Malaysia’s Najib’s fear campaign

The Malaysian Prime Minister’s ruthless tactics to hold onto power at all costs demonstrate that he is the one who is most afraid while his people are willing to fight on.

This week Najib Tun Razak is beating the Malay chauvinist drum at his party’s annual general assembly (AGM). Meetings of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) have regularly followed this mode, but the use of racism and paranoia have taken on greater intensity in the face of its leader’s eroding political legitimacy.

For the past two years, Malaysia’s Prime Minister has been beleaguered by the 1MDB scandal that has involved not only nearly $700 million going into Najib’s personal account but also raised issues of criminal money laundering, embezzlement and economic mismanagement involving over $3.5 billion. The case is being investigated and prosecuted in over six jurisdictions, most notably by the US Department of Justice.  The scandal featured centre stage in last month’s Bersih 5 rally in which thousands went to the streets to protest corruption, economic mismanagement and systematic inequalities in the electoral process.

Despite public discontent, Najib has adeptly used a variety of tactics to stay in power, which is crucial if he is to avoid international prosecution. The most obvious of these involves a crackdown on political opponents. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in 2015. Since then more than 10 opposition politicians have faced a variety of charges from sedition to challenges to ‘parliamentary democracy’. Last month whistleblower and parliamentarian, Rafizi Ramli, was convicted of violating the Official Secrets Act for releasing evidence associated with 1MDB. This week’s UMNO meeting has called for continued no-holds barred attacks on the opposition.

The crackdown on dissent has also targeted civil society. On the eve of the 19 November Bersih 5 rally, its chairperson, Maria Chin Abdullah, was arrested. She was held in solitary confinement and charged as a ‘terrorist’ under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act. This follows a litany of attacks on other activists, cartoonists and artists, as well as ordinary citizens for ‘insulting’ posts on Facebook and WhatsApp. In 2015 there were 91 cases for ‘sedition’ alone. Human Rights Watch has detailed these in an October 2016 report.

The media has also been in the firing line. In 2015 the harassment of publishers led to the closure of The Malaysian Insider. Last month the online portal Malaysiakini was raided, and its editor Steven Gan was charged for simply publishing a video. This comes on the back of the Communication and Media Act being tightened in March. ‘Protection’ from insults has extended beyond Najib to those seen to be protecting him. The aim is to silence criticism of Malaysia’s most unpopular prime minister.

To complement these attacks, Najib’s government has deepened its use of racial chauvinism. From the 2013 elections onwards, it has depicted opposition to it as ‘Chinese’ and reinforced the view that Najib’s UMNO party, is the only viable protector of the Malays. This politicised framing lacks any grounding in reality as over 40 per cent of Malays voted for the opposition in 2013 and the most recent Bersih rally showcased the breadth of multi-ethnic opposition to Najib, especially among young Malays. Nevertheless, Najib’s strategy has increased ethnic tensions along political lines. His ratcheted war-like rhetoric at the UMNO meeting points to a willingness to tear the society apart for his own political survival.

Scare tactics have extended to thuggery, most evident in the crass use of violence and intimidation by the UMNO-linked ‘red shirts’. Some of these political vigilantes – many of them allegedly paid to participate in hooliganism – have also been arrested but have clearly received favourable treatment. Despite official denials, the widespread perception is that thuggery is being promoted by the government.

Najib’s machinations also involve political manoeuvring. He has forged an alliance with conservative Islamist zealots. His government has allowed Wahhabi Islam to extend its extremist and intolerant tentacles through the unchecked and increasingly locally- and internationally-funded religious bureaucracy, with particular support from Najib’s close ally and 1MDB partner Saudi Arabia. Lacking moral authority of his own, Najib has chosen to ally himself with the discredited Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), led by Hadi Awang and his designer suit-wearing appointees. Perceptions of corruption and discriminatory land grabbing from indigenous people have corroded PAS’s public support, as Hadi has introduced a bill that hypocritically strengthens the punishment of ordinary Muslims for immoral activity. This bill, known as RUU 355, will open up opportunities for abuse by authorities in a government where the rule of law is not fairly practised and fuel ethnic tensions. It is no coincidence that bill was reactivated after the Bersih 5 rally.

