Over the past four years, Taiwan–China
relations have improved substantially.
The February 2012 re-election of Taiwan’s Kuomintang candidate,
President Ma Ying-Jeou, offered an opportunity for Taipei and Beijing to move
on from past trauma to pursue reconciliation. The potential may now exist to
consolidate and build on recent successes, such as the June 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement and the opening of Taiwan to independent tourists from the
mainland through the Free Independent Traveller Program.
Yet, the confirmation of China’s new
leadership team at the 18th National Party Congress
on 15 November had many Taiwan observers searching for indicators as to how the next stage of cross-Strait
relations may be shaped. There is no question that for China,
(re)unification with Taiwan is the desired outcome. However, the critical
questions still remain: will the status quo continue, or can the new leadership
team provide the necessary momentum to achieve (re)unification? While some
expect that the new leadership might use the Taiwan issue to demonstrate
resolve, the myriad of domestic issues facing Beijing is more likely to see the
cross-Strait status quo continue.
Some commentators believe
that the new members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) are less reform
minded and more conservative than the former elites. This might lead to a more
assertive stance on Taiwan. The PSC is now dominated by ‘princelings’, with Xi
Jinping as General Secretary of the CCP and President of China, and Li Keqiang
as Premier of the State Council. Despite an emerging myriad of factions,
in particular the ‘princelings’ and the Communist Youth League, China remains a
single-party system. Therefore the credentials of the leader of the CCP are
critical, not just in providing unity to the party, but also in the formation
and implementation of its policies, cross-Strait issues included.
Significantly, one of the few surprises of the Congress was that Xi Jinping was
also confirmed as head of the Central Military Commission. Outgoing President
Hu Jintao opted to not retain the position for an additional two years after
stepping down from his leadership posts.
This indicates that Xi will be faced
with political pressure to avoid following in the footsteps of Hu’s arguably
ineffective regime. In a February speech to the US–China Business
Council, Xi called on Washington to recognise Beijing’s one-state policy and
oppose moves toward Taiwanese independence. Having operated in locations where
the majority of Taiwanese business people are based ¾ Fujian for 17 years,
Zhejiang for 5 years and Shanghai for 6 months. Xi’s credentials in Taiwan
affairs are considered stronger than former leaders, in particular Hu.
Consequently, putting (re)unification at the top of the agenda may serve as a
way for the new leadership team to display strength and commitment to its
policies of territorial sovereignty and integrity ¾ not just over Taiwan but
also Xinjiang, Tibet, and islets in the East and South China Seas.
But, there are reasons to believe
that even under the new leadership, China’s Taiwan policy will be more of the
same. Xi faces a challenging agenda, including domestic problems, relations
with Washington and a complex set of territorial disputes with China’s neighbours.
At the Party Congress, a particular emphasis was placed on
resolving corruption scandals, such as the Bo Xilai case and the investigation
into Wen Jiabao’s fortune. Such issues have undermined public confidence in
China’s leaders and cast greater scrutiny on the prevalence of nepotism and
patronage at the top ranks of the party. The widespread public impression that
Chinese leaders are getting richer at the cost of ordinary citizens, combined
with the increasing class divide, suggests that Xi will be preoccupied with a
public mood of frustration and pessimism regarding party officials.
Additionally, Xi will have to deal
with the future of a more critical relationship ¾ that with the US ¾ as well as
territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, not to mention burgeoning
ethnic tensions in Xinjiang and Tibet. Significantly, he will not face domestic
political changes in the two other key players in cross-Strait relations:
Taiwan and the United States have already determined their presidential leaders
for the next four years, and both Ma and Barack Obama have reconfirmed their
desire to maintain the cross-Strait status quo.
For Beijing, the cross-Strait issue is stable, with calls for Taiwan’s
independence no longer on the cards. As such, (re)unification no longer has to
be a top priority for the regime.
While this is a positive sign for
the short- to medium-term stability of cross-Strait relations, in the long term
it will be harder to negotiate terms of (re)unification that will appease both
sides. That is, the longer the status quo is prolonged, the more stimulus will
be given to the evolution of Taiwan’s national identity and liberal democracy.
This will be in opposition to a Chinese leadership with no incentive to
increase civil liberties, but is facing mounting pressure from political
factions and the public to achieve its long-stated objective of
(re)unification.
Sheryn Lee is a PhD Student in Political Science
at the School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania.East Asia Forum
KBC Rob C is firmly convinced Taiwan wants and soon will get SAR status ans reunite with PRC as a state, in the One Country 2 systems law rather like a SepZones here in SRV.
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