Many airline operators prefer the Airbus fly-by-wire system
in preference to risking pilot error. Aeroplane manufacturers deliver only what
the buyer wants, the problem is that most buyers have never flown an aeroplane,
certainly not under IFR (instrument flight rules) conditions, and pilots aren’t
to be trusted to fly such expensive machines.
The misinformation coming
from commentators is close to irresponsible.
Let’s get one thing clear,
only the pilot is in complete command of the aircraft and no one else.
Flight controllers will designate a standard instrument departure (SID)
or the pilot will comply with any other departure instructions. He will be
given a flight level on his heading that will allow for safe separation and
will receive approach and landing instructions at his destination, and that’s
it. Decisions of safety are the pilot’s alone.
Under stress of weather the pilot may ask for a different flight level,
if it is refused and the pilot believes his aircraft is at risk, he has every
right to tell the controller he is taking whatever heading and flight level he
believes is safe, it’s then up to the controller to sort out the relevant
separations.
Over a period of forty years contending with the severest of storms and
with 7,300 hours' flight-time in just about everything that flies, except for a
hot air balloon, I have learnt to trust instruments rather than trust
myself.
The two most important instruments to have serviceable in a convective
storm system are the airspeed indicator and the attitude indicator, you can
afford to lose just about every other instrument and still remain alive.
Okay, the attitude indicator (most IFR rated aircraft will have two) is
a simple gyro and rarely malfunctions, it tells you the attitude of the
aircraft.
But the airspeed indicator, of which there will also be two, both rely
on Pitot tubes which measure dynamic ram airflow pressure and are housed
outside the aircraft and are subject to everything from icing to ant nest and
spider infestation.
Some catastrophic accidents have
occurred when Pitot tube protective covers have been left on.
The Pitot tube will give the pilot an “indicated” airspeed relative to
the conditions and not a speed over the ground as is the case with a GPS. For
instance, if you are flying into an 80kn headwind, your GPS SOG will show you
are going 80kn slower than your airspeed indicator.
The fly-by-wire Airbus A320-200 is designed to rely on a computer
corrected, four-axis auto pilot that will anticipate and correct aircraft
movements faster and smoother that any human can.
A serious problem arises when Pitot tubes feed the computers an
incorrect air speed. All hell breaks loose because computers are not rational
and can only respond to what they are told. The pilot can turn the autopilot
off and switch to manual control but he will be no better off. No other
instrument will make sense to him.
If the pilot of QZ8501 decided to climb to a higher altitude to avoid a
storm (and it is reported he did) he would lose speed and airflow over the
control surfaces. If the Pitot tubes, due to icing or for any other reason,
were already falsely indicating a low indicated airspeed, the pilot would be
told in no uncertain terms over a loud speaker that his airplane was about to
stall.
It was reported the airplane was
climbing at 190kn, well and truly below stall speed for this aircraft.
Now every pilot is trained to react to a stall warning by automatically
lowering the nose to increase speed, let’s say the pilot does so. The aircraft
is now close to VNE (never exceed speed of around 0.85 mach at 35,000 ft) yet
the computers and the pilot are still being told it is close to stall speed and
they’d better correct it.
So now the pilot has a nose down attitude and is increasing speed past
VNE. Add extreme turbulence and the next severe up-draught to that equation and
the wings and vertical stabiliser get ripped straight off.
The pilot now realises he and everyone else on board are about to die
while the computers are still happily responding to exactly what they have been
told.
No doubt pilot error will again be the finding. He had asked if he
could climb to a higher altitude due to stress of weather, he did not advise
the air traffic controller that he was going to climb, in which case it would
have been the controller’s separation problem. He instead waited some minutes
for a clearance to flight level 38.
Okay, the tops of these monsoonal storms can reach up to 60,000 feet, a
height at which this airplane cannot be flown, the air’s thinness means margins
for safe flight are too narrow, and he has no way to know the height of the
convectional storm anyway.
Now some pilots will disagree, but I’ve been tossed around and thrown
upside down like a rag doll in too many monsoonal storms and my rules are now
simple; go left, go right or go back.
Never try to go to under or you’ll likely finish up in someone’s lounge
room and never try to go over because you may never reach the top and by then
the black/green mass will have closed in below and behind you.
Airline operators want their pilots to merely monitor computers but
when it becomes necessary to switch the autopilot off in an emergency it’s a
terrifying experience, suddenly you feel the unusual pressures on the control surfaces
and if a Pitot tube full of ice crystals is giving you incorrect readings it’s
goodnight Irene.
If you’re about to die from a great height you really need a pilot and
not a computer managing your rapid descent... at least a pilot can turn to you
with a grimace and say, “Shit, sorry mate”.
Pickering
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