Most of Najib’s politicking has focused on maintaining the support of his own party. He has repeatedly paid off UMNO leaders for their ‘loyalty’ through patronage while also purging UMNO of its leading critics. Former Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad resigned from the party earlier this year due to his opposition to Najib, while the party voted to expel former deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, another prominent critic of the Prime Minister. Najib appointed the grassroots party-stalwart Ahmad Zahid Hamidi as his deputy, aiming in the short-term to deflect party challenges. He is seen to be holding off on the appointment of his favoured cousin, Hishammudin Hussein. But even within UMNO dissatisfaction remains high due to the realisation that Najib is an electoral liability and UMNO could lose. This is despite the attacks, divisions and lack of clear alternative leadership from the opposition.  The public shows of loyalty through dictator-like salutes of the leader at the UMNO AGM hide real unease among members and growing discontent between UMNO elites and the grassroots.

It is therefore little wonder that Najib has increasingly relied on the levers of power to stay in office. His government has broadened gerrymandering and malapportionment in the 2015-2016 electoral redelineation exercise, conducting it without transparency and repeatedly dismissing the record number of challenges. He has also increased populist measures to buy support among Malaysia’s poorest citizens, a pattern that was replicated in the May 2016 Sarawak state elections. These measures have been introduced despite serious strain on operating budgets for government departments and widespread cuts to education and public services.

To compensate for the lack of funds and rising debt, Najib has turned to his new geostrategic ally – China – for money. Not only did China bail out Najib over 1MDB, but he also returned from a visit to Beijing at the beginning of last month bearing some $34 billion worth of deals, funds perceived to help greasing the patronage wheels ahead of the next elections to be scheduled before the end of 2018.

China has a vested interest in keeping a weak, dependent, autocratic leader in power. Little attention is being paid to the potential loss of Malaysian territory to the Chinese, to the unfavourable terms of these arrangements and their limited positive impact on Malaysia’s economy. Guarding against the possibility of electoral defeat, Najib has also established the new National Security Council, which came into effect in August and allows the prime minister to dictatorially declare a state of emergency through a body made up of his own appointees. At the same time, Najib has created a new special defence force and increased his personal protection.

While the Prime Minister has tried to use fear against his people, the person who has been the most afraid is Najib himself. This week’s UMNO meeting reflects rising paranoia. So far he has managed to hold on to power, but not without incurring serious costs. Growing authoritarianism, widening political polarisation, deepening ethnic tensions and discredited immoral leadership have damaged Malaysia’s social and political fabric. Najib’s mismanagement is also evident in the economy’s contraction and the depreciating currency. That thousands braved threats of arrest and thuggery to attend the Bersih 5 rally shows that many Malaysians are willing to fight on and will not be cowed. The test ahead will be the point when Najib’s fear campaign backfires more widely, and more Malaysians realize that the only thing they have to fear is Najib himself.

This piece is published in partnership with Policy Forum – Asia and the Pacific’s platform for public policy analysis and debate.

 

Bridget Welsh is a Senior Research Associate of the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University. She specializes in Southeast Asian politics, with particular focus on Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore. She has edited/written numerous books including, Reflections: The Mahathir Years, Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia, Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years, Democracy Takeoff? The B.J. Habibie Period, Awakening: The Abdullah Badawi Years (a Malay edition Bangkit was published in 2014) and The End of UMNO? Essays on Malaysia’s Dominant Party.  She is the Asian Barometer Survey Southeast Asia core lead, and is currently directing the survey project in Malaysia and Myanmar. From 2015-2016 she was a professor of political science at Ipek University in Turkey. Prior to joining Ipek, she taught at Singapore Management University, the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC and Hofstra University in New York. She received her doctorate in political science from Columbia University, her language training at Cornell University (FALCON) and bachelor’s degree from Colgate University. She also is a Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, a University Fellow of Charles Darwin University and a Senior Advisor for Freedom House and a member of the International Research Council of the National Endowment for Democracy.  

 

Cambodia - Toward peace, reconciliation, and an end to genocide

This month marks a momentous event in Cambodia’s modern history, and the lives of its people, with the handing down of a final verdict by the Extraordinary Chambers of Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in the first case concerning two surviving senior officials from the Khmer Rouge regime, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan.

The Documentation Centre of Cambodia organised live screenings of the decision, held mostly in Buddhist temples and monasteries, in seven remote rural locations, with the aim of providing access to otherwise hard-to-come-by information. Screenings took place in the far-flung provinces of Stung Treng and Mondulkiri, the nearer but isolated districts of the Takéo, Svay Rieng and Kandal provinces, as well as Kampong Chhnang and Kampong Cham which have the largest concentration of Muslims in the country.

Briefings targeting ethnic minorities, marginalised peoples, ex-Khmer Rouge soldiers and cadre, villagers and school-aged students took place prior to the 9am pronouncement, which took one and a half hours to deliver. Following the verdict, forums were held for participants to express their reactions and opinions relating to justice, and the ongoing issue of healing and reconciliation.

