India's elite faces potential revolt

FOR a country with 1.2 billion people, India is ruled by a surprisingly small elite, which runs everything from the government to large companies and even sports bodies. But a series of scandals, some involving billions of dollars, has now seriously undermined that elite's standing in the eyes of the public.






Almost anyone in a position of power in India, including well-known print and television journalists, is now viewed with suspicion. This is occurring at a time when economic growth is pulling a young and upwardly mobile population into the urban middle class. This new middle class is no longer constrained by the patronage systems of the village, but it also does not enjoy the cozy relationship that links the old middle class with the elite. Could this crisis of the elite trigger India's own Tiananmen Square moment?

Except in totalitarian regimes, a country's elite depends on a degree of popular acceptance, which is mostly derived from the belief that the elite is broadly "fair" in its dealings. Following the recent series of scandals, the average Indian does not believe this any more.

Of course, doubts about the ruling elite are not unique to India. Almost all countries undergoing a shift from a pre-industrial equilibrium based on patronage to one based on modern institutions and the rule of law have faced such crises of legitimacy.
Until the early 19th century, for example, British politics was extraordinarily corrupt. The old aristocracy not only dominated the House of Lords, but also used its influence to get relatives, friends and family retainers elected to the House of Commons by exploiting a key institutional weakness -- the existence of "rotten boroughs" that could be bought and sold.

The Duke of Newcastle alone is said to have controlled seven such boroughs, each with two representatives. Meanwhile, large and populous industrial cities like Birmingham and Manchester were barely represented. In 1819, a crowd of 60,000 gathered in Manchester to demand reform, but were charged by the cavalry. Fifteen people were killed and many more injured in what is remembered as the Peterloo Massacre.

Given the recent memory of the violent French Revolution, the British elite reluctantly agreed to democratising reforms. Ultimately, the Reform Act of 1832 abolished the rotten boroughs and extended the franchise to the new middle class (the working class and women would have to wait).

The United States, too, went though a period of robber baron industrialisation in the 1870s and 1880s. The greed and corruption of that era were satirised in 1873 by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner in their book The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today. The period ended with the depression of 1893-96, and was followed by the major political reforms of the Progressive Era.

For Britain and the US, the transition in the nature of the governing elite was relatively smooth. But there are many examples where such change was sudden and violent -- the French and Russian Revolutions, for example. In Germany, the old Prussian elite successfully managed the country's industrialisation in the late 19th century, but was discredited by defeat in World War 1. Nazism filled the ensuing vacuum, and a new equilibrium would be established only after World War 2.

Similar shifts have been witnessed in Asia. Japan saw two shifts -- the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the period after World War 2. South Korea was ruled by generals until widespread student protests led to a democratic transition in 1987. (Many of the country's top businessmen faced prosecution in subsequent years). Indonesia experienced its shift more recently, in 1998.

When China confronted this moment during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the communist state repressed the students with an iron fist, but has since maintained a single-minded focus on economic growth. Corruption remains a major problem, but the authorities take care to punish the worst excesses in a highly visible way. Still, as the recent controversy over the Nobel Peace Prize demonstrated, the government remains nervous about any dissent that challenges the legitimacy of the ruling elite.

Even adjusted for purchasing power, India's middle class today probably totals no more than 70 million (far smaller than is generally assumed). But, in the coming decade, today's established middle class will be swamped by newcomers working their way up from the country's slums, small towns and villages.

One can see them everywhere -- learning English in "coaching centres", working anonymously in the new malls and call centres, or suddenly famous as sports stars. Never before has India experienced such social mobility. So far, this new group has been too busy climbing the income ladder to express their resentment at the excesses of the elite, but one can feel a growing sense of anger among its members.

It is impossible to predict when the shift will happen or what form it will take. Given India's democratic traditions, it is likely that the change will be peaceful. One possibility is that it will take place province by province -- the previously ungovernable state of Bihar being a prime example.

