Old Song, A New Singer: Will Jokowi’s Reign Bring Liberation for West Papua?

Old Song, A New Singer: Will Jokowi’s Reign Bring Liberation for West Papua?   

With last week’s release by the Indonesian government of five West Papuan political prisoners and more foreign media shining a light on the deteriorating human rights situation in West Papua, Indonesia is under increasing pressure to open the region to the outside world.

The Indonesian constitution and international law supports the idea of exercising rights to peaceful protest without prosecution, but Indonesia’s arbitrary detention of peaceful political activists in West Papua contradicts this. Many West Papuans have been and continue to be jailed for so-called “crimes” and sentenced to three to 15 years — such as Filep Karma, who peacefully raised the outlawed Morning Star flag in 2004 and was convicted of treason for 15 years, and Forkorus Yaboisembut and Edison Waromi, who were among the five released last week, jailed in 2011 on convictions of “subversion“ for reading out a “declaration of independence” from Indonesia.

The crime of subversion, which accounts for so many West Papuans still incarcerated, is an old Dutch law reconstituted by Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, on May 1, 1963 — the day the United Nations gifted the territory and people of West Papua to Indonesia. Many West Papuans — and sometimes even their relatives — are arrested by Indonesian authorities for simply attending political demonstrations, being politically active or joining political organisations, or for engaging in civil resistance activities.

The searing indictment on Indonesia’s policies and military practices shows at least 71 political prisoners (on record) still behind bars. The ongoing exploitation of the Indonesian constitution de-legitimises and censors pro-independence groups and maintains offensive restrictions on West Papua’s freedom of assembly and expression.

Outgoing Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s two terms in office have proven Jakarta’s impeccably futile policy on West Papua. The stalemate continues, with West Papua’s statehood facing a political climate of inaction, denial and marginalisation, with unprecedented challenges of increased division of regencies, increased convictions for corruption to undermine the struggle for self-determination and inadequate action on a culture of impunity.

Well-placed Indonesians in Jakarta claim Yudhoyono believes West Papua should be free but doesn’t want to stand charged with violating his state’s long-standing policy of “territorial integrity”. Jacob Rumbiak, a West Papuan academic who spent years in jail with Waromi, said: “The Indonesian state demands absolute loyalty from its citizens, and its institutions have always been charged with defending its territorial integrity. In the service of those imperatives, anything the international community would consider illegal has always been quietly legalised.”

Although Rumbiak believes Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s President-elect, will be as bound by centralism and territorial integrity as previous presidents, most civil society groups in West Papua welcome Jokowi’s win and his ambitious campaign declaration to allow foreign journalists into the region. The big challenge awaiting Jokowi is tackling the underlying grievances of West Papua’s political status and international pressure on human rights abuses. Until these are addressed, the common saying in West Papua remains: “An old song sung by a new singer”.

Rumbiak was speaking from the Federal Republic of West Papua office in Melbourne Docklands, opened last month by Yarra councillor Amanda Stone. “West Papuans have always rejected the New York Agreement that rendered us Indonesian. It was drawn up by foreigners — principally the US, Netherlands, Indonesia, and Australia … and set up the genocidal conditions for Melanesian West Papuans that are now, finally, being reported on,” he said.

Rumbiak added, “The state we raised in 2011 is what West Papuans have determined they want. It stands on UN principles, not the machinations of a few unprincipled foreign governments. That’s why so many Australians are paying the rent on our office in Docklands — they believe in us, and the future of West Papua.”

Peter Woods, a supporter of West Papua who regularly visits the country, insists Australia’s national interest — and relationship with Indonesia — would be better served if Australian politicians address rather than ignore the Federal Republic of West Papua. “East Timor is a good example. Indonesia’s illegal occupation was eventually overthrown by the East Timorese people and the good citizens of the world, but accommodated by successive Australian governments. We shouldn’t allow ourselves to be isolated in the region again. Australia should use its position in the UN Security Council to undo the travesty wrought upon West Papuans 52 years ago.” Crikey.com (Australia)
by Ron Kareni

Australia ‘Gags’ a Massive Banknote Scandal (incl: Indonesia)

Australia ‘Gags’ a Massive Banknote Scandal (incl: Indonesia)

Suppression order involves 17 prime ministers, presidents and others in three Southeast Asian countries


The Australian government has issued an unprecedented blanket gag order prohibiting anyone in Australia from reporting the names of the current or past leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia or Vietnam “or their relatives and other senior officials” in connection with a multimillion dollar bribery case involving contracts for bank notes in each of the countries.

It isn’t known how the Southeast Asian leaders, totaling 17, are connected to the bribery case, which has been called the biggest scandal in Australian history. But they include three Malaysian prime ministers – Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and current Premier Najib Tun Razak – as well as former Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin and former international trade and commerce minister Rafidah Aziz. It also includes Abdullah Badawi’s sister-in-law, Puan Noni.

The gag order also includes two Indonesian presidents, Megawati Sukarnoputri and current leader Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the current Vietnam President, Truong Tan San as well as lesser officials.

In June, seven senior executives of the Reserve Bank of Australia, the country’s central bank, were secretly indicted on allegations that partly owned subsidiaries, Securency and Note Printing Australia, had paid bribes to government officials of the three countries and others to obtain contracts to supply polymer banknotes. The scandal has been percolating in all of the countries behind the scenes for months if not years.

“This is the worst corruption scandal in our history, not because of the amount of money that's been involved, but because the most respected institutions of our country have failed to discharge their responsibilities to the public," Dr. David Chaikin of the University of Sydney Business School told the Sydney Morning Herald in reaction to the scandal.

Australia began experimenting with plastic banknotes with holographic devices to guard against forgery as early as 1968. The notes were considered more durable, more environmentally friendly and less likely to carry dirt and disease. They were released in Australia in 1988. Securency was formed in 1996 as a joint venture between the bank and Innovia Films to market the technology overseas. By 2009, Securency was exporting to 25 countries, with more than three billion polymer notes in circulation. Apparently, if news reports are to be believed, marketing them required considerable ingenuity.