Each venue had at least two Documentation Centre representatives present to guide the participants through the history of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and case-specific content. Documentation Centre staff also distributed materials including copies of Khamboly Dy’s A History of Democratic Kampuchea (2007 DC-Cam), which is a now a staple textbook for all secondary students in Years 9-12. A book specifically about the founding case against the surviving Khmer Rouge officials, known as 002, was also provided, as was a booklet on the history of the ECCC, including a summary of the Trial Chamber’s original judgment in case 002/01 (which narrowed the scope of 002).

Elderly survivors from the Prek Phtoul commune in the south-western Takéo Province welcomed the news of the final verdict, in addition to the opportunity to discuss the hardships endured under the regime.

“I believe this is about Karma because they did bad deeds, they were very cruel,” said Mrs Srey Yeng, 71. She recalled how at eight-months pregnant, she was assigned hard labour as part of the ‘four-year plan’ (1977-1980) where improbable tonnes of rice were expected to be yielded from war-scarred territory. When her three-year-old daughter became gravely ill with disease-related malnutrition, she requested permission from the collective leaders to attend to her. “You are not a doctor. You just keep working. Your children are looked after,” she remembers one saying. Yeng lost a total of ten family members, along with her daughter who died shortly after this incident.

The estimated number of deaths from starvation, execution, disease and overwork, ranges anywhere from 1.7 – 2.2 million – just under a third of the population at that time. That suggests there is not a person living today who remains unaffected by the aftermath of the near four-year reign of terror. More than 40 years later, the yawning wounds of the era may have healed into palpable scars, though reconciliation has been met with a degree of incredulity and repudiation particularly among the younger generation.

“I have often shared my experiences with my grandchildren, but I am never quite sure they believe me,” said Mrs Sok Phy, 79, echoing others who have found it a struggle to explain the extreme oppression endured.

Accompanied by her grandchildren, Pech Keat, 72, points to a page in her copy of A History Of Democratic Kampuchea provided at the screening. “During Khmer Rouge regime, I worked like them. It was unimaginable hardship,” she tells them, hoping that the grainy, muted grey and brown photographs will work in some way as proof of her nightmarish existence under the regime.

While the Khmer Rouge Tribunal has been heavily criticised for lengthy delays, arguably its greatest impact has been on valuing education as a means of genocide prevention.

“One of the most significant effects has been in the form of generating discussion and raising awareness,” said Youk Chhang, Executive Director of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia. Additionally, revealing evidence to explain what happened during the period, in order to understand how it could ever have happened, highlights the importance of justice both in the present and for the sake of the future.

“How can a country profess to have the courage to take on the problems of the present and future, if it does not even have the courage to face its past?” asked Chhang who has been instrumental in getting a genocide studies program up and running to heal a forty-year division between perpetrators and victims.

To date, over half a million people have visited the tribunal, with a large percentage being mostly school-aged students from rural areas participating in the outreach program. The Khmer Rouge Study Tour is a one-day affair where interested parties such as NGOs and students visit the ECCC, the nearby Choeung Ek ‘Killing Fields’ and the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, the Khmer Rouge’s most notorious prison-security centre codenamed S-21. For the elderly and for those marginalised by distance and other circumstances, the live screenings importantly provided an opportunity to work toward healing and reconciliation within their own small communities, still very much plagued by social issues.

“I do not want personal compensation,” says 51-year-old Mr Dang Sheang. “What I hope to see are the kind of education measures being put in place now, which will continue to serve as a reminder to younger generations to protect the country from mass atrocity.

Julia Mayer is a Masters of Museum and Heritage Studies student at the Australian National University. She has lived in Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea, and has written extensively on traditional arts, performances and cinema in the region. She is also the Asia Correspondent for Metro Magazine Australia.

 

Jokowi wakes up the leviathan

Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo is turning state-owned enterprises into ‘strong buffaloes’ to drive his economic development strategy. But, not everyone is happy, not least the country’s private sector.

Since the Asian financial crisis, Indonesian governments have regarded state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as ‘cash cows’, an important source of government revenue that required little investment.

Yet, since coming to power in 2014, Indonesia President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has adopted a markedly different approach, providing robust support to turn SOEs into strong ‘buffalos’ that could help to cultivate the economy. However, the private sector has begun to raise concerns about Jokowi’s economy-wide SOE-led development strategy.

