The US request to Vietnam and the enabling of US surveillance activities
demonstrate how smaller countries are being drawn into major countries'
strategies and tactics. The request also reveals that the principle and
tolerance of the US for freedom of navigation does have limits when invoked and
implemented by other powers. The US doesn't like it - and neither do the
targets of US surveillance.
But these activities are only the visible tip of an iceberg of broader
strategic competition involving the US, China, Japan and Russia - and thus we
can expect a lot more of the same.
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct
senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou,
China
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