The gag order was made public by Julian Assange, the Australian who heads Wikileaks. He called it “the worst [gag order] in living memory.” The Australian government, Assange said in a press release, “is blindfolding the Australian public to cover up an embarrassing corruption scandal involving the Australian government.”

The gag order document specifically bans the publication of the order itself as well as an affidavit affirmed last month by Australia's representative to Asean, Gillian Bird, who has just been appointed as Australia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The gag order effectively blacks out the largest high-level corruption case in Australia and the region, Assange said.

The scandal blew open in 2012 after running behind the scenes for as long as a decade, with bribes allegedly paid in countries as far away as Nigeria, the United Kingdom, Spain and Latin America as well as the three Southeast Asian nations. In a case that has been described as having security implications, it was believed that Securency, whose interest has since been sold by the Australian central bank, offered sexual favors in addition to bribes.

For instance, the Melbourne-based Age reported that one of the most senior Securency managers allegedly secured an Asian prostitute for a visiting deputy governor of an unnamed foreign central bank in 2007. The witness, a Securency employee, gave the Australian Federal Police his diary in which he recorded the middleman telling him in 2007 that the ''governor would be very happy if the commission [payment] was increased."

The Age reported that agents had been paid almost A$50 million in commissions since 2003. After the audit's release, according to The Age, two top executives left the company.

Records made public by the Sydney Morning Herald showed that in 2007, Reserve Bank assistant governor Frank Campbell was told how Securency had engineered a dodgy business deal to hide a $492,000 payment to an allegedly corrupt Malaysian arms dealer. The arms dealer's company wrote to Campbell demanding further payments, stating it had convinced the ''Prime Minister and the Malaysian cabinet'' to give out contracts. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was the Malaysian prime minister at the time.

The Reserve Bank, the paper reported, “unwittingly or otherwise ‑ hampered the federal police bribery inquiry by failing to inform police for several months in 2009 of incriminating documents it held regarding its subsidiaries' activities. At the same time the RBA was withholding crucial documents, senior RBA officials approved Securency transferring millions of dollars offshore in payments that authorities now suspect included large bribes.”

Although Reserve Bank officials said they had no idea of the corruption concerns involving Securency, confidential files indicated that as early as 2007 the Reserve Bank was told that Securency was seeking to hide inflated contracts and that the issue was also raised at a Note Printing Australia board meeting in September 2007 attended by Reserve Bank officials.

Fairfax, the publisher of the Sydney Morning Herald, revealed in June 2007 that what was described as an explosive memo had been sent to the central bank alleging that bribes had been paid to win contracts to peddle the currency notes.

Nonetheless, there was no sign of enforcement activity on the part of Australian authorities despite multiple reports in other countries.

The last known blanket suppression order of this nature was granted in 1995 and concerned the joint US-Australian intelligence spying operation against the Chinese Embassy in Canberra, Assange said in his prepared release.

"The concept of 'national security' is not meant to serve as a blanket phrase to cover up serious corruption allegations involving government officials, in Australia or elsewhere,” Assange said. “It is in the public interest for the press to be able to report on this case, which concerns the subsidiaries of the Australian central bank. Who is brokering our deals, and how are we brokering them as a nation? Corruption investigations and secret gag orders for 'national security' reasons are strange bedfellows. It is ironic that it took Tony Abbott to bring the worst of 'Asian Values' to Australia."

 

Aegis, Missile Defense and the US Pivot

The U.S. Navy’s Aegis Weapon System is the lynchpin for regional missile defense in Asia.

Geopolitical developments across the Western Pacific region are generating a rise in military modernization efforts among U.S. allies and partners and other countries.  One of the military systems receiving increased focus and resources is missile defense—especially ship-based defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles.  In that regard, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Weapon System is emerging as a centerpiece of these efforts, and will play a significant role in enhancing regional missile defense cooperation, interoperability and integration against common adversaries––particularly North Korea but also China as well.

Regional Missile Threats

Many nations in the Pacific are growing increasingly uncomfortable with the pace of China’s military modernization as well as its regional expansionism. Likewise, the North Korean regime’s continued bellicosity combined with its testing and deployment of new, longer-range ballistic missiles is ratcheting up regional tensions.

According to the Pentagon’s 2014 report to Congress on China’s military, the PLA Navy has experienced at least a decade of modernization that has yielded an impressive force with modern ships, submarines and an aircraft carrier entering the fleet.  In mid-2014, the PLAN boasts nearly 200 major combatants, and some experts project it will surpass the size of the U.S. Navy as early as 2020.  In 2013, the PLAN laid down, launched or commissioned more than 50 ships and similar numbers are expected  in 2014, including a new-generation guided missile destroyer armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles and anti-submarine missiles––the PLAN’s equivalent of the U.S. Navy’s Burke guided missile destroyers (DDGs) that first went to sea in 1991.  New destroyers and guided-missile frigates provide a significant upgrade to the PLAN’s air defense capability, which will be critical as it expands operations into “distant seas” beyond the range of shore-based air defenses.

Particularly troubling for the U.S. Navy and its Asian partners has been the PLAN’s “demonstrable progress in anti-surface warfare,” with new generations of advanced, long-range ASCMs linked to more effective command and control networks across the fleet.  Most PLAN surface combatants are now equipped with YJ-8A or YJ-62 ASCMs, while some newer Luyang III-class destroyers are fitted with vertical launching systems for these weapons.  Likewise, there is growing concern about land-based, conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly the CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile. The CSS-5 Mod 5 gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, at ranges greater than 1,000 nautical miles and with a maneuverable warhead.  As a larger percentage of the PLAN includes modern combatants equipped with more capable anti-ship weapons and advanced radar and command systems, Asian navies will have to devote more resources to boosting their missile defense efforts.

Similarly, during the last two years the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-un has acted erratically and increasingly provocative, sparking concern in Japan, South Korea and the United States.  As the U.S. Director of National Intelligence noted in his 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment:

North Korea has publicly displayed its road-mobile ICBM [KN-08] twice.  We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to developing long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. Its efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns….  We do not know Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.

