China, like much of the developed world, faces slower growth and an ageing
population. Africa in contrast offers the potential of ‘catch up’ growth
and a growing young pool of low-cost labour, alongside plentiful natural resources.
The economic prospects of both are increasingly intertwined. The path of
China’s trade and investment ties with Africa offers insights into China’s
ongoing economic reforms and internationalisation.
China is Africa’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade is expected
to surpass US$200 billion in 2014. Trade with Africa is small in terms of
China’s total trade, but it is strategically important because of its
composition. Commodities — especially oil — dominate China’s imports from
Africa. For Africa, China’s low-cost manufacturers have helped to stimulate
consumer markets. These are also reported to have selectively threatened
domestic industries, such as textiles.
China’s foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Africa is also growing. According to China, in 2012 its FDI
in Africa reached US$2.52 billion, reflecting annual growth of some 20 per
cent since 2009. Facing a shrinking labour supply, excessive industrial
capacity, and a state-led push to upgrade and internationalise the national
economic model, in Africa Chinese firms can gain an international foothold and
outsource labour-intensive manufacturing. In 2013, China’s state media
announced a plan to invest a further US$1 trillion in the continent within a
decade.
Infrastructure development
is directly and indirectly fundamental to those plans. Visiting Africa in May
2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang spoke of connecting African capitals using
China’s high-speed rail technology. In November 2014 China Railway Construction
Corp signed China’s largest-ever overseas investment deal, agreeing to build a
1400 kilometre railway along the coast of Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. A five-nation
train line in East Africa will in sections replace British narrow rail
gauge for China’s standard rail gauge.
Following the footsteps of
Li, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently reiterated China’s commitment to
assist Africa to develop ‘Three Major Networks’ — railway, road and regional
aviation. Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Ming, was also in Ethiopia for
the 2015 heads of state meeting of the 54-member African Union (AU). The
resulting African Union–China deal has been billed as ‘the most
substantive project the AU has ever signed with a partner’. It promises to
connect the continent by road, rail and air transportation. This year’s
triennial leaders’ gathering of the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation is
sure to include similar announcements.
China is also investing in
steel and iron ore in Africa — pushed by excess capacity in its steel sector at
home and pulled by prospective industrialisation in Africa. In late 2014, Hebei
Iron & Steel, China’s largest steelmaker, announced plans to shift five
million tonnes of production (roughly 11 per cent of its annual output) to
South Africa. In 2014 China was also party to a
US$20 billion deal reached between Rio Tinto, Chinalco, the International
Finance Corporation and the Government of Guinea. The deal will develop
Guinea’s Simandou iron ore deposits. It is the largest combined iron ore and
infrastructure deal ever attempted in Africa.
Ethiopia is a case of China
merging infrastructural FDI with the parallel development of light
manufacturing. China’s Huajian Group plans to invest US$2 billion over the next decade to create
a shoe-manufacturing cluster that exports to other African nations, Europe and
North America. The plan makes use of Ethiopia’s trade preferences with each of
those markets and the relatively lower wages of Ethiopian factory workers
compared to their Chinese counterparts. In September 2014 the Ethiopian Roads
Authority also signed an agreement with China’s CGC Overseas Construction Group
to upgrade the Dire Dawa–Dewele highway, which provides a link to the Port of
Djibouti.
But this rising economic
dependence is not free of contention. Much of China’s FDI in Africa is
sovereign loan-financed, contracts are often opaque and there are tensions
around the use of imported Chinese labour in building infrastructure. In
addition, civil society and more established multinationals in Africa protest
Chinese firms’ labour and environmental standards. The Governor of Nigeria’s
Central Bank, Sanusi Lamido, said in 2014 that Africa should ‘recognise that
China … is in Africa not for African interests but its own’. He called for
African governments to take a more competitive stance by adopting policies that
allow China to make money while helping to develop the continent. New research, however, suggests those policies remain a
cross-continental ‘noodle bowl’.
In the face of shrinking
labour, sluggish growth, and excess industrial capacity and savings, China is
pushing to upgrade its own economic structure and to increase outbound investment. Prominently, China has
promised to massively increase its trade and investment ties with Africa. Understanding these trends and their domestic drivers
offers insight into the direction and speed of China’s economic reforms and
these particular pathways of China’s own economic internationalisation. This
can also better inform Sino–African policy-making.
Lauren Johnston is a
Research Fellow in the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social
Research, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne.
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