But we might also see an unpredictable turn, with a new political leader or movement suddenly capturing the popular imagination and sweeping aside the old arrangements. As we know from Nazi Germany and other cases, such movements do not always lead to a happy outcome.

Perhaps India's existing elite will learn from history, purge itself, and then open itself up to new talent. Many investigations have been ordered into the current corruption scandals. Over the course of this year, Indians will find out if such efforts are serious and whether they will lead to reform -- or merely to deeper crisis. -- Project Syndicate


By Sanjeev Sanyal author of The Indian Renaissance: India's Rise after a Thousand Years of Decline
New Straits Times Kuala Lumpur

Vietnam’s Troubled Economy

Steady as she staggers
Rulers pass up the chance to deal with mounting economic problems











ALL too frequently Vietnam’s capital is plagued by power blackouts. Hotel lifts get stuck, and even the espresso machines in Hanoi’s Parisian-style cafés splutter to a halt. Many thought this fast-developing country had left such symptoms behind. Yet the economy is now straining, and often failing, to keep up with the ambitious growth targets set by Vietnam’s Communist bosses. Inflation is rising; the budget is in deficit; the currency is falling; and people are rushing to turn their savings into dollars or gold.

Decisive action is called for, but is unlikely to come from the Communist Party’s showcase congress, its 11th, later this month. As well as a misfiring economy, the list of problems includes official corruption, unpopular land grabs, environmental damage and, as ever, a lack of political transparency. Little change in policy is expected, nor even in personnel, apart from a polite game of musical chairs at the very top. Earlier hopes that a cohort of reform-minded apparatchiks might replace an older, more staid generation have now been disappointed.

Even the prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, may stay in office, after speculation that he would take the rap for the biggest mishap, the collapse of Vinashin, the giant state-owned shipbuilder. Last year the sprawling empire imploded with debts of $4.5 billion. In December Vinashin defaulted on a loan to international creditors and it has been forced to go cap in hand to the government to pay its wage bill.

To critics of Vietnam’s policies, the collapse of Vinashin was a vivid illustration of the perils of relying on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to provide the impetus for economic growth and modernisation. Yet according to congress documents which have already been agreed upon, the SOEs will continue to play the economy’s “leading role”, as they always have done. One expert on Vietnam, David Koh of the Institute of South-East Asian Studies in Singapore, says that, away from the party congress, the government has been taking some action. It recently issued directives that put new restrictions on how SOEs are allowed to operate, particularly in terms of how much they may diversify away from their core businesses. But commerce in Vietnam is highly bureaucratic. It will take the state enterprises a long time to respond to these directives, if indeed they ever do. Meanwhile, who is to say that the enterprises are in the right business to start with?

Such conservatism will make investors fret. The problems of the SOEs explain much of Vietnam’s weakening macroeconomic outlook. If the government does not take the SOEs by the scruff of the neck, it will be able to do little else. The SOEs need to be set free, but for that the Communists would have to give up political control of the economy. That is out of the question. So these corrupt and inefficient behemoths continue to gobble up and then squander a good share of the foreign investment and export earnings that come into the country. Meanwhile, the government is blowing its budget. The fiscal deficit rose to 7.4% of GDP last year, breaching the target of 6.2%.

The country now also runs big trade and current-account deficits, as it relies too heavily on exporting low-value stuff like processed seafood and rice. These deficits, added to inflation, which rose to 11.8% last year, have put the currency under pressure. Three times in the past 14 months the government has been forced to devalue, hence the rush among Vietnamese to hoard dollars and gold as they lose faith in the dong. The government has pledged to improve all these gloomy figures. Yet chasing growth rates of 7% a year or more without commensurate structural change will only generate more of them.

The Economist

Thai Nationalist elements threaten to wreck Thai-Cambodia thaw

Patriotism sounds good in theory. In practice, it often drives nations into conflicts and even wars. The Thai Patriots Group, a faction that split from the yellow-shirt People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), is returning to the political limelight. This time, it is using the same arbitrary tactic: stirring up a sense of nationalism against Cambodia.

