Last year was not a good year for international relations on the South
China Sea. In fact, one could argue that the conflicting interests became the
primary security issue in Southeast Asia. This year is unlikely to be better
and could be worse.
Flux is integral to
international relations and that describes the political situation in Southeast
Asia and the South China Sea. China - which aspires to be the dominant regional
power - is trying to build positive relations with neighbours and fellow claimants
to disputed territories, and also with the US, which currently dominates the
region.
The tone and tenor of the
China-US relationship affects the political climate. But it is not clear that
either is willing or able to make the compromises that a peaceful coexistence
requires - let alone a relationship in which cooperation outpaces competition.
In China's view, the US wants to continue the status quo, maintaining, and
enhancing, its cold war "hub and spoke" alliance system and presence.
With the US "pivot", the South China Sea is becoming a cockpit of
China-US rivalry for dominance in the region.
In particular, despite their
November memorandum of understanding regarding "rules of behaviour"
for unplanned military air and ship encounters, more incidents are likely.
The problem is that these
encounters are not unplanned, but purposeful probes and intercepts designed to
send a message. China will continue to challenge US naval intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance vessels and aircraft, as well as drones
operating on, under and over China's "near seas".
The US believes China is
developing a strategy to control the near seas and prevent access in the event
of a conflict - say, between Beijing and Taipei. The US response is the air-sea
battle concept, intended to cripple China's command, control, communications,
intelligence and surveillance systems. So, attempts to negotiate preventative
measures are unlikely to make much progress.
There is also likely to be
little progress in negotiating a robust code of conduct between the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and China. China believes other claimants to
disputed territories are violating the non-binding declaration on conduct by
not negotiating the issues directly with Beijing and instead
"internationalising" them. Until they do so, China is unlikely to
yield.
The arbitration panel
hearing the Philippine complaint against China may render a verdict this year -
at least on whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case - and if it decides it
does, tensions will rise. China will continue to officially ignore the process
and increase pressure on the Philippines and Vietnam to negotiate with it
directly.
Regardless of the outcome,
the Philippines and Vietnam will continue to appeal for Asean's support, and
the US will continue its tacit backing for their position. Cambodia, Laos and
Myanmar will probably still demur on the matter. Indonesia may begin to
exercise some leadership within Asean and attempt to bridge the gaps. It will
be interesting to see how Malaysia - not exactly a neutral party - will
"lead" Asean on this issue as the 2015 chair. Intra-Asean maritime
disputes will remain unresolved and could even resurface as stresses and
strains undermine unity.
In short, 2015 is likely to
bring more of the same for the South China Sea: isolated but potentially
serious incidents, political wrangling and megaphone diplomacy. There may be an
acceleration of the evolution of pro-US and pro-China factions both within
Asean and within individual member countries like Vietnam. Certainly, China and
the US will continue to enhance their economic, political and military presence
in the region.
In the longer term, there
are several ways the political imbroglio could unfold. In perhaps a worst-case
scenario for Asean, the US-China rivalry would feed upon itself, exacerbated by
domestic nationalists in both countries but particularly in the US in the
run-up to the 2016 presidential election. The South China Sea disputes would
fester and tensions would wax and wane. Proxy domestic and inter-state conflict
would become the "new normal". International oil companies would shy
away from the disputed areas.
A preferred scenario for
Asean would be one in which a robust binding code of conduct is agreed with
China and implemented. This would lessen the opportunity for US-China conflict
and reaffirm Asean's centrality in regional security. Not only could this lead
to an era of peace and stability in the South China Sea, but the claimants
could find a way to jointly explore for oil and gas.
Neither of these scenarios
is likely and the reality will be somewhere in-between. The disputes can be
managed - particularly if Indonesia becomes the principal broker - but probably
not resolved. Asean and its members can try to ensure that the reality is
closer to the preferred scenario by seeking to manage US-China rivalry without
blatantly siding with either. This will not be easy but it may be key to
preserving Asean unity on this issue.
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at
the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Hainan
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