On
1 July 2014, Japan’s Abe government announced a major change to the country’s
post-war security policy by effectively lifting the ban on collective
self-defence. The Abe government introduced new legislation that reinterpreted
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, thereby permitting Japan to use
military force to come to the aid of an ally or a country in a close
relationship with Japan when it is under armed attack.
China’s
response to Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution has been predictably
negative. The official Xinhua news agency described the changes as a ‘brutal violation’ of the
spirit of Japan’s pacifist constitution, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry in
more muted tones suggested that constitutional reinterpretation raised doubts about Japan’s
commitment to peaceful development.
In the weeks
since the Abe government’s announcement, two themes have become particularly
notable in Chinese official and academic commentary.
The first is
staunch criticism of the way in which the Abe government circumvented Japanese
public opposition to lift the ban on collective self-defence.
Instead of making these changes by formally revising the constitution — which
would require support from two-thirds of each house of the Japanese parliament
and 50 per cent of the Japanese public — the Abe government instead opted for
the simpler path of constitutional reinterpretation via a cabinet decision.
This required the unanimous support of only the 19 members of the cabinet, and
amendments to relevant laws to implement to reinterpretation will require
support from 50 per cent of each house of parliament.
Chinese
officials and academics alike have roundly censured the Abe government for
ignoring the considerable portion of the Japanese public that opposes these changes
to national security policy. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei noted the strong public opposition
within Japan to lifting the ban on collective self-defence, while Wang Ping
from the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences argued that Abe was acting in defiance of the
long-held norm of ‘pacifism’ in Japan. Indeed, one of China’s leading
Japan-watchers, Lian Degui of the Shanghai Institutes for International
Studies, has predicted that Abe’s
willingness to ignore Japanese public opinion on this issue will lead to the
downfall of his government.
Highlighting
Japanese public opposition to major security reforms is a strategy that Chinese
officials have adopted frequently over the past sixty years. In the 1950s and
1960s, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials regularly described the intricacies
of Japanese Diet debates or public protests about the US-Japan alliance on the pages
of the People’s Daily in order to reach out to the Japanese public and
build opposition to changes in Japan’s security policy.
Yet, as in
the 1950s and 1960s, this strategy is unlikely to have much success.
While
Japanese public opinion remains divided on the issue of collective
self-defence, China’s ability to exploit these divisions is limited. China’s
own non-representative government weakens China’s credibility in criticising
the Abe government for ignoring public opinion. Similarly, China’s behaviour in
the East China Sea in recent years means that the Japanese public will most
likely view China as a self-serving actor on this issue.
The second
theme to have dominated Chinese responses to Japan’s constitutional
reinterpretation is condemnation of the Abe government for undermining the post-World War II
international order. The ‘post-war international order’ championed by China’s
leaders and People’s Daily editorials is one in which Japan occupies a
very particular role as an ‘abnormal’ non-military power. Japan’s ‘pacifist’
constitution is a major symbol of this post-war international order, requiring
as it did that Japan renounce ‘the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes’ and prohibiting Japan from developing military forces.
Though it
has been steadily reinterpreted by the Japanese government over the past sixty
years — for instance allowing Japan to develop its Self-Defense Forces and to
participate in international peacekeeping operations — Japan’s ‘pacifist’
constitution has broadly kept Japan constrained as an ‘abnormal’ power not
permitted to use force abroad. The Abe government’s constitutional
reinterpretation has therefore been condemned by Chinese leaders because it
allows Japan to further break free from this particular post-war status and,
more importantly, to take military steps that could be seen to counter China’s
rise.
The July
reinterpretation is highly significant for regional security because it will
force China to confront the possibility of dealing with a more ‘normal’ and
powerful Japan in East Asia. We have yet to see much creative thinking
in China about how to deal with such a Japan. Still, the Abe government may
have forced China to start.
Amy King is
a Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University.
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