Thai-Cambodian relations have remained dangerously erratic, especially since the PAD politicised the case of the Preah Vihear Temple, known in Thai as Phra Wihan, to help unseat the Thaksin-backed regime in 2008. The successful politicisation of the issue reminded policy-makers of the inexorable connection between nationalism and diplomacy: The strength of the former is celebrated at the expense of the weakness of the latter.

Last week, Democrat MP Panich Vikitsreth and six other Thais, including PAD member Veera Somkwamkid, were arrested by the Cambodian authorities near the border in Sa Kaew province. The Thai Foreign Ministry admitted that they were actually inside Cambodian territory when the arrests took place.

Thai analysts were convinced that their encroachment into Cambodian territory was not accidental. It was part of a plan to provoke nationalistic feelings that could further damage the already fragile bilateral ties. They did not inform local Thai Army officials of their visit to the disputed area in Sa Kaew. Panich, as an MP, should have been more responsible and better aware of the negative repercussions of his actions on Thai relations with Cambodia.

Nationalism knows no bound. What happened at the border has unleashed a patriotic force in the Thai capital. A few days ago, members of the Thai Patriots gathered outside the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok to demand the release of the Thai group from a Phnom Penh jail. The protest included the burning of a coffin with a picture of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on it.

It is reported that Prime Minister Hun Sen is upset at the protests by this group linked to the PAD. He has always believed that there is an anti-Cambodia agenda within the PAD. He may have forgiven Kasit Piromya, then serving in the opposition, for humiliating him on a television talk show in October 2008. But surely Hun Sen will never forget.

True, Hun Sen is himself a forceful nationalist. In the past he has regularly employed nationalist strategies and tactics to achieve a variety of political goals at the expense of his country's ties with Thailand. His seeming reluctance to interfere in the arson attack on the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh in 2003 by so-called Cambodian patriots was just one way of demonstrating his nationalist principles.

In the current episode, both the Democrat-led government and the Thai Foreign Ministry are working to overcome great obstacles. These obstacles have been exacerbated by mutual distrust and the distortion of history by the two countries. The difficulty for the Thai Foreign Ministry is clear: Hun Sen has never been fond of Kasit, and Kasit's earlier association with the PAD has complicated Thai diplomacy vis-a-vis Cambodia.

Similarly, for the Democrat Party, its earlier support of nationalist protests against Cambodia revealed one dangerous and risky strategy: using international politics for domestic gain.

In 2008, Abhisit Vejjajiva, leader of the then opposition Democrat Party, provoked nationalist feelings by stressing in parliament: "I hope that all Thai MPs will show distrust of this government. I call on all MPs who are 'Thai' to vote against Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama for abusing their constitutional power involving the Preah Vihear issue. It is time for Thais to have a government that is grateful to its Thai ancestors and knows how to prioritise the nation's interests."

Since the Democrat Party came to power in late 2008, it has been unable to set aside certain nationalist tendencies. This attitude has undoubtedly boosted the PAD's confidence in challenging Hun Sen's leadership.

A large body of opinion has always argued that leaders have incentives to allow anti-foreign, jingoistic protests in order to gain domestic political points, even if they may lose diplomatic bargaining leverage by doing so.

Domestic constraints reduce the advantages in international negotiations. Anti-Cambodia protests, as an example, provide an alternative mechanism by which domestic political objectives can be fulfilled. But at the same time, they deepen bilateral conflicts. In this case they open the door for Cambodia, a smaller nation, to raise its diplomatic leverage as it interacts with Thailand.

The government may argue that it knew nothing about its own MP and his plan to instigate renewed Thai nationalism against Cambodia. But territorial disputes between the two countries have been a sensitive issue for a few years now. And like it or not, the Abhisit government has to take responsibility if Panich's illegal entry into Cambodia causes a serious problem in our bilateral relations.