The Indonesian government continues to control a significant part of the economy through SOEs, which are dominant in a range of industries, including natural commodities, utilities, marine and air transportation, banking, and telecommunication. While the SOEs in the manufacturing sector of many developing countries have been privatised or have vanished due to low competitiveness, SOEs in Indonesia continue to manufacture diverse products including glass, paper, fertilisers, cement, steel, airplanes, trains, ships, assault rifles and medicines. SOEs in the construction sector build commercial buildings as well as infrastructure.

In 2014, the government held shares in 150 firms and was a majority shareholder of 126 SOEs. The sector’s assets and revenue were equivalent to 44.2 per cent and 19 per cent of GDP respectively in 2014. Moreover, four out of the six Indonesian companies on the 2016 Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest public companies were SOEs.

From the very beginning, the Jokowi administration put the SOE sector at the centre of the government’s economic development plans and has been energetically providing policy measures to support SOEs or ‘agents of development’. For example, the amount of state capital injection into SOEs expanded significantly in 2015, and it was 43 per cent larger than the entire amount injected in the decade from 2004 to 2014. The share of state capital injection in the government expenditure jumped to 3.6 per cent, which was as high as that during the oil boom under the Suharto government.

At the same time, the Jokowi government is pursuing SOE reform including the formation of sectoral holding companies. But, the aim is different to that of previous administrations, as Jokowi aims to expand the SOE sector rather than make it lean. With strong support from government, the SOE sector’s assets are expected to increase by 40 per cent and its investment by nearly 90 per cent between 2016 and 2019.

Jokowi seems to believe that the cost of delayed infrastructure development and industrialisation is significantly higher than the cost incurred due to inefficiencies in SOE-led projects. The President’s decision to put the SOE sector at the forefront of his economic development strategy comes from the accumulated knowledge on the difficulties that past governments faced in attracting private investment for large projects.

The government is also using SOEs to carry out projects with high level risks, hoping that this will draw private investment in the long term. Moreover, it aims to reduce the rent-seeking behaviour of private contractors who sit on their infrastructure licenses with an aim of reselling them to acquire capital gains.

Jokowi’s SOE-centred development strategy has had some success in terms of initiating headline-grabbing projects that have been stuck at the planning stage for the past decade. Some time will need to pass before drawing conclusions about how successful Jokowi’s SOE-led economic development has been, as many SOE-led projects are long term.

While the private sector welcomes the acceleration of infrastructure development, it is also worried about the expansion of SOEs in various sectors of the economy.

The Indonesian National Shipowners’ Association complained about the government’s decision to assign a SOE, Pelni, to manage more than half of the state-owned shipping routes. The Indonesian Port Operators Association grumbled about the government’s plan to hand over the management rights of hundreds of government-controlled ports to SOEs in a situation where the SOE sector already manages more than half of Indonesia’s ports.

The Indonesian Logistics and Forwarders Association has raised concerns about the government’s airport operator, Angkasa Pura, and port operator, Pelindo, entering the logistics services sector. The Indonesia Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Indonesian Builders Association have bemoaned the dominance of SOEs in the construction industry and the lack of opportunities for private contractors in major infrastructure projects.

The government has stated that one of the aims behind the establishment of holding companies is to reduce the competition between SOEs that causes market cannibalisation. If the state-owned holding companies are established without developing non-discrimination policies, the playing field could become even more tilted against private businesses as the holding companies are likely to become even more powerful in the market. Moreover, SOE-led manufacturing industries, ranging from cement to steel, are calling for stronger protection against imports and the entry of foreign companies.

The government’s current management approach for the SOE sector indicates that an ambiguous interpretation of Article 33 of the Constitution will continue to be reflected in the revised SOE Law that is expected to be passed in the People’s Representative Council before the end of the Jokowi administration. This law would send mixed signals and further confuse private investors who positively view Jokowi’s business-friendly policies. Future administrations will have to deal with the side effects of waking up the leviathan.

Kyunghoon Kim is a Phd candidate at the Department of International Development, King’s College London, UK. He was previously a research fellow at the Samsung Economic Research Institute, Korea.

 

Who is behind TODAY’S DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA?

The rally was initiated by the so-called National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council’s Fatwa (GNPF-MUI), referring to a fatwa from the MUI stating that Ahok had indeed committed blasphemy. The leader of the hard-line Islam Defenders Front (FPI), Habieb Rizieq, is a leading organizer of the planned rally.

Ahok, a Christian and Indonesian of Chinese descent in a Muslim-majority country, has sparked uproar among Islamic groups after he made a comment about a Quranic verse during his visit to Thousand Islands regency in late September.

Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations have expressed their disapproval over the rally.

Muhammadiyah and Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) have called on the GNPF-MUI to refrain from holding another demonstration, saying the move would disrupt the ongoing legal process.

The Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI), meanwhile, has also called Muslims not to stage another rally, asking them to channel their aspirations through more democratic ways, namely through meetings with the government or through the media. The MUI has also distanced itself from the GNPF-MUI, saying the latter was not part of it and did not have any formal relations with the council as an Islamic organization.

What will they do?

Rizieq had initially said the protesters would carry out Friday prayers along two of the capital's main roads, Jl. MH Thamrin and Jl. Sudirman. National Police chief Gen. Tito Karnavian quickly rejected the idea, as doing so would cause massive congestion. NU leading cleric Ahmad Mustofa Bisri has also expressed concern that conducting Friday prayers on the street had no precedent in Islam.

The MUI, meanwhile, announced in a fatwa on its website that Friday prayers could be held outside a mosque as long as there was coordination with law enforcement bodies and no disturbance to public activities.

After a series of meetings between the GNPF-MUI and the National Police, it was decided that the rally’s Friday prayers would be held at the National Monument (Monas) from 8 a.m. until 1 p.m. and would consist only of dzikir (mass chants in praise of God), sermons and Friday prayers instead of street demonstration. Jl. Merdeka Selatan is also prepared to accommodate protesters.

Up to 600,000 people are predicted to join the rally according to Monas management, but police estimated the number to be closer to 150,000 to 200,000 people.

How will this rally affect business and traffic?

The National Police will reroute traffic around the Monas to prevent congestion, and Jl. Medan Merdeka Utara and Jl. Medan Merdeka Barat will be closed.

(Read also: Police to reroute traffic during anti-Ahok gathering on Friday)

Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) chairman Rosan P. Roeslani said local and global investors had expressed hope that the rally would not turn violent.

Previously, the leadership of the Confederation of Indonesian Workers Unions (KSPI) announced that its members would participate in the Dec. 2 rally. Aside from demanding Ahok’s arrest, the labor union would also voice its protest over Government Regulation No. 78 of 2015 concerning wages. The union boasted that 500,000 workers would join the rally. The National Police are calling on labor union leaders to postpone their rally.

Some schools in Central Jakarta, such as St. Theresia Catholic School, will be closed on Friday.

Will the rally turn chaotic?

Gen. Tito has called on Greater Jakarta residents to not be alarmed about the rally. Jokowi has also stated that he considered the rally a mass prayer event rather than another anti-Ahok demonstration.

The police and the military are ready to deploy 22,000 joint forces to secure the rally. The personnel will secure not only Monas, but also government offices surrounding Monas and other government offices and hotels, such as Jl. Veteran, Lapangan Banteng, the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle, Tanah Abang, Jl. Abdul Muis and Jl. K.H Hasyim Ashari.

Just like for the Nov. 4 rally, the personnel would not carry firearms and take a friendly approach toward protesters. However, not everyone is convinced the rally will run peacefully. National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) chief Comr. Gen Suhardi Alius, for example, has warned that former terrorism convicts may join the rally.

What about the legal process in the blasphemy case?

The legal process is still in progress and moving quickly as the case has been given a priority due to its sensitive nature.

• Sept. 27: Ahok visited Thousand Island regency
• Oct. 11: MUI concluded that Ahok had committed blasphemy
• Oct. 14: First rally demanding Ahok’s immediate arrest in front of City Hall
• Nov. 4: Mass rally in front of State Palace with more than 100,000 protesters. Jokowi promised that the case would be solved within two weeks.
• Nov. 7: Police summoned Ahok for closed-door questioning
• Nov. 9: A police official said that the police had questioned more than 30 witnesses in their investigation
• Nov. 10: Plan to live-broadcast the case-screening was announced, and canceled the next day
• Nov. 12: Jakarta General Elections Commission (KPU Jakarta) confirmed that Ahok is still eligible to run for Governor despite suspect status. KPU Jakarta chairman Sumarno said the only thing that could invalidate Ahok’s candidacy was if a court sentenced him to five years of imprisonment or more. If a candidate is sentenced to five years, Sumarno said, political parties endorsing the candidate were required to find a substitute at the very latest 30 days before the election.
• Nov. 14: Ahok’s campaign carries on with the launch of a new post
• Nov. 15: The case screening was held, Ahok did not attend. A case screening is part of a crime investigation prior to the police deciding whether or not to name someone a suspect.
• Nov. 16: Ahok was named suspect. The governor was charged with violating Article 156 (a) of the Criminal Code on blasphemy, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
• Nov. 17: Amnesty International urged police to drop the case
• Nov. 22: Ahok appears at Bareskrim for first interrogation as suspect. He was questioned for eight hours and refused to comment further.
• Nov. 22: Human Rights Watch urges Indonesia to repeal Blasphemy Law
• Nov. 23: Police probe Buni Yani, uploader of Ahok’s allegedly blasphemous speech. Buni’s edited video contained errors in the transcript that started the issue of blasphemy. He was named a suspect. Buni was charged with violating Article 28 of the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law, which carried a maximum sentence of six years in prison.
• Nov. 25: Police handed over case dossier to Attorney General’s Office (AGO)
• Nov. 30: AGO declared the case dossier complete