The North Korean regime also successfully placed a satellite in orbit in 2012, using a modified three-stage version of the Taepo Dong-2 missile, called Unha, which is based on UN-banned ballistic missile technology. A few months later, the regime also announced it had conducted a third nuclear test.  The mobile KN-08 mentioned above could similarly threaten South Korea, Japan and parts of the South China Sea. In April 2013, the North abruptly severed communications with South Korea, sealed their common border and threatened Guam and Hawaii.  After North Korea launched two ballistic missiles in March 2014, the Japanese government authorized BMD forces to attempt to intercept any incoming North Korean missile.

In response, the United States moved Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems closer to the area and dispatched a Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam.  “Our number one security concern is North Korea,” Adm. Harry Harris said in January 2014. “I don’t understand them, I don’t understand their leadership, and I don’t understand their intent.”

Regional Missile Defense Cooperation

To counter these troublesome trends, the United States, its allies and partners throughout the Western Pacific have stepped up cooperation, especially in the area of ship-based missile defense.  This includes greater cooperation between the U.S. and its allies in Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Australia

Australia’s contribution to regional BMD has remained strong for more than 40 years, largely through providing early warning capabilities. In his 1992 address to the Australian Parliament, President George H.W. Bush cited the “invaluable role” joint defense facilities in Australia played in detecting Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf War.  The 1995 exchange of letters between the Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization and the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization signified formal cooperation.  A BMD Framework memorandum signed in 2004 called for increased “policy collaboration and information sharing.”  Then-Defense Minister Robert Hill lauded the 2004 agreement and called for Australia to take advantage of increasing BMD technology to support its future security needs. The BMD Framework facilitates information sharing among close allies and cooperation on research and development issues. The Labor Party has also become more open to BMD possibilities in recent years, after a history of opposition to the program.

Accordingly, the Royal Australian Navy is building three new Hobart-class air warfare destroyers (AWDs) that feature Aegis as the ship’s radar system. These ships are expected to perform “blue water” operations in the future and can be expected to deploy across the Pacific region. While the current focus is on air defense missions alone, these ships could incorporate the latest ballistic missile upgrade of Aegis in the future.  However, “structural and systemic issues” have combined to create concerns about AWD program resources and timing.

When Aegis-equipped Hobart-class BMD warships are eventually deployed, this capability will provide the RAN with immediate interoperability with U.S. Navy ships and smooth the waters for future joint and multinational operations across the region.

Japan

During the last year, Japan has initiated unprecedented changes in its national security legal framework and defense strategy that hold enormous implications for future defense cooperation between Tokyo and Washington, as well as  other regional allies.  These changes, particularly the adoption of “collective self-defense,” will permit Japanese forces to assist or come to the aid of American forces under attack.  This should also open new avenues for cooperation in missile defense and, over time, lead to more integrated operations with Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF).  “Think BMD patrols together, Japan and the United States, with collective self-defense,” Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert told a Washington think-tank event last year. “We need to reconcile our BMD capacity and capability over there.”

JMSDF has long been closely linked to the U.S. Navy’s Aegis fleet, given its acquisition of the radar system for installation on its Kongo-class of destroyers. Japan has six Aegis-equipped ships in its fleet in mid-2014, of which four are BMD-capable.  In 2007, Kongo successfully destroyed a ballistic missile target using the Aegis BMD system—becoming the first allied warship to achieve this significant milestone.  In December 2013, the government issued new National Security Guidelines that call for the acquisition of two additional BMD-capable destroyers during the next decade. Recent reports suggest this timetable has been accelerated. The guidelines specifically state that boosting Japan’s ballistic missile defenses is a new priority.

The U.S. and Japan have also had a long, cooperative relationship developing the improved Block IIA version of the SM-3 Standard anti-air missile. Japan has taken the lead on this effort, which will result in a larger more dynamic air-defense missile configured for BMD missions.

Republic of Korea

South Korean Navy officials have announced plans to procure three additional Aegis-equipped destroyers in the 2020-2025 timeframe. This marks an acceleration of previous modernization plans, and South Korean Navy officials have emphasized that these newer ships will be BMD-capable. Korea already deploys Aegis on all three of its KDX-III King Seojong the Great-class destroyers, which at more than 11,000 tons are the largest ships equipped with Aegis. But these three KDX-III destroyers do not have BMD capabilities built-in. Korean officials maintain the three additional ships will be outfitted with the latest BMD version of Aegis. While its ships operate Aegis, the Korean Navy does not employ the SM-3 missile.

“In Korea, there are a lot of opportunities still,” Greenert said at the Center for a New American Security last year. “It takes cooperation and a deliberate, relentless approach to this.”

Trilateral Cooperation

South Korean growing operational experience with Aegis and its continued exercises and deployments with similarly equipped U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers opens up new avenues for missile defense cooperation. This cooperation could also include Japan’s MSDF over time as these two former enemies work through mutual suspicions and focus on the larger threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile program. Indeed, animosity between South Korea and Japan continues to hamper real cooperation across the northwest Pacific. Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted this issue in 2013, when he noted that there is extensive information exchanged between the U.S. and Japan and between Korea and the U.S., but the lack of a common operating picture across all three militaries is detrimental in the long term. “I think we should see this [period of North Korean provocation] as an opportunity to become interoperable.”

A seamless trilateral missile defense cooperation relationship between Japan, Korea and the United States could emerge, with the U.S. Navy’s Aegis fleet serving as the key linking mechanism, an “Aegis Hub” as it were. This linkage will not happen immediately, but events are moving in a positive direction. Although South Korea has become more willing to discuss missile defense with Washington, it remains hesitant to go beyond its low-tier system of Aegis/SM-2 and land-based Patriot (PAC-2) missiles. Japan, Korea and the United States have been conducting more joint naval exercises, including with the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) operating in conjunction with a Korean destroyer and a JMSDF destroyer last year.  China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in December 2013, combined with rumblings of imminent missile tests from North Korea, all combine to push the process of cooperation forward. Indeed, on the sidelines of the 2014 Nuclear Summit, the leaders of South Korea, Japan and the United States met to discuss the shared threat their countries face from North Korea.