In the past few months, Thai-Cambodian ties have steadily improved. Hun Sen's U-turn policy toward the Abhisit government has become a subject of much debate: whether the adoption of a friendlier policy is a reflection of Cambodia's recognition of Abhisit's stronger position at home, or whether a deal has been done between the two countries' armies to maintain a status quo over the disputed border areas.

Whatever the reasons, the Thai Patriots' protests will not contribute positively to the improved relationship.

By Pavin Chachavalpongpun, former diplomat, fellow at Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. The Nation, Bangkok

Challenges for Indonesia as ASEAN chair

A portentous opportunity for the nation to bolster its diplomatic achievements and standing in Southeast Asia has emerged as Indonesia readies itself to take over ASEAN’s rotating chair in 2011. In 1976, when Indonesia chaired ASEAN, member states produced the Bali Concord I, which was based on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). It laid out the rules of the game for ASEAN and also for other powers that wanted to engage in any form of cooperation with ASEAN.

The recent signing and ratification of this treaty by Japan, China, and the United States further emphasized its importance to ASEAN as well as to the three nations.
Similarly, in 2003, ASEAN produced the Bali Concord II, which initiated the ASEAN Economic Community. Therefore, it is understandable if we expect another breakthrough from Indonesia this time around, probably in the form of a third Bali Concord.

The government of Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono seems enthusiastic and prepared to play a huge role, at least from what we can see on the surface.

If we examine the slogan that Indonesia chose for its chairmanship, ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations”, it can be inferred that Indonesia’s leadership over the next 12 months will be more outward-looking.

In the words of government officials, Indonesia will focus on carving a bigger role for ASEAN in international society, using the nation’s advantages as the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and the only Southeast Asian nation in the G20.
Nevertheless, when we talk about regional cooperation, especially in the form of an organization, we will always face the question of “deepening” versus “widening”.

Deepening means the organization will focus more on internal improvements, such as strengthening its dispute settlement mechanism. Widening usually refers to enlarging membership, organizational roles

or issues covered. These options are not necessarily contradictory, yet priorities have to be set.

For ASEAN, executing both deepening and widening strategies will be very hard, considering the short period of the chairmanship. This means that Indonesia must choose which option to focus on. For those who believe that ASEAN still needs many organizational improvements, then, it will be considerably naïve for ASEAN to widen its role and seek influence externally while not devoting attention and energy to internal development.

If Indonesia focuses on deepening, it will find many unresolved challenges that need to be taken care of very seriously.

To begin with, Indonesia will be faced with the jargon of “people-centered association”, which needs to be translated into real action. Arranging events in which the ASEAN public will be involved is insufficient. Instead, within the aforementioned expression lies a mandate for any form of cooperation made within the framework of ASEAN to done for the benefit of the people.

ASEAN is often criticized for being too elitist. Such criticism is not entirely wrong, because people might feel that the cooperation or negotiations that have been happened inside ASEAN have not necessarily brought advantages to them.

For Indonesia, one immediate regional and national interest should be the protection of migrant workers.

As one of the largest sources of migrant workers, protection and promotion of their rights is Indonesia’s vital interest and needs to be one of the focuses of Indonesian foreign policy in ASEAN. This is also in line with voices from domestic constituents, who have urged the Indonesian government to step up efforts to protect its citizens abroad, including migrant workers.

The Declaration on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers made in Cebu in 2007 is a good start, yet it needs to be closely monitored in execution.

If we look at the implementation of an ASEAN single market, which also includes the free flow of workers, then this issue will not only be the interest of Indonesia, but also of most of ASEAN’s member states. Therefore, as the incoming chair of ASEAN, Indonesia should promote this as one of the most important items on the agenda during its tenure.