Is it true that the rally can lead to the President’s impeachment?

Speculation that the demonstrations are actually targeting President Jokowi is rife since Nov. 4. At his press conference following the large-scale rally, the President vaguely accused “political actors” of being behind the rally.

During the rally, House of Representative Deputy Speaker Fahri Hamzah made a provocative speech about impeaching the President. In his speech, Fahri said there were two ways Jokowi could be impeached, through the legislature or through the ‘street legislature’.

Jokowi’s supporters grouped in the Red and White Solidarity Group (Solmet) reported Fahri to the Jakarta Police for allegedly violating Article 160 of the Criminal Code on provocation. Another group, the President’s Volunteer Forum (Bara JP), reported Fahri to the National Police’s Criminal Investigation Department (Bareskrim).

Fahri later dismissed the impeachment rumor.

The Constitution allows lawmakers to impeach a president if two thirds vote in favor. However, an impeachment seems far-fetched after Jokowi made a series of meetings with leaders of political parties to consolidate support after the Nov. 4 rally.

 

People of Thailand, meet your new king - playboy prince has a reputation among his soon-to-be subjects for bizarre behavior, womanizing and cruelty to his many wives

With the Southeast Asian nation facing an uncertain future with the death of its revered monarch on Thursday, a new photo has emerged of the throne’s heir apparent looking more court jester than king.

Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, 64, showed up at an airport in Munich recently, strutting around in a rolled-up tank top, sagging jeans and fake tattoos with a poodle in tow.

In contrast to his father, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, whose death ends a 70-year reign, the playboy prince has a reputation among his soon-to-be subjects for bizarre behavior, womanizing and cruelty to his many wives.

Taking a page from Caligula, Vajiralongkorn named his favorite pet, a poodle named Foo Foo, as an air marshal.

He even took the pooch to a 2007 reception hosted in his honor by US Ambassador Ralph “Skip” Boyce.

“Foo Foo was . . . dressed in formal evening attire complete with paw mitts, and at one point during the band’s second number, he jumped up onto the head table and began lapping from the guests’ water glasses,” Boyce wrote, according to a WikiLeaks document.

 “The Air Chief Marshal’s antics . . . remains the talk of the town to this day.”

But tales of the prince’s behavior exist mostly in the realm of rumor in Thailand. The nation has strict laws banning stories about the royal family.

But in 2007, the depravity of Vajiralongkorn’s court was exposed when a video surfaced of his third wife, Princess Srirasmi, a former bar waitress, walking around topless at her own birthday party while eating cake with Foo Foo.

When the dog died last year, it was given a four-day funeral.

Srirasmi has split from the prince after being booted from the Royal Palace in December. In a show of his cruelty, he recently allowed her parents to be thrown in prison for 2¹/₂ years for “royal defamation.”

His earlier two marriages were equally rocky. During his first — to his cousin — he allegedly fathered five kids with a mistress, then married the mistress. Later he dumped her, forcing her to flee the country.

The new images of him are sensitive, with officials detaining the Thai wife of a British journalist who put them online.

While Vajiralongkorn is the heir apparent, some hope his younger sister, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, might ascend to the throne. But women are banned from the throne.

Vajiralongkorn, meanwhile, has asked for four days to mourn before being installed as king — but some wags think he only wants more time to party.

With Post wire services

Moving beyond the Myitsone dam dilemma

How a historical border treaty between China and Myanmar could keep both countries out of troubled waters when it comes to the controversial and stalled project.  After taking power in April 2016 some specialists expected that Myanmar’s NLD government would quickly determine the fate of the China-backed and controversial Myitsone dam.

Amid a wave of popular, protest construction on the Chinese-backed project was halted by the Thein Sein government in 2011. Aung San Suu Kyi’s assurances in August that there will be a solution to the stalled dam may be welcome news in Beijing.

As it  turns out though,  both sides still need to go through a hard, if not time-consuming, bargaining process in order to solve this bilateral issue — a problem further complicated by the fact that it cuts across Kachin localism, Burmese nationalism, and cultural symbolism.

But a solution is not impossible – and both countries only need to turn back the clock and look to the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty for a potential way forward.

Today’s leaders in Myanmar and China have inherited a shared legacy of successful bargaining from the 1950s on one of the most significant and controversial issues in the history of Sino-Burmese relations—boundary settlement.

According to the final treaty signed in 1960, the Chinese government recognised and respected the status quo of the then China-Burma boundary, and gave up previous claims on territories by accepting the “McMahon Line” and the “1941 Line”. In return Beijing got back Hpimaw（片马）, Gawlum（古浪）, and Kangfang （岗房）villages, and the Panhuang（班洪）-Panlao（班老） tribal area.

For China, the treaty relinquished previous claims over unsettled territory and represented a tough decision that was initially strongly opposed by the Chinese embassy in Burma, by the government of Yunnan province, and by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. It is still  criticised by nationalists, and on occasion by researchers, today.

For Myanmar, the treaty conceded 132 square miles to China in exchange for 85 square miles. Sacrificing a small portion of territory in order to prevent a major misunderstanding and anxiety was more than worthwhile.

The Sino-Burmese boundary treaty  was part of a national strategy designed by then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, and a clear demonstration of his pragmatism.  In 1956 he told Burmese Prime Minister U Ba Swe  “we have to concede to you in order to solve, once and for all, all China’s border disputes with neighboring countries. We will make every effort to overcome the difficulties to fulfill the scheme.”

Thanks to Premier Zhou’s forward-looking spirit and diplomatic pragmatism,  an an initiator of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, the boundary settlement has made a great contribution to the mutual benefit of Myanmar and China.

That’s why today, China should respect the status quo of Myitsone dam. Learning from history, Beijing must recognise and accept the decision to halt the Myitsone dam project  rather than pushing the NLD government to reauthorise construction.

This is a priority for three reasons.

First, Myitsone dam is quite unpopular in Kachin State which has been in revolt against Myanmar’s central government since 2011. Any kind of revival of the project will jeopardise Myanmar’s peace process and any eventual peace agreements with the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) that, to a large extend, represents one fourth  of the over 1.6 million people in the state.

Second, Myitsone dam has already become one of the main targets of Burmese patriotism and environmental activist movements. If Aung San Suu Kyi were to accept generous Chinese terms to restart the dam, it seems most likely that her public reputation would suffer, or worse, it could be an act of ‘political suicide’.

 Third, any decision on Myitsone dam should not be judged as an indication of Myanmar’s ‘flirtation’ with the West, nor should it be seen as an example of the special Paukphaw friendship shared with China. It should be seen for what it is – a decision about a dam. Neutralism in this contentious issue is still in the national interest for both China and Myanmar.

The final agreement on the Myitsone dam controversy must result from modest concessions by both sides. China and Myanmar need to reach a mutually respected deal to break the impasse and move Sino-Myanmar relations forward.

Liu Yun is an independent analyst based in China and writes on Myanmar regularly. 

 

In Search of Recognition - The Leo Stach Story

Author’s Note

Leopold W. Stach, 16 June 1914-12 February 1998

As we commemorate the life of Leo Stach, we are reminded that this great country, Australia, is indebted to the many generations of migrants who contributed to the nation’s wealth and prosperity.

A gifted child, Leo was born in Melbourne to a first generation Australian family of German extraction at a time when the European conflict spread, creating economic hardship for all. When the Great War ended and, under the watchful eyes of his mother and a doting Aunt Hilda, Leo excelled at school, winning scholarships as his academic successes multiplied.

He was a lonely child, neglecting sports in favour of his studies, accepting that he would be unable to attend high school or university without the benefit of scholarships. It was these difficult times that moulded Leo’s appreciation for security, often in later life misinterpreted by his peers as meanness. For Leo, a penny was a penny and he decided at an early age to ensure that he would never be without again.

Leo’s love for geology became apparent in his early teens when he would wander around rocky outcrops alone, learning to unlock the secrets the timeless formations held underfoot. His youthful but advanced knowledge of geology resulted in many achievements. Some rocks he discovered during one of his many weekend excursions into the countryside, peddling his way tirelessly through the hills, were named after him. Whilst only 16, Leo was admitted into the prestigious Royal Society of Victoria.

Further scholarships took the diligent student through university, and he gained his Masters in Geology in record time. Recruited by Australian oil interests, Leo suddenly found himself in Papua assisting with the first oil drilling programs ever to be undertaken there. This was practical experience in difficult terrain. Bitter memories of those times remained with Leo throughout his life.

Europe had again exploded into war under Hitler. Leo’s workplace in the jungle became a living hell as he fought to prove his loyalty to Australia. Then the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour. Leo was evacuated back to Australia, where he remained until recruited by General Douglas MacArthur to accompany American intelligence teams during the long battle through the West Pacific and on to Japan.

It was during this time that Leo Stach excelled, serving the Allied Forces with distinction. Unarmed due to his civilian status, Leo bravely waded ashore from US landing craft to be among the first hundreds to land, under heavy enemy fire, on the beaches of Balikpapan in Indonesian Borneo.

On patrol in the New Guinea highlands, he came under aerial attack when his survey teams were strafed. He assisted in the carving of airfields and roads through the treacherous jungles. He continued to work tirelessly as a member of General MacArthur’s team, spending years in the most difficult conditions, often in extreme danger, collecting and collating landing intelligence.

In his last days, Leo expressed sadness that his contributions were still to be recognized by the United States and Australian governments. But he never boasted of his war exploits and, even in his twilight years, recounted his incredible story with humility. Leo died an unsung hero.

Hopefully, one day, the Australian and American governments will recognize Leo for his war effort, which undoubtedly contributed to saving many Allied lives. His bravery in storming ashore under fire unarmed to obtain first hand intelligence lessened casualty figures as the landings continued. Leo’s dedication and expertise was not lost on General MacArthur. The American Forces took him to Tokyo, where he played a pivotal role in helping rehabilitate the country’s devastated oil industry.

During the Occupation period, Leo fell in love with his late wife, Aki and they raised a family together. Soon they were blessed with three children, William, George and Sue. During this time Leo became interested in stock markets and ardently pursued investments on the New York Exchange and then in Australia.

Leo was engaged by the United Nations, which resulted in his moving to Taiwan, where he firmly placed his stamp on the emerging oil and gas industry. At the same time he became active in the Australian oil industry; he pegged out his own explor­ation lease in Torquay and, during occasional leave breaks from the Orient, advised Western Australian oil interests.

As his children grew, Leo decided to relocate his family to Melbourne, after which he was again engaged by the United Nations to assist with the development of the oil and gas industry throughout Asia. He was appointed Chief of Mineral Resources with the United Nations Development Program. Leo’s contrib­ution was recognized, his works published on no fewer than 50 occasions as the accolades continued to flow.

But many of Leo Stach’s achievements remain unknown. In 1974 he was secretly flown into Saigon by the American Forces to examine South Vietnam’s oil and gas potential. Most of Leo’s earlier work remains locked in American military archives. His records show that Japan’s most senior Shogun held Leo in high esteem. His communications with the famed novelist James A Michener and the photographs of our lightly-built Australian hero standing beside General Douglas MacArthur on the beaches of Balikpapan speak silently of his colourful life.

When I first met Leo Stach, evidence of the man I would grow to understand was far from apparent in the stooped, fragile frame that shuffled over, with outstretched hand, to greet me. My immediate concern was that there would be insufficient time to complete our interviews before he finally surrendered to the debilitating emphysema that so cruelly impeded his capacity to speak for any length of time. Obviously I had a great deal to learn about this man, whose sense of determination had carried him from the desperation of being poor and physically feeble, to outstanding success and the satisfaction of great achievement.

Leo was keen to assist others wishing to undertake studies similar to his. During his last years he provided funds for instit­utions specialising in earth science, geology and palaeontology studies. He was interested to support students who achieved excellent grades but had limited funds to educate themselves, remembering how difficult and frustrating his own life was as a struggling student. In 1994 he established the Leo Stach Memorial Scholarship at the University of Melbourne. The Institut Teknologi Bandung, in Indonesia, the Chiang Mai University in Thailand, and the Prince of Songkla University in Thailand also benefited from his grants.

Leo Stach passed away on 12 February 1998, before his story was in print. At his bedside, not hours before he died, I gave him my undertaking that I would complete this biography so that at least in part, his achievements would be documented and the story of his exploits recorded for his peers and heirs to read. This was the mixture of the man: so humble in the telling of his story, and yet so yearning for recognition of his deeds.

His passing will be remembered as the end of an Australian pioneering era.

Kerry B. Collison