Aegis BMD is Key

What this all means is that a nascent regional missile defense capability based on the Aegis Weapon System is emerging across the Western Pacific. While developing piecemeal in 2014, given political, economic and other strategic issues that will have to be resolved, the fact remains that during the next decade a growing number of BMD-capable warships, all operated by close American treaty allies and sharing a common radar system, will be deployed to sea and able to conduct multi-national operations.

In March 2014, Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Director of the U.S. Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency, confirmed that the U.S. Navy had 30 BMD-capable Aegis ships in the fleet. In testimony to a House subcommittee, Syring said Aegis BMD capabilities will be incorporated into the Navy’s Aegis modernization program and new destroyers. By 2019, the U.S. Navy plans to have an operational availability of 43 BMD warships. The improved-performance SM-3 Block IIA missile, which the United States is co-developing with the Japanese government, and an upgraded version of the Aegis Weapons System, are on schedule for deployment in 2018.  The upgraded Aegis Weapons System combined with the faster, longer-range SM-3 IIA, will provide the capability to counter more sophisticated threats.

Key to the entire concept of regional interoperable missile defense is Aegis, and more specifically the sequential ballistic missile upgrades that continue to be deployed across the Fleet. The latest version just now exiting its operational test and evaluation phase and to be deployed in coming years is designated Aegis BMD 5.0. This upgrade to Aegis is nested within the larger Baseline 9 capability package that will be deployed on all Navy Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers in the coming years.

Baseline 9 integrates BMD capabilities into the legacy Aegis anti-air warfare (AAW) computer program, thereby bringing those two separate missions into a single, fully integrated computer program and equipment suite.  The U.S. Navy calls this the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability. BL 9 Fleet Introduction is proceeding through a series of tests with the USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53), which will serve as the U.S. Navy’s lead IAMD-outfitted ship.  The ship’s BL 9 IAMD capabilities will serve as the foundation for future Aegis IAMD developments.  John Paul Jones went into dry dock in September 2012 for BL 9 installation, which is being co-funded by the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency.

The overall objective of IAMD is to enable the dynamic allocation of the ship’s finite computer resources to maximize BMD without degrading AAW defense.  Based on the tactical threat picture, IAMD dynamically allocates radar resources between AAW and BMD within this single computing environment.  A dynamic resource scheduler aggregates computing capacity across multiple servers to prevent bottlenecks and increase response time according to operational priorities.  For the first time, IAMD-equipped destroyers can conduct ship self-defense, strike group area air defense and ballistic missile defense missions simultaneously with full capability in all air/missile-defense domains—a major advance in Aegis defense against emerging air and missile threats.

The principal IAMD capability-enabler for BL 9 destroyers is the Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP) for the SPY-1D radar. Earlier BMD computing suites for the radar used a separate signal processor, meaning a BMD-equipped surface warship could engage either a ballistic missile or an aircraft/cruise missile threat, but not both simultaneously. The new upgrades enable the SPY to go from a single-beam to dual-beam capability to meet the power resource priorities for simultaneous anti-air warfare and BMD sector coverage.  The MMSP’s up-to-date COTS hardware and software algorithms control radar waveform generation and allow for simultaneous processing of both AAW and BMD radar signals.  Critically, the MMSP improves SPY radar system performance in littoral environments, e.g., against sea skimmers in a high-clutter environment.  For BMD, the processor also enhances search and long-range surveillance and tracking and BMD signal processor range resolution, discrimination and characterization, as well as real-time capability displays.

The MMSP leverages the capability already provided by the third variant of the SPY-1D, the SPY-1D(V) Littoral Warfare Upgrade.  This upgrade replaced the SPY-1D in newly-constructed ships beginning in FY 1998 and started deploying in DDG 51 Flight IIA ships in 2002.  The SPY-1D(V) improves the radar’s capability against low-altitude, reduced radar cross-section targets in heavy clutter environments with intense electronic countermeasures.  Under development for installation in some Flight IIA ships, this upgrade has additional moving target indicator waveforms and a greater ability to counter deceptive electronic attack measures.

Catalyst for Greater Cooperation

“Our fleet should place a premium on certain operationally required attributes suggested by the character of the vast Pacific region and its security challenges,” naval strategist Frank Hoffman wrote in early July. “In particular, we need a fleet that has reach, endurance, and lethality…. We need a Navy Fighting Machine that deters competitors, reassures allies and friends and, when crisis erupts, can fight and win against a projected antagonist.”

Given the range of threats and strategic challenges in the Pacific, especially the rapid escalation in the range and sophistication of North Korea’s ballistic missiles, there is growing interest in missile defense. Since several nations––Japan, Korea and Australia––are already building new warships equipped with the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Weapon System, the idea of adding a BMD element into these ongoing programs is gaining greater attention. Doing so would increase cooperation among allies, deepen operational linkages and potentially lead to integrated operations where allied BMD-equipped warships can be seamlessly embedded in U.S. carrier strike groups or amphibious ready groups. That is a positive development for the entire region and will help promote presence, stability and engagement.

Robert Holzer is senior national security manager with Gryphon Technologies’ TeamBlue National Security Programs group.  Scott Truver is TeamBlue’s director.

 

Aquino damaged, prostituted our democratic institutions

Marcos and Aquino: Both hijacked our democratic institutions.

Strip Benigno S. Aquino 3rd of his daang-matuwid rhetoric, and he emerges as the worst president, along with the dictator Marcos. Both captured or tried to capture our democratic institutions. Both had rhetorical skills and catchy slogans: “This nation will be great again” for Marcos; “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap” for Aquino.

Marcos abolished or lorded over our democratic institutions when he imposed his one-man rule in 1972, when the Philippines was touted as the exemplar of democracy in Southeast Asia.

Aquino attacked or prostituted our democratic institutions, which his mother Cory Aquino restored after Marcos fell in 1986 when the Philippines was touted as the exemplar for the restoration of democracy in the world.

Unfortunately, as the histories of most countries in the world have shown, it is the strength of these democratic institutions that are crucial for a nation’s long-term growth and prosperity.

