There
are recent signs that Russia and China are growing closer.
Last year,
Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Moscow as the destination for his first
overseas trip after he took office. At the summit between Xi and Russian
President Vladimir Putin, they pledged to build an “all-round strategic
partnership.”
After U.S.
President Barack Obama's "rebalancing" visit to Asian alliances in
April, Putin was welcomed by China in May with the signing of the largest ever
natural gas deal. Xi and Putin vowed to enhance bilateral ties and support each
other to ensure national security and other interests. Putin told Chinese media,
“Establishing closer ties with China is Russia’s unconditional foreign policy
priority.”
At the
fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures
in Asia (CICA), held in Shanghai in May, Putin was present and supported Xi’s
proposal of “a new Asian structure for security cooperation.” As a security
summit from which Japan and the United States are excluded, the CICA provides a
forum for China and Russia to express different voices on regional security
affairs.
Furthermore,
the two also deepened military ties by conducting a joint naval drill in the
East China Sea in May. Given China's tensions with Japan in the region, the
joint action demonstrates that Putin is helping China to deter Japan. In
comparison, right before that, Obama warned China by clearly saying that the
Senkaku Islands fell within the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
So what
pushed Russia and China to become so close recently? In a word, the two now
face very similar diplomatic predicaments and geostrategic challenges.
Russia has
been hit by sanctions by the United States and the European Union for its
military activities in Crimea. Undoubtedly the aim of the sanctions, including
reduction of energy imports from Russia, would have great impact on the Russian
economy. Russia has long been plagued by NATO's gradual expansion to Eastern
Europe, Russia's traditional sphere of influence. Ukraine therefore becomes the
flashpoint. The U.S. and European efforts to isolate Russia economically and
geopolitically would naturally drive it to turn to China for a closer
"strategic relationship."
China is
having a pretty difficult time in the East China Sea and South China Sea as the
maritime territorial disputes continue to intensify. The U.S. rebalancing and
pivot to the Asia-Pacific has further amplified China’s sense of insecurity.
The U.S. backup to Japan and increasing military deployment in the Philippines
are perceived by China as containment to its rise in the region, in particular
its outward maritime strategy.
During the Cold
War era in the 1950s, China and
the Soviet Union used to be allies, based on the same communist ideology.
Currently China and Russia also have similar authoritarian regimes, different
from Western democracies.
However,
this time they are aligning along the line of geopolitics much more than
ideology. Russia and China see similar security challenges from U.S.-led
alliances, be it on the Eurasian continent or in the East and South China Seas.
The broad
structural background for the re-alignment might be that the Pax Americana
(peace under American preponderance) is approaching its ending. The
multi-polarization in world politics is accelerating, and America is not the
sole overwhelming superpower anymore. As two emerging powers, China and Russia
are intentionally or unintentionally challenging the existing world order and
requesting more rights to construct a new international order.
Surprisingly,
recent world politics have gained some “Cold War” dynamics. On the one hand,
Russia and China are growing closer.
On the other
hand, the United States is also convening its allies in Europe and Asia. At the
recent G-7 summit, for the first time, Russia was excluded. Russia and China
became the major concerns of the meeting, and both were condemned for their
recent foreign policy behaviors. However, this would even stimulate Russia and
China to go hand in hand to counter the pressures from the U.S.-led bloc.
Some have
even argued that Russia and China might develop a formal alliance. However, the
possibility would be quite low as the two also have a lot of divergent
interests and geostrategic competition. A bipolar world order in the Cold War
era is not attractive any more for great powers given the booming regionalism
and deepening economic interdependence.
COLD WAR MENTALITY
Nevertheless,
it seems that since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical contours for
great powers haven’t changed much. The Cold War did end in 1991, but its legacy
remains resilient. The “cold war mentality” is still lingering.
Great powers
have the path dependency to ally with old partners when the power transition
causes structural reorganization. A trust deficit between the emerging powers
and existing powers also leads to the revival of old alliances. This is true
for both the Russia-China realignment and the strengthening of U.S.-led
alliances.
Unfortunately,
the recent development of the Russia-China strategic partnership reveals that
great powers haven’t escaped from the trap of playing “power balance games” in
world politics. China has championed the “new model of great power
relationship” for its relations with existing powers, particularly the United States.
However, the
perceptional gap and strategic distrust still loom large. To achieve improved
great power relationships in the gradually multi-polarized world, major powers
might need a revolutionary mind change and strenuous confidence building.
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