Another goal that Indonesia needs to achieve is promotion of democracy and human rights. It is understood that some ASEAN states are, as some say, “in the process of transitioning towards democracy”. Those countries, which are relatively young in terms of ASEAN membership, are looking at other members for examples as to how democracy and human rights can be practiced.

Indonesia is a reference for those young members. Indonesia as one of the founding fathers and the incoming chair of ASEAN must be able to set a good example as to how to practice democracy and how to enforce human rights.

By the end of its tenure as ASEAN chair, Indonesia must be able to report not only to its citizens, but also to all citizens of ASEAN that it has done its best to convert ASEAN’s slogan of a “people-centered association” into people-centered policies.

The time for rhetoric in ASEAN is over. It is time for real action to benefit of the people. Hopefully Indonesia will be able to maximize its role as the chair of ASEAN in 2011.


The writer is an assistant lecturer in International Relations at the University of Indonesia in Depok, West Java. Jakarta Post

Challenges for Indonesia as ASEAN chair

A portentous opportunity for the nation to bolster its diplomatic achievements and standing in Southeast Asia has emerged as Indonesia readies itself to take over ASEAN’s rotating chair in 2011. In 1976, when Indonesia chaired ASEAN, member states produced the Bali Concord I, which was based on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). It laid out the rules of the game for ASEAN and also for other powers that wanted to engage in any form of cooperation with ASEAN.

The recent signing and ratification of this treaty by Japan, China, and the United States further emphasized its importance to ASEAN as well as to the three nations.
Similarly, in 2003, ASEAN produced the Bali Concord II, which initiated the ASEAN Economic Community. Therefore, it is understandable if we expect another breakthrough from Indonesia this time around, probably in the form of a third Bali Concord.

The government of Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono seems enthusiastic and prepared to play a huge role, at least from what we can see on the surface.

If we examine the slogan that Indonesia chose for its chairmanship, ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations”, it can be inferred that Indonesia’s leadership over the next 12 months will be more outward-looking.

In the words of government officials, Indonesia will focus on carving a bigger role for ASEAN in international society, using the nation’s advantages as the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and the only Southeast Asian nation in the G20.

Nevertheless, when we talk about regional cooperation, especially in the form of an organization, we will always face the question of “deepening” versus “widening”.
Deepening means the organization will focus more on internal improvements, such as strengthening its dispute settlement mechanism. Widening usually refers to enlarging membership, organizational roles

or issues covered. These options are not necessarily contradictory, yet priorities have to be set.

For ASEAN, executing both deepening and widening strategies will be very hard, considering the short period of the chairmanship. This means that Indonesia must choose which option to focus on. For those who believe that ASEAN still needs many organizational improvements, then, it will be considerably naïve for ASEAN to widen its role and seek influence externally while not devoting attention and energy to internal development.

If Indonesia focuses on deepening, it will find many unresolved challenges that need to be taken care of very seriously.

To begin with, Indonesia will be faced with the jargon of “people-centered association”, which needs to be translated into real action. Arranging events in which the ASEAN public will be involved is insufficient. Instead, within the aforementioned expression lies a mandate for any form of cooperation made within the framework of ASEAN to done for the benefit of the people.

ASEAN is often criticized for being too elitist. Such criticism is not entirely wrong, because people might feel that the cooperation or negotiations that have been happened inside ASEAN have not necessarily brought advantages to them.
For Indonesia, one immediate regional and national interest should be the protection of migrant workers.

As one of the largest sources of migrant workers, protection and promotion of their rights is Indonesia’s vital interest and needs to be one of the focuses of Indonesian foreign policy in ASEAN. This is also in line with voices from domestic constituents, who have urged the Indonesian government to step up efforts to protect its citizens abroad, including migrant workers.

The Declaration on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers made in Cebu in 2007 is a good start, yet it needs to be closely monitored in execution.

If we look at the implementation of an ASEAN single market, which also includes the free flow of workers, then this issue will not only be the interest of Indonesia, but also of most of ASEAN’s member states. Therefore, as the incoming chair of ASEAN, Indonesia should promote this as one of the most important items on the agenda during its tenure.