In our own case, the dictatorship at first resulted in a phenomenal economic growth, a sustained 6 percent growth every year from 1972 to 1979.

Without the type of checks and balances of a democracy though, Marcos’ economic-policy errors were not corrected, cronyism worsened, and by 1981, he was on a survival mode that he lost control of the economy, which then became too weak to survive the 1982-83 debt crisis and the political turmoil in the wake of the senior Aquino’s assassination in 1981.

 

The collapse of the economy in 1985 and 1986, which contracted 7 percent for each of those years, meant a return to the economy’s size in 1979.

Partly because of his remarkable myth-driven popular support and the public sympathy for the death of his mother when he assumed power in 2010, and partly because of his gargantuan slush fund amassed through the grossly misnamed Disbursement Acceleration Program, President Aquino didn’t need martial law.

He damaged the Supreme Court, and has controlled the other key institutions of a democratic republican system: the Congress, the Commission on Audit, the Ombudsman, and media.

He has also prostituted a crucial executive agency that was traditionally a bastion of justice administration, supposedly above the fray of politics, the Department of Justice. He has made the DOJ as his own political assassin and legal persecutor. Even the Bureau of Internal Revenue has been transformed by Aquino into one of his hit men.

We are lucky, though, that Aquino has only two years left to continue damaging our institutions, and the Supreme Court has survived his attacks, that it has fought back as the last bastion of democracy in our country. I will discuss the first set of institutions Aquino damaged or wrecked, while the rest would be for my column on Friday.

(1) The Supreme Court
Aquino browbeat and assaulted the Supreme Court when he undertook a conspiracy to remove the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice. In a last-resort move to have the Tribunal order P10 billion paid to his clan’s Hacienda Luisita instead of just P460 million as it had decided on, Chief Justice Corona was removed.

Corona was impeached not for any case of graft or incompetence, but by failing to declare his dollar accounts in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN), of which the legally prescribed remedy is simply to file another SALN.

As a result, the High Court had become a damaged institution. In his wish to control it, Aquino threw into the dustbin long-cherished notions that the highest court of the land should be manned not only by the best legal minds in the country, but by the most experienced.

Aquino’s college classmate, whose career as an academic had been mediocre, was appointed to replace Corona. After that, he appointed to the court the weird college dean, Marivic Leonen, who should be disbarred from the practice of law for formulating an agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that is patently unconstitutional.

What was Leonen’s qualification? The fact that he did Aquino’s bidding to come up with that agreement with the MILF wherein they could have their own state and claim “peace” so that Aquino could be nominated for the Nobel peace prize.

Even Marcos, with his dictatorial powers, didn’t have the gall to appoint legal lightweights to the court, as Aquino did on the basis entirely of his thinking that they would do his bidding.

While the image of Enrique Fernando, chief justice from 1979-1985, holding an umbrella for Imelda Marcos, has been iconic purportedly symbolizing the Marcos dictatorship’s hold on the court, the strongman appointed respected and independent chief and associate justices to the high tribunal, legal luminaries the likes of Querube Makalintal, Felix Macasiar and Claudio Teehankee. No one among the justices Marcos appointed to the Supreme Court then was in the junior league of now Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno and Associate Justice Leonen.

We are fortunate, though, that the Supreme Court has weathered its decapitation, and appears even to have grown stronger, perhaps because of its realization that it has become the last barrier to a de facto Aquino dictatorship.

It has ruled as unconstitutional Aquino’s Disbursement Acceleration Plan, his grand scheme that hijacked the budget to use it at his whim. The bully has been in tantrums, claiming the Court has gone “personal” against him. The worst isn’t over for him. The Court will most likely rule unconstitutional his pact with the MILF, as well as his military pact with the US.

(2) Congress
It is no longer rumor but established fact that Aquino bribed the House of Representatives to file the impeachment complaint against Corona, with the Senate equally bribed to find him guilty. This was through P13 billion in funds he hijacked from the budget and cloaked as his “Disbursement Acceleration Fund.” The Senators who voted to convict Corona are, in fact, now in the annals of our legal history, as the Court decision on the DAP listed them together with amounts each received from that fund, shortly after their “decision.”

Have you heard of any commentator or member of Congress now praising that saga as a victory to cleanse the Court of corruption?

The Court’s decision on July 1 on the DAP was that Aquino, in effect, disregarded Congress by commandeering funds, whose allocation had been determined by the body through the Appropriation laws it passes each year.

Here is one branch of government, the Judiciary, defending the second branch, the Legislature, from being lorded over, politically raped by the third, the Executive branch.

Yet, Congress is even applauding Aquino’s DAP. Worse, one of Aquino’s lackeys in the House of Representatives, Rep. Niel Tupas, who was the chief prosecutor in Corona’s impeachment, is childishly bullying the Supreme Court to reverse its decision by calling for an investigation of its own funds.

Aquino, in effect, screwed them by throwing to the dustbin the budget laws, which Congress is the prime author of. Yet, Senate President Franklin Drilon and House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte were applauding Aquino’s state-of-the-nation speech yesterday. They should have asked Congress to protest its political rape by refusing to have Aquino speak before them.

Belmonte didn’t even bother to undertake the kind of moro-moro hearing on the DAP in the Senate. Belmonte’s minions investigate the alleged sex tapes illegally released by a doctor, yet didn’t lift a finger to investigate how DAP politically raped the Congress.

Never since the restoration of democracy do we have the likes of Drilon and Belmonte that are so servile to the President. Think of Drilon and how he “lawyered” for Abad in the hearing on the DAP last week: He shames the office that luminaries like Jovito Salonga (who defied Cory’s wish to retain the US military bases), Neptali Gonzales, Marcelo Fernan, and Blas Ople, had held. Belmonte is without doubt the most spineless Speaker the House has ever had.

(3) The Commission on Audit
No president, not even Marcos before, ever recruited the COA to participate in its conspiracies, as they understood that it was vital to the nation that his institution remains above politics. The framers of the Constitution in their wisdom made the COA an independent body with the sole authority to audit every single centavo of taxpayers’ money.

Yet, Aquino appointed Grace Pulido-Tan COA as chair, whose career as finance undersecretary had been unremarkable, with her main qualification being as a rabid Aquino supporter. Aquino appointed as member of the three-man commission Heidi Mendoza, who had retired 10 years ago from the COA and had been going around in NGO circles as a self-proclaimed anti-graft crusader.

More importantly for Aquino perhaps, Mendoza had for years been probing the alleged corruption of vice-president Jejomar Binay, now the shoo-in for the presidency after Aquino. Mendoza’s dossier on Binay, my sources claimed, will be Aquino and his candidate Mar Roxas’ propaganda artillery in 2016.

Mendoza early on proved her value to Aquino’s schemes, when she deliberately misinterpreted Corona’s dollar bank accounts and gave this to Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales. She then with a dramatic flair waved the bank documents in the air, claiming it shows the Chief Justice had $10 million in his dollar bank accounts. (He didn’t, as Mendoza counted flows, not stock, so that Corona’s $1 million became $10 million.)

COA’s report on the use of pork-barrel funds covered only mostly those of opposition senators and congressmen. The excuse it gave was that Budget Secretary Abad refused to release all documents it requested. But was this really the case, or did the COA actually connive with Abad to use the special audit process to file charges against opposition senators, especially Enrile, Estrada, and Revilla? To this day, how senators and congressmen disbursed their PDAF has been kept secret.

Despite demands by the opposition, why has COA chairman Grace Pulido-Tan not issued an order auditing the pork barrel funds of all legislators during Aquino’s administration, and the much bigger P167 billion DAP funds?

Why did it, instead, put as a priority for special audit the P900 million Malampaya funds, which seem to provide more proof against the jailed opposition senators?

This is the real state of the nation four years with Aquino in control. Our most important democratic institutions have been damaged or prostituted.

FB: Rigoberto Tiglao

 

Are we backing the wrong horse... as Ukraine atrocities become clear?

MH17 is fast emerging as a secondary emergency as social media becomes the primary arsenal of Ukraine and Gaza combatants. Truths that were once concealed by tyrants and terrorists are now visible in gory detail on any computer screen, and not before time.

The pictorial horror of war is no longer sanitised, it’s on-line, and mainstream media is reluctantly being forced to compete for truth in news.

Okay, we sit up in bed with our hot chocolate and watch the decontaminated late news totalling casualties and running clips of protagonists’ speeches, we sleep well, it’s a long way away, we are unaffected and anyway, obese, unattractive fools like Laurie Oakes and Graham Richardson will sum it up for us in the morning.

Julie Bishop is choosing her words more carefully in Kiev and starting to doubt the motives of illegitimate, self-appointed President Poroshenko who is systematically murdering thousands of his own Ukrainian citizens. He has little interest in MH17, his interest is genocide.

The Ukrainian military is bombing its own undefended eastern cities, razing schools, hospitals, suburban infrastructure, water and electricity supplies. It is showering mortars indiscriminately on rural nationals who are fleeing as refugees from their own country in numbers approaching a quarter million.

Yet, if Putin dares to assist in stemming the genocide he is labelled a supporter of separatists and rebels by the West.

Poroshenko is feigning co-operation with the Dutch and Australians in order to precipitate further Western sanctions on Russia. It’s working. Julie Bishop and Tony Abbott are now hoping they have backed the right horse in Poroshenko. Clearly they haven't.

They are trusting this tyrant to secure the MH17 site when his sole interest is to ethnically cleanse the East of all Russian sympathisers. The problem is that Putin will now be forced to meet the Poroshenko behemoth head on, leaving MH17 irrecoverable in the midst of an escalating white hot warzone.

How a person like Graham Richardson is allowed a voice on SKY is confounding. Not only is he an ignorant reactionary but he is a Labor Teflon crook of Obied proportions who another crim, Keating, was forced to sack.

Before you take notice of this person who helped to give us Gillard and utter destruction read all about him here, because you won’t read it anywhere else.

http://pickeringpost.com/story/scribblings-of-a-lunatic-fringe-dweller/2098 

Indonesia's Jarring Wealth Gap

The gulf between rich and poor has widened in Indonesia more than in any other developing country. It has grown by as much as 60 percent over the last decade, according to our comprehensive look at inequality in the country. While the rich get richer, around 40 percent of the country's 250 million people still live with less than $2 per day.

The last ten years in Indonesia following the departure of former President Suharto and the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 has seen dramatic change. Across Asia we've seen rapid growth, but this hasn't trickled down to the region's most impoverished people as much as one would hope - and Indonesia is a case in point. The country's economy has boomed since the 2000s, but this has benefited the rich more than the poor. The dramatic rise in inequality is even more spectacular when you consider that for many developing countries in Latin America, inequality is on the decline.

So what's the cause of Indonesia's rising inequality? Recent economic growth has been fuelled by a commodity boom - as world prices have increased, there's been a rise in exports such as coal and palm oil. Natural resource production demands capital investment, hence the commodity boom generally benefits the already rich.

Some argue that a burgeoning gap between rich and poor can be attributed to the rapid development of Indonesia's urban areas, such as the capital, Jakarta. But we found that inequality has risen across the country, and much of the increase is within provinces and districts.

We calculated different measures of inequality, such as the difference in what the richest and poorest in Indonesian society spent from 2003-2013 (ie the ratio of spending between the richest 10 percent and poorest 10 percent). Using this measure, we found an increase in inequality of over 60 percent. Using more standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, we also found a rise in inequality of more than 30 percent during the same period.

At the same time, Indonesia's use of fiscal policy to address rising inequality during the last decade of economic growth has been ineffective. For instance, last year personal income tax contributed around Rp 102 trillion ($8.8bn) to the country's national budget. In contrast, fuel subsidies came to Rp 200 trillion ($17.2bn) - a tax break enjoyed by the richest 40 percent. Meanwhile, social spending was just Rp over 80 trillion ($6.9bn)

What could President Joko Widodo do in his first 100 days in office to address such issues? A more progressive budget to tackle inequality is possible - by channelling the fuel subsidy towards social spending.

There's good reason to have hope in the new president. Widodo's election win comes from his track record of innovative health and education policies as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta.

