Closer Cooperation With Australia Would Be Wise Move for Indonesia

The intelligence Code of Conduct agreement between Indonesia and Australia was finally signed last week. It was a welcome improvement to the bilateral relations between the two neighbors, which deteriorated last year owing to a number of diplomatic incidents.

There has been, regrettably, a general disposition in almost all successive Indonesian governments to overlook Australia as a partner crucial to Indonesia’s regional interests. The Suharto government certainly made no conspicuous effort to enhance relations between the two, in complete asymmetry to what his counterpart Paul Keating tried to do in the 1990s.

The rationale behind this tepid approach had a number of causes, chief of which was the not entirely accurate notion that Australia needed Indonesia more than the other way around. During the Suharto years, Indonesia was indeed a giant within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and seemed comfortable with its role and prestige.

It was also early days for Keating’s pronouncement that Australia was more part of Asia than the West. Indeed, Australia has been viewed by Jakarta more as a junior partner within the unofficial alliance of English-speaking countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.

In many ways, it was difficult for Indonesian officials to formulate the right policy because of what they saw as ambiguity in Australia’s in-between status.

Indonesia also believed then that it was just as important, if not more important, to the US than Australia was. As a partner in the English-speaking bloc, it was taken for granted that Ausralia would side with Washington whereas Indonesian support would always depend on what the US could offer.

However, hubris aside, those circumstances of the past bear little resemblance to the present. Indonesia no longer has the same standing as it did in Southeast Asia.

The lack of a coherent foreign policy since the fall of Suharto, coupled with squabbles with our neighbours over border disputes and migrant workers issues, means that Indonesia’s both soft and hard power have undergone considerable decline within Asean.

Indonesia’s decreasing projection of regional power is also in complete symmetry with China’s burgeoning influence throughout Asia. China has also overlooked and in some cases bypassed Asean, preferring to deal with individual countries on a bilateral level rather than face the region en bloc.

China’s increasing power and confidence have also exacerbated its long-standing territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the Philippines, Vietnam and possibly Indonesia over the Natuna Seas. However, even after the Chinese navy’s showdown with Vietnam over the former’s installation of oil rigs in the South China Sea, Asean as a whole has failed to come up with unified resistance against Chinese territorial encroachment of its member states.

It would seem that individual Asean states, with perhaps the exceptions of Vietnam and the Philippines, are reluctant to mobilize against China for fear of jeopardizing their own bilateral relations with Beijing. Malaysia, for example, is China’s largest trading partner in Asean. China is also Singapore’s second-biggest trade partner. The same applies for Thailand. So in the end economic priorities may turn out to be a great stumbling block for Asean unity against China.

Thus it is essential that Indonesia broaden its network of regional allies to prevent China’s hegemony in Southeast Asia. And for this purpose, Australia is an ideal candidate and would definitely welcome Indonesian overtures.

In terms of defense, both Indonesia and Australia are middle powers. Indonesia’s ground forces are larger in number. However, the Australian Armed Forces have had more combat experience than their Indonesian counterpart. Australia’s military budget is also significantly greater than Indonesia’s. The similitude in military potency between the two countries can only be mutually beneficial as it would ensure more or less equal partnership. It would also guard against Indonesia being relegated as a junior partner, which would be the case if we were to become partners with a country of far superior military force.

Further, in light of the existing US military commitments overseas and how unpopular they are at home, Washington may well have to rely on Canberra more to represent its interests in the region.

Economically, cooperation and trade between the two nations are far from optimal. According to figures released by the Australian government, Australia ranks 10th as export destination for Indonesia. However, our export to our southern neigbor is only 2.4 percent of our total exports. In turn, our import figures from Australia stand at 2.7 percent, making Australia our 9th-biggest supplier.

As the future Joko Widodo administration promised an overhaul of our dying agricultural sector, Australia, as a major agricultural exporter, could be a valuable partner. Transfer of technology and direct investments in the sector are all possibilities that should be pursued.

Indonesia’s relationship with Australia has not exactly been smooth sailing for the past few decades. It could and should definitely be better than it is now. The next Indonesian foreign minister would indeed be remiss to continue ignoring Australia as a potential friend.

Johannes Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya.