The recent passage of the new law on regional elections has been denounced as a step back for Indonesia’s democracy. Amid the public uproar on the social media, the parliamentary showdown was in effect a battle between competing factions of the oligarchy and the political elite.
In the Republic, Plato defines oligarchy as a system where “only the rich hold office and the poor have no share in government.” While this may be apt to describe the workings of our government, the classical picture is far too simplistic to denote the true nature of non-democratic forces at work in Indonesia.
Political scientist Jeffrey Winters identified the original Indonesian oligarchs as super-rich individuals who influenced government policies during the Suharto regime. These people were largely unseen by the public, while their front men were political grandees and top echelon officials who made up the political elite.
After the fall of Suharto, the once clear-cut distinction between the two groups began to blur. While most of the oligarchs, many of whom are Chinese-Indonesian tycoons, still prefer working behind the scene, a few have decided to cross the line and become political grandees themselves, such as Aburizal Bakrie, Surya Paloh, Hary Tanoesoedibjo and Hashim Djojohadikusumo.
Concurrently, there are also those in the political elite who are no longer content with being financially beholden to the oligarchs. Using their political clout, many political grandees and their families have catapulted themselves into the realm of corporate affairs. Recent Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) investigations have uncovered corrupt business activities by children of ministers and members of political dynasties. Evidently, many of Indonesia’s political potentates would not spurn oligarchic heights.
So, in the first group, we now have the inconspicuous oligarchs who pull strings inside elegant boardrooms and shy away from publicity. Many of these, Jeffrey Winters suggested, currently support the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and its allies in parliament. This group was victorious in the presidential election and successfully delivered their nominee Joko Widodo to the presidency.
In the second group, we have the Red-and-White Coalition which supported Prabowo Subianto’s presidential candidacy. This group has the support of some of the old oligarchs such as Aburizal, Hashim, who is Prabowo’s brother, and Hary. However, the group, in greater parts, represents the interests of those political grandees whose fortunes were either decimated in both the legislative and presidential elections, or suffering from political misfortunes.
Both Prabowo and Hashim must have spent a hefty sum on the elections, only to lose out to Joko. Aburizal suffered from public humiliation when he was “ping-ponged” while trying to secure political alliances in the lead-up to the election.
Further, the political hopes of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s family were dashed when votes for their Democratic Party in the legislative election plummeted. Other political grandees such as Suryadharma Ali of the United Development Party (PPP); Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS); and Jero Wacik of the Democrats were named graft suspects by the KPK.
In so many ways, the political battles seen in the passages of both the law on legislative bodies and the law on regional elections were the clashes between the two major groups in our current political sphere. As it happened, both battles were won by the second group, whose recent electoral setbacks seem to have stoked their political furnace.
Commenting on his defeat in the presidential election, Prabowo told reporters he had lost because his opponents had more funds than he did. Suffice it to say, he did not refer to his own personal fortunes, estimated to be in the trillions of rupiahs, as opposed to Joko’s mere billions. He was speaking in the context of oligarchic high politics.
Judged against this background, the desire of the second group to restore the old method of electing regional chiefs by their respective regional parliaments is understandable. By keeping the process in the parliamentary chamber, the political elite and their oligarchic backers are more likely to be in their element compared with the electoral alternative.
Direct elections, which have many variables, tend to be unpredictable in their outcome. Moreover, direct elections in Indonesia inevitably involve vote-buying. Most members of the political elite, even those with corporate empires, cannot hope to match the financial might of the old oligarchs who control a vast portion of the nation’s economy.
Oligarchic politics will still dominate the governance of Indonesia for many years to come. There is no easy cure for this ailment in our democracy. The most effective ways to combat its excesses are through rejection of vote-buying by the electorate, the cultivation of civic culture, and greater political awareness. In the end, the quality of any democracy is simply a reflection of the prevalent values within its populace.
Johannes Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya.
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