Another goal that Indonesia needs to achieve is promotion of democracy and human rights. It is understood that some ASEAN states are, as some say, “in the process of transitioning towards democracy”. Those countries, which are relatively young in terms of ASEAN membership, are looking at other members for examples as to how democracy and human rights can be practiced.

Indonesia is a reference for those young members. Indonesia as one of the founding fathers and the incoming chair of ASEAN must be able to set a good example as to how to practice democracy and how to enforce human rights.

By the end of its tenure as ASEAN chair, Indonesia must be able to report not only to its citizens, but also to all citizens of ASEAN that it has done its best to convert ASEAN’s slogan of a “people-centered association” into people-centered policies.

The time for rhetoric in ASEAN is over. It is time for real action to benefit of the people. Hopefully Indonesia will be able to maximize its role as the chair of ASEAN in 2011.


The writer is an assistant lecturer in International Relations at the University of Indonesia in Depok, West Java. Jakarta Post

Running Silent, Running Deep Around Taiwan

Anti-sub capability gives the Chinese navy the ability to escape into blue water










With Chinese naval nuclear-powered submarines beginning to slip unchallenged through American and Japanese surveillance cordons, China appears well on its way to gaining absolute control over everything that lies within a 500 nautical miles radius of its coasts, military analysts say. A major part of the reason for that, they say, is that Taiwan’s surveillance capability is woefully inadequate.

That means not only will US Navy carrier battle groups have a hard time getting anywhere near China unless China allows it, but the waters around Taiwan could well already have become the Chinese navy’s safe entry and exit points into the Pacific Ocean.

In an effort to shore up its defenses, Taiwan has bought 12 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft at a cost to its taxpayers of US$1.3 billion. The P-3Cs were part of an arms package authorized by former US President George W. Bush in 2001. Although Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense says its anti-submarine capability is sufficient, critics say its older plans, 27 Grumman S-2T Trackers transferred to Taiwan in 1999, are obsolete and that only three of the planes are still operational.

Whether the P-3C Orions will help is problematical, critics say. Although Japan has deployed more than 100 of the advanced anti-submarine aircraft, it is still having apparent difficulties deterring People’s Liberation Army Navy subs from breaking through. Critics including from the US online publication Defense News say the purchase of the P-3Cs is purely symbolic, and failures in detecting submarines of unknown origin are notoriously covered up.

On December 31, Sankei Shimbun, one of Japan's five national newspapers, revealed that in February 2009, a Chinese nuclear sub crossed the so-called First Island Chain in waters near Taiwan. The term “First Island Chain” describes a maritime line which runs roughly between Korea and Japan's western coasts, through the Taiwan Strait along the northern half of the Philippines, and ending at the Indonesian island of Sumatra. To the US and its allies, any action by the Chinese navy beyond the First Island Chain symbolizes that Beijing is expanding its geographic limits or boundaries in terms of its military's operations.

The 2009 incident resembles one in November 2004, when a P-3Cs of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces discovered a Han-class nuclear-powered submarine sneaking southwest of Ishigaki, an island belonging to the Okinawa Prefecture. That prompted the then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to bring into force a marine guard action directive to follow the sub. Together with the US, the Japanese subsequently monitored the Chinese sub making a cruise around Guam, a US key military hub, after which it sailed back to its mother port Jianggezhuang, a Chinese naval base 24 km east of Qingdao in the Yellow Sea. But while the 2004 incident led to considerable media coverage, the 2009 break through the First Island Chain was not detected by the Taiwanese.

Although the US has responded to the rapid development of the Chinese submarine fleet by deploying the ocean surveillance ships USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable, which monitor the seas with low-frequency sonar arrays and The Japanese self-defense forces have also strengthened surveillance with their 100 P-3Cs, both the 2004 and 2009 incidents make it obvious that US and Japan have been gradually losing the ability to fully monitor Chinese subs' movements.

Moreover, if the Chinese in February 2009 managed to sail nuclear-powered submarines through Taiwanese waters to make their way between Miyako and Yonaguni, two Japanese islands located in close proximity to Taiwan's east coast, the Chinese have indeed succeeded in identify ing Taiwan as the weak link in the First Island Chain. But despite the recent finalization of Taiwan's P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft deal, the island doesn't seem able to close the gap.

The Ministry of National Defense's attempt to paint Taiwan's anti-submarine capabilities as rosy belly-flopped when an obviously upset retired Vice Admiral, Lan Ning-li, published an article on how Taiwan's anti-submarine aircraft were -- or are about to become-- useless, including the P-3C anti-submarine aircraft that cost taxpayers US$1.3 billion.

Although no one questions the actual capabilities of the P-3Cs, it's unlikely that they would be of use in case Taiwan were to be drawn into a war. This is because the maritime patrol airfields would almost immediately be rendered useless by Chinese missile strikes. Moreover, the P-3Cs could only operate if Taiwan enjoys superiority over its airspace, a circumstance that likely wouldn't last very long if the PLA were to attack. Therefore, what Taiwan accordingly needs isn't a P-3C fleet but anti-submarine helicopters, which in the event of war stick with the fleet, protected by the Navy's own air defense.

The issues of worn out weapons and Chinese subs passing by unchallenged lie hidden in the culture and system of Taiwan's military. Taiwan doesn't allow private think tanks to conduct research and assessments into national defense affairs, and there are no investigations carried out by independent groups on irregular events, accidents or corruption cases.

Detailed information is kept from the public, even on issues that caused considerable media uproar, such as one in 2009 when the captain of the submarine Hai Lung was washed overboard and drowned, or when another sub lost a torpedo which was never to be found despite the offer of a NT$30,000 (US$930) reward to any fisherman who might turn it up.

The possibility to have all but everything shrouded in mystery makes it easy for decision-makers to ditch responsibility in case things go wrong, and the general computerization of the chain of command's processes makes cover-ups even easier.

In the past, directives as well as memorandums were still handwritten and gradually made their way up the chain of command. Those with objections could write by hand in the margins. If there were irregularities, it was possible to trace where the mistake had originated. Today by contrast, directives on sensitive decisions and matters are usually given orally so as not to create a trail of written documents.

Staff officers then have to follow these oral directives without knowing the reasons and genuineness of the directives. If superiors sense that a scandal is about to break out, they have the option of refusing to admit having given any instructions, remaining silent or purposely forgetting something. Lower-ranking officers receive all the blame and no one up the hierarchy ladder must resign if, for instance, the decrepit state of weapon systems was covered up, or if the Japanese again detected something that had embarrassingly escaped Taiwanese surveillance.

It was not only the Sankei Shimbun and Defense News stories which exposed lack of anti-sub preparedness. Last year on Jan. 27, an unidentified submarine was detected 44.4 km off a Kaohsiung military port. Again it wasn't the Taiwanese but the Japanese who detected it.

Taiwanese navy circles believe with Taiwanese waters a crucial part of the First Island Chain, Washington carries out annual assessments on the navy’s anti-submarine capacity. Reportedly, originally the US evaluated Taiwan's strength as equal to that of Israel, a nation armed to the teeth. That perception, however, is said to have profoundly changed. By now, Taiwan's ability to detect and fight enemy subs is allegedly somewhere similar to that of Panama, a country that has abolished its standing army. This is spite of the US$10 billion annually that Taiwan spends on its military.

Wendell Minnick, the Asia Bureau Chief of Defense News, in an interview with Asia Sentinel makes clear the rationale behind the P-3C procurement. “All arms sales to Taiwan are symbolic. They are nothing more than a US reassurance that it will continue to support Taiwan's defense needs,” he says.

By Jens Kastner freelance writer based in