Abe’s politics towards these issues appears to be influenced by Japan’s
diplomacy during Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) governance from 2009–12. A
major policy of Abe’s predecessor Yukio Hatoyama, in power from 2009–10, was to
embrace Japan’s neighbouring countries to build a stronger East Asian
community. But the policy failed. It seemed that neither China nor South Korea
was ready to be embraced by Japan. Instead, both countries used the opportunity
to assert stronger claims on disputed territories. Abe’s current stance, in
line with his overall political agenda of making Japan strong again, is a
response to these events.
Abe often seems to have a dual personality: one pragmatic and the other
nationalistic. On visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
in December 2013, he emphasised that it was not his intention to hurt the feelings of
Chinese and South Korean people. While reconfirming the Kono Statement in a speech in May 2013, he broke with
tradition by not mentioning those killed by Japanese soldiers during World War
II in another speech in August that year. In 2014, on the 69th anniversary of
Japan’s defeat, Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, sending only a ritual
offering. He also refrained from going to the shrine for the autumn festival.
This flip-flopping behaviour has been interpreted as an attempt to calm
critics prior to the bilateral meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping at
APEC. Yet even Abe’s ostensibly pragmatic rhetoric and offerings to Yasukuni in
lieu of personal visits still left a bitter taste and drew harsh responses from
China and South Korea.
The South Korean government, for its part, seeks to capitalise on public
anti-Japanese sentiment, especially toward politicians. Surveys have shown that
Japan and Abe are perceived
almost equally as bad as North Korea and Kim Jong-un.
The latest expression of this strategy could be seen when Kato Tatsuya, the
Seoul bureau chief of the right-wing Sankei Shimbun, was
charged for supposedly libelling South Korean president Park Geun-hye. Tatsuya
had speculated about why it took Park seven hours to show up at the Central
Disaster Management Headquarters on the day of the tragic Sewol ferry disaster.
The president’s daily log, which was later released to public, only stated her
absence but said nothing about what she had been doing. Moreover, the recent actions
by the South Korean government have created a climate in which South Korean journalists can hardly write
anything positive about Japan.
The aggressive rhetoric being pushed by Japan’s right-leaning media further
compounds the Japan-ROK tensions. Japan’s biggest daily newspaper, the
conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, has engaged in a campaign criticising the more
liberal Asahi Shimbun for their coverage of the ‘comfort women’ issue.
Their loud criticism targeted several Asahi reports that were based on
the subsequently false testimony of Seiji Yoshida, a novelist and soldier in
the Imperial Japanese Army.
While the Yomiuri Shimbun is right in discrediting these
particular reports of women being forcibly taken, this does not fundamentally
change the core of the issue. But the mistakes made by the Asahi Shimbun
have been used as an opportunity to do exactly that.
After the UN rejected efforts by the Japanese government to revise a 1996
report which determined that so-called ‘comfort women’ had served as sex
slaves, the Yomiuri Shimbun recently published three booklets on the issue. The
arguments contained within them are quite disturbing. It is alleged that Korean
men also sexually attacked Japanese women during the war, a line of thought
also advanced by the extremely nationalistic Japan Institute for National
Fundamentals. It is concerning that not only is this obscure think-tank
prominently advertised by the Yomiuri Shimbun but also that a number
of professors and journalists support and contribute to it.
It is time that Japan’s liberal internationalists raise their voices to
drown the loud noises of the growing revisionist camp. China and South Korea
should actively support such efforts instead of continuously criticising, but
this would mean the end of capitalising on anti-Japanese public sentiment. For
Japan, there would be nothing worse in its quest to revitalise its economy than
being isolated any time in the near future.
Benedikt Buechel is a
graduate student at the Seoul National University.
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