FLATTERY can be nice, especially for
an ancient civilisation still getting over what it perceives as a century of
humiliation by Western barbarians, but China is starting to show alarm at the
new power and prestige being attributed to it.
In recent weeks Beijing has started
to hose down the idea that it is challenging the US in strategic power, an idea
strongly pushed in the new book The China Choice by the former
Australian defence official Hugh White.
Its top officials are also extremely
nervous that Chinese nationalist hotheads could escalate disputes with Japan
and other neighbours over outlying islands, after protests turned into rioting
in Chinese cities last weekend.
In recent weeks, a ''top secret''
document on Chinese nuclear strategy appears to have been widely leaked to
American and other analysts, reaffirming that China is sticking to a minimal
number of nuclear weapons sufficient to guarantee a ''second strike
capability'' and that it still abides by a ''no first use'' policy.
While visiting the University of
Sydney this week, China's former ambassador to Canberra and Washington Zhou
Wenzhong stressed that China felt it was prospering from free trade in Asia,
that it saw an ''interdependence'' with the US and other powers, and still
adhered to the late leader Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on economic development.
White's book is what the French
might call a jeu d'esprit, a mind-game, putting the proposition that the US
shortly faces a stark choice: join a never-ending and fruitless arms race with
China in the western Pacific; allow the Chinese to steadily eclipse its power;
or come to a grand bargain to share power.
The author advocates the third
course, suggesting the US, China, Japan and India agree on a peaceful regime
for Asia, on the lines of the Concert of Europe between the great powers of the
19th century after the defeat of Napoleon.
There are many problems with White's
thesis. He sees an important moment when the Chinese economy grows bigger than
that of the US in absolute terms, which it is bound to do sooner (he thinks) or
later, even if the difference in gross domestic product growth rates narrows
and the faster-breeding Americans catch up a fair bit in population size.
Wealth is power, he insists. But it
will be a long time before the Chinese are as wealthy as Americans. Some
demographers say they will get old first. And the American knowledge advantage
may persist long after China's GDP becomes the world's biggest.
Another problem is White's assertion
that the US has already lost ''sea control'' in the waters close to China,
thanks to new missiles and submarines that make it too risky for US aircraft
carriers to sail there. He suggests the US could not now defend Taiwan.
But tactics and defences have
evolved as missile capabilities grow. And China's reported program to develop a
''carrier-buster'' ballistic missile is still an unproven concept.
Nor is the Concert of Europe all
that encouraging. It was reached between European states with similar political
systems and values. Yet there was still war: in the Crimea in 1854, between
France and Prussia in 1870-71, the ''Great Game'' between Britain and Russia in
central Asia and in the scramble for Africa. And it all led to World War I.
Even so, if White's jeu d'esprit led
to greater dialogue and co-operation with China it would be valuable. But
instead it has probably added to a sense of panic about its rise, and
strengthened resolve to stand up to the Chinese.
His suggestion that Canberra should
try to persuade its big US ally to cut a deal with China and save us a lot of
conflict is not gaining much traction.
The two sides of Australian politics
are vying to show who is more devoted to the US in strategic power, so much so
that many foreign policy figures are uncomfortable. They feel Australia should
be showing more independence in the ''Asian century''. They were dismayed that
the new American ''pivot'' into Asia was announced in the Australian
Parliament, and feel that the new US military presence in Australia, notably
the marine deployment to Darwin, has been presented in a misleading way to the
public.
A new report on the US force posture
in the Asia-Pacific by Washington's Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, commissioned by the Pentagon, certainly portrays it as more than
regular training.
The study describes it as the
''rotational presence'' of a 2500-strong Marine Air-Ground Task Force,
augmented with ships and aircraft, that is part of a plan to redistribute the
four such marine task forces in the western Pacific away from the present
concentration in Okinawa, where they are vulnerable to Chinese weapons. The
four task forces - in Okinawa, Hawaii, Guam and Australia - could be quickly
brought together in case of military crisis.
China doesn't help itself by its lack
of transparency, and the uncertain status of what it does put out. Is the
leaked document about nuclear forces a genuine message or disinformation to
encourage the US and Russia to cut back their arsenals? Are articles suggesting
China abandon ''no first use'' in case of massive US conventional attack just a
jeu d'esprit by reckless young army officers keen to get noticed, or part of a
more considered shift?
It is unfortunate that our leaders
no longer dare to be seen as close to China. We might be more confident about
the answers to such questions, and less inclined to jump at bogymen.
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