To make all this work in the
face of scepticism or even hostility from the US and its allies, China needs
junior partners with influence, like fellow UNSC member and friend in need Russia, even though Putin’s strategic aims are
quite different from Xi’s. At his November 2014 speech to the Central Work
Conference on Foreign Relations Xi kept the neighbourhood and great powers
firmly in the diplomatic framework. But he also added a new category of ‘major
developing powers’ – presumably including Russia – to China’s diplomatic
strategy.
Both sides are wary about a
hostile international environment dominated by the US. But Xi’s view of the US
is much more nuanced than Putin’s, who regards the US as Enemy Number One. The
Chinese government is not afraid to criticise the US, but has not forgotten
that China is probably the world’s greatest beneficiary of globalisation and
the US-led Asian order. Xi Jinping sees a stable, if different, relationship
with the US. ‘Fostering a more enabling international environment for peaceful
development’ is important to the achievement of his ‘Two Centenary Goals’.
China has used the Russian
government’s helpful obfuscation to remain on the fence regarding Ukraine.
Official press commentary of Putin’s recent — and strongly anti-US — speeches
is factual and neutral in tone. It’s probable the Chinese government is
increasingly uncomfortable with Putin’s Ukraine policy and his anti-Western
ranting, though they would not report this in the press. It seems even more
likely that they would be aghast at his denial that China’s vast land
neighbour Kazakhstan is a state.
In the meantime, China
continues to enjoy the benefits of Russia’s military technology. The Russian
News Agency reported on 14 November 2014 that Russia is ready to supply Su-35 fighter jets to China.
This will be a resumption of hi-tech arms exports that were suspended several
years ago. At that time China appeared to have reverse engineered Russia’s jet
technology and put .
Russian Defence Minister
Sergei Shoigu visited Beijing in November and announced a plan for new joint
naval exercises in 2015, one in the Mediterranean and one in the Pacific. These
two locations were presumably chosen to demonstrate the global reach of a
Sino–Russian combined force. But the Chinese Defense Ministry was careful to
specify to reporters that China follows ‘the principles of no
confrontation and no alliance’. They did not repeat Shoigu’s claim
that Russia ‘expressed concern over US attempts to strengthen its military and
political clout in the Asia Pacific Region’.
But this year’s biggest
Russian combat training exercise, Vostok 2014, appeared
designed to test combat readiness against China itself, indicating less than
complete strategic confidence in Putin’s new best friend.
In his State of the Union
address in December, Putin gave the Asia Pacific the most cursory mention.
He accorded more words to the Eurasian Economic Union. The EEU is the most
obvious expression of Putin’s frustration at China’s dominance, as they jockey
for economic and political power in Central Asia. Russia’s position is only
likely to weaken: one of the main tenets of Xi’s foreign policy is the building
of the ‘New Silk Roads’. The
main route is overland, making a dogleg to Moscow almost as an afterthought
after working its way through the Khorgos International Center for Boundary
Cooperation, through Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, and on to Iran and Europe. It looks as though Chinese dominance of the Central
Asian region will give little economic benefit to Russia.
In this transactional
relationship, there is little strategic trust.
China’s dominance will frustrate Russia, while Putin’s diplomatic alienation
will increase the cost of China’s political support. Today’s confluence of
interests will not last forever.
Rebecca Fabrizi is Senior
Strategic Research Fellow at the Australian Centre on China in the World,
College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU.
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