FOR political science professor Alex Magno, the recent Beijing mission of Vice President Jejomar Binay to plead for the lives of three Filipinos on death row for drug tra-fficking made the Philippines look like a vassal state of China. Maybe the seemingly subservient gesture was called for by a life-and-death matter. But doing it a second time over an issue where we are in fact the aggrieved party seems doubly unwarranted.
That may be what the administration of President Benigno Aquino 3rd is poised to do in its protest over a recent incident in the South China Sea, where there are conflicting claims by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, particularly over the Spratly islands and their surrounding waters.
According to the Philippine military, two Chinese patrol boats intimidated a seismic survey team operating in waters that we deem to be within our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The boats told the exploration unit to leave and sailed close to their facility, seemingly to ram it, before turning away. The Chinese left when two Philippine Air Force planes flew to the area.
The Aquino government filed a protest with the Chinese Embassy, which predictably reiterated Beijing’s claim over the most of the South China Sea and all the islands in it. But, PNoy told reporters last week, the government would also send a Spratlys expert to Beijing to seek an explanation.
So picture this: the Philippines, represented by the expert, will to go China to discuss an incident in an area we consider part of our EEZ. Somehow, would India, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Vietnam, or any other country that has had territorial brushes with China do the same thing if their claimed lands or waters were encroached upon?
President Aquino said the Philippines wanted to “de-escalate” the issue rather than ratcheting up the rhetoric and confrontation. That seems a very different tack from his open criticism of allies last November over security advisories which were not only the right but also the duty of those governments to issue to their citizens.
Maybe the Aquino Administration wanted to avoid more tensions Beijing on top of the August hostage drama in which eight Hong Kong tourists died, PNoy’s refusal to even reprimand officials deemed responsible in the incident, and last month’s scheduled execution of the three Filipino convicts, which was deferred after the Binay visit.
However, developments in the conflicting South China Sea claims may point to a direction that is anything but de-escalation. Last month’s patrol incident can be traced to Beijing’s decision in early 2009 to send vessels of its Maritime Safety Bureau’s provincial units to the South China Sea.
The first to sail was a converted naval patrol vessel, the Beijing News reported at the time. The Chinese Embassy spokesman in Manila, Hua Ye, also cited a “fishery patrol ship, not a warship.” He insisted then: “I don’t think the Chinese side has done anything or violated the Declaration of the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea”, referring to the non-binding agreement in 2002 among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China. In the pact, the signatories “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability,” though it does not specify what such activities might be.
Numbering six in later Chinese news reports, the vessels were deployed supposedly to assist fishing and transport ships. Done by a civilian agency, it could be argued that the deployment does not constitute military action, which might go against the Declaration. The use of provincial boats would also allow the central government in Beijing to deny direct responsibility for their deployment.
The patrols, in turn, might have been in response to the 2009 enactment of the Philippine Archi-pelagic Baseline Law, which defines national borders, including islands claimed by the country. Republic Act 9522 complied with the United Nation’s May 2009 deadline for filing information on the archipelago, which provides the basis for our claim on the country’s extended continental shelf (ECS). The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for rights to mineral resources in the ECS, which extends beyond the EEZ’s limit of 200 nautical miles or 370 km from the country’s baseline.
In the months before its passage, Beijing warned against the Baselines Bill, particularly portions claiming parts of the Spratlys. “The People’s Republic of China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters,” said a Foreign Ministry statement in February 2009. Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya summoned the Philippine Embassy’s charge d’affaires to lodge a ‘stern protest.’ (And, no, there was no expert sent to Manila to discuss the matter.)
For its part, the Vietnam government sought to downplay the Philippine baselines legislation, calling on members of the ruling communist party to avoid “doing anything that might complicate the situation.” In fact, most countries including China have filed their respective baselines information with the U.N., including disputed claims.
China’s sea patrols also followed a near-collision in March 2009 between Chinese boats and a U.S. naval surveillance ship in China’s exclusive economic zone near Hainan, the mainland’s biggest island. The state-run China Daily newspaper quoted maritime law expert Zhou Zhonghai warning: “This year could be the starting point of many more disputes. Strategies with a firm stance to protect marine territories are of vital importance.”
Besides RA 9522, a more recent contentious issue for China is the Philippines’ current move to refurbish base facilities in the Kalayaan group, the first islands claimed by the country back in 1956. At the time, Thomas Cloma, a Filipino, declared ownership of 33 islands and reefs plus nearby fishing grounds, and named the area covering 65,000 nautical miles Kalayaan or Freedomland.
Armed Forces spokesman Gen. Jose Mabanta told media last September that there were “major plans to renovate,” including the airstrip and related facilities. Some reports cite such construction work as possibly violating the Declaration, but the informal pact explicitly mentions only “inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features” as an action to avoid. Last November, a visit by Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and AFP Chief Gen. Ricardo David were aborted due to bad weather and “poor landing strip conditions,” Mabanta explained.
The seismic survey team intimidated by the Chinese boats were under a drilling contract with Forum Energy, a London-based oil and gas company. The initial deal was for a limited geophysical survey exploration contract, which was covered by a three-year agreement among China, the Philippines, and Vietnam for joint scientific studies.
That pact ended in 2008, allowing the government to convert Forum
Energy’s contract into a full-service agreement all the way to oil and gas production.
The company maintains that its 8,800-square-kilometer exploration block covering the Sampaguita discovery in the Reed Bank basin is not part of the Spratlys, but situated 150 km to the east, close to Palawan than the disputed island chain. Instead, Forum Energy stated, the areas under Service Contract 72 is within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile EEZ, as defined by RA 9522.
However, Beijing’s claim on the basis of historical sovereignty extends to most of the South China Sea, including chunks of the EEZs of several countries, including the Philippines. It has been asserting this claim not only through statements and laws, but also through patrols and facilities, including the extensive structures it built in 1995 at Mischief Reef, part of the Philippines’ claimed are.
Now, China seems to be testing the Philippines’ resolve in defending our territory and assuring investors like Forum Energy that we can enforce our resources contracts. On Wednesday, we discuss how we can do so despite our minuscule military muscle.
By Ricardo Saludo heads the Center for Strategy, Enterprise and Intelligence (ric.saludo@censeisolutions.com). He was an Asiaweek editor in 1984-2001 before becoming Secretary of the Cabinet in 2002-08.
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