For instance, last year his Jakarta Smart Card initiative targeted more than 300,000 students from poor families at a cost of Rp 800 billion ($69m). It meant that a typical poor family of two young children in school received vouchers of Rp 360,000 ($31) per month - about a quarter of their household budget. The vouchers must be spent on education (getting the bus to school, books, uniform and so on). Evidence suggests that this policy alone could cut rising inequality in Jakarta by half.

Widodo's promise to expand the Jakarta Smart Card programme nationwide has appealed to the millions of Indonesians voting for him.

Indonesia can certainly afford to help its poorest. And if the new president wants economic growth to continue, he must tackle the growing gap between rich and poor. Research shows that rising inequality not only prolongs poverty, but also slows economic growth. Let's hope the new president lives up to expectations and is able to continue with his significant progressive track record.

Arief Anshory Yusuf is the Director of the Centre for Economics and Development Studies, Padjadjaran University, Indonesia

Andy Sumner is the Director of King's College London International Development Institute.

The article is based upon a research paper to be published in the forthcoming issue of the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies.

Vietnam Buckles Under Chinese Pressure

Since China's July 16 withdrawal of its HYSY-981 oil exploration rig from waters claimed by Vietnam, tensions in the South China Sea have momentarily defused. But Beijing's months-long placement of the rig roughly 130 nautical miles from Vietnam's coast presented the most divisive threat in years to Hanoi's Communist Party leadership

Hanoi showed itself to be all but powerless to counter Beijing's maritime provocation. Diplomatically, China's actions fell just short enough to avoid any potential Association of Southeast Asian Nation unified front against the rig's placement. The United States, likewise, did not get involved in a meaningful way. Indeed, China may have succeeded in convincing other South China Sea claimants that the US would be an unreliable ally in future disputes in the area.

But the greatest damage to Hanoi was that China's actions exposed a large rift among the senior echelons of the party over how to respond to Beijing's aggression. Vietnamese leaders were hoping for a diplomatic concession from China when Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited Vietnam on June 18-19.

The visit, however, was anything but conciliatory when he berated his hosts for "hyping up" the situation and said bluntly that China would "take all necessary measures" to protect the rig. During the visit, China deployed a second exploration rig into the contested waters.

At the time, Hanoi seemed ready for a fight. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made very clear that Vietnamese sovereignty was not for sale. "Vietnam has always wanted peace and friendship with China. However, we cannot trade our sacred independence and sovereignty for some elusive peace or any type of dependence."

Advocates of a more assertive foreign policy seemed to be carrying the day. A June 2014 meeting of the Vietnam Communist Party's Central Committee unanimously resolved to condemn Chinese aggression and encroachment.

Yang held meetings with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and Dung, as well as with Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong. Minh and Dung reportedly maintained a less compromising approach. Not surprisingly, Trong was more conciliatory and focused on party-party ties and long-term relations.

Immediately following Yang's departure, the Politburo met to formulate a response. One group led by Dung and Nguyen Sinh Hung, the Chairman of the National Assembly who has been vociferous in his public calls for Vietnam to stand up to China, advocated a more hardline and confrontational approach. They argued that any concession to China would only encourage future aggression and advocated a multi-faceted strategy entailing:

·  The filing of a brief with the International Arbitration Commission, paralleling the submission by the Philippines in March 2014 that infuriated Beijing;

·  Proactive leadership within ASEAN to push for a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea;

·  Forging closer ties and coordination with the Philippines and Indonesia.

·  Engaging in more multilateral military exercises, including with the US, India, Indonesia and Japan;

·  Developing closer ties with the US and negotiating a more defined "comprehensive partnership";

·  Joining the US-led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, necessitating major economic reforms and opening of closed or heavily regulated sectors of the Vietnamese economy, including state-owned enterprises;

·  Developing closer ties with Japan. Perhaps not publicly endorsing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's reinterpretation of Article IX, but quietly encouraging a more proactive diplomatic and security posture in the region;

·  Acceptance of an economic slowdown due to less Chinese trade and investment, with a belief that it would force Vietnam to diversify their economic relationships and end their dangerously high levels of economic dependence on China.

Other members of this group included the pro-reformist Le Thanh Hai (Ho Chi Minh City's Party Chief), Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the deputy chairmen of the National Assembly, Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan and Thong Thi Phong.

In China we trust

The other group led by Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was much less willing to provoke Beijing or do anything that would further escalate tensions. They offered no real strategy, but argued that defusing tensions with Beijing would serve the country's interests in the long term.

They apparently argued that Vietnam could not afford a conflict with China and emphasized historical and ideological affinities with Beijing. They quashed the filing of an arbitration submission and questioned US intentions and resolve. The crux of their argument was a naive belief that China will accommodate and make concessions in the future.

The de-escalation camp was joined by To Huy Ru'a, a member of the Party's Secretariat, Le Hong Anh (VCP Secretariat), Ngo Van Du (Chair Central Committee for Inspection), Dinh The Huyen (Propaganda and Education Commission), Pham Quang Nghi (Hanoi Party Chief), Nguyen Thien Nhan (Chairman of Vietnam Fatherland Front). The Minister for Public Security, Tran Dai Quang was probably fearful of mass discontent and continued protests should the conflict escalate.

There are two heavyweights whose input could have made a difference. President Truong Tan Sang most likely sided with the majority. He is one of the most pro-economic reformers but wary of conflict. The Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh, the senior most uniformed officer who had been vocal in terms of the need to pursue an arbitration case, is cautious about reliance on the West. Cognizant of Vietnam's limited options, Thanh joined the majority and supported accommodation.

Regardless of the actual vote, the result seems evident: the Politburo approved a policy to de-escalate tensions. In early June, the decision to file an arbitration case seemed to have been made with the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense, and the Chairman of the National Assembly all speaking in favor of the move. Today, it seems to be shelved, spoken of only as a hypothetical by mid-level foreign ministry personnel. Senior leaders seem to be extremely wary of antagonizing Beijing by filing a suit similar to that of the Philippines. Hanoi did file a complaint with the United Nations but an arbitration filing is unlikely to happen any time soon.

Second, Foreign Minister Minh canceled a well publicized scheduled trip to Washington at the invitation of US Secretary of State John Kerry at the height of the oil rig tensions. A US presidential envoy did travel to Hanoi to meet with Minh, a much lower profile exchange than an official visit to Washington. Educated in the West, Minh is perceived warily by Beijing as pro-Western. He is also known to have a long rapport with Kerry. He is also the son of Nguyen Co Thach, the architect of Vietnam's opening to the West who was sidelined by pro-Chinese leaders following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Hanoi quietly announced that Pham Quang Nghi would pay a visit to the US in Minh's place. Although he is a Politburo member, Nghi's official position is simply the party chief of Hanoi, so in terms of protocol his visit is much lower profile. Nghi has an important job to do in ascertaining Washington's level of commitment to playing a role in a potential conflict with China in the South China Sea.

Vietnam's activist foreign policy within the 10-member ASEAN seems to have been tempered with the de-escalation. Earlier calls from Hanoi for a binding Code of Conduct have more recently drifted to the background. In short, Vietnam appears to have retreated from its previous tougher policy line towards China. Indeed, the rig crisis showed that a majority of the Politburo is unwilling to stand up to China, even though the country's historical narrative is built on fighting back against and repelling Chinese aggression.

There are arguably four main reasons: 1. The economic costs of continued confrontation are too great. Though Vietnam is working to diversify its exports, China remains the most important foreign player in its economy and serves as its largest trading partner, accounting for nearly $50 billion in bilateral trade in 2013. That amount is climbing each year as Vietnam becomes more integrated into China's supply chain. Some 10% of Vietnam's exports go to China, mainly food and natural resources. China is simply too vital for the Vietnamese economy at a time the World Bank says the country is under-performing its potential.

2. Vietnam knows that China is not going to back down on the South China Sea disputes and the costs of further escalation and armed conflict are simply too high. Vietnam would lose any military conflict at sea, no matter how limited. That would be both costly and a humiliation for the country's Communist Party leadership.

3. There is a hope in some quarters that by making concessions on the Paracel Islands, the Chinese will reciprocate in the Spratly Islands. But this is folly. For one, the Vietnamese made significant concessions on their land border demarcation, in the expectation that China would be conciliatory with the Gulf of Tonkin negotiations, which of course never happened. China is instead increasing its presence in the Spratlys, currently dredging at five separate atolls to create artificial islands.

4. State Councilor Yang and General secretary Trong both spoke of the importance the two sides place on maintaining friendly party-party and state-state ties. For Trong, the long game of peaceful relations with its behemoth neighbor is greater than the potential hydrocarbon wealth supposedly in the South China Sea.

Appeasement risk

Hanoi's decision to back down has potential grave implications. Vietnam has effectively appeased China, which will most likely lead to more aggression. China will likely continue to explore and offer concessions up and down Vietnam's continental shelf, creating "facts on the ground" to reinforce their 9-dashed line map doctrine and complement their artificial island strategy on the eastern perimeter.

Pro-Chinese accommodationists can argue that their quiet back room diplomacy worked, i.e. that they convinced China to de-escalate tensions for the sake of regional stability. But China removed the rig when they did because it had already served their interests, namely:

·  They found some hydrocarbons, apparently enough to justify returning to the site at a later date;

·  They proved that they could act with impunity and that no one could stop them.

·  They were able to bully the Vietnamese into not joining the Philippine arbitration;

·  They sowed seeds of doubt in the region about America's reliability as an ally;

·  They could withdraw the rig in a face-saving way with the early arrival of major typhoons;

·  ASEAN remained divided and no closer to compelling Beijing to sign a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

With an early and active typhoon season and expected confrontations at the ASEAN Regional Forum scheduled for August, the timing was right for an early Chinese withdrawal.

Such faulty analysis will pose a danger to the regime itself. Most Vietnamese may not be aware of the leadership's decision to de-escalate. They can look to the near daily maritime encounters that often leave their small coastguard fleet battered as proof that the government continues to stand up to China. Yet the real threat in not standing up to China is the threat to the regime's legitimacy. Communist ideology is hollow and the government has to be responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people.

If the public believes that their leadership capitulated, their legitimacy will be severely eroded, dangerously at a time of slowing economic growth. That's when the real street demonstrations, aimed both against China and the Vietnam's Communist Party-led government, could be sparked.

More importantly, the decision is likely to cause deeper rifts among the party leadership, which could have broad economic implications. The pro-Chinese camp will focus on the interdependence of the two economies, even though Hanoi runs more than a $20 billion trade deficit with China and primarily exports raw materials and rice rather than manufactured goods. Vietnam might becoming a more important spoke in the southern Chinese supply chain but the trade relationship is highly unequal.

The decision to accommodate rather than confront China is also a defeat for domestic economic reformers. Those who advocate accommodation with China still see a leading role for the state sector in the economy, despite its glaring inefficiencies. They believe that the reforms and concessions demanded by the US to gain entry into the TPP are too great and would threaten the regime's current iron-clad control of the economy.

Reformers see the TPP as key to economic diversification away from China and overhauling the state-owned sector. In March, Prime Minister Dung instructed ministries to speed up privatization of state enterprises. The government "equitized" 74 state enterprises in 2013, three times the number in 2011 and 2012. In early 2014, the government announced the sales of shares in key state enterprises, including VINASHIN, Vietnam Airlines, and several ports.

Making these firms economically viable is a top priority for the government as state enterprises use about 50% of public investment, tie up 60% of bank lending, and account for more than half the nation's bad debt.

The window of opportunity for Vietnam to gain entry into the TPP is closing quickly. There is also a concern is that there are really just one to two more Central Committee meetings where real reforms can take place before the remainder of the plenums are dominated by planning for the next party congress to be held in the first quarter of 2016. That change in focus will benefit China and undercut party reformers keen to respond to Beijing's challenge with a recalibration of the country's strategic and economic relationships.

Zachary Abuza, PhD, is principal at Southeast Asia Analytics specializing in regional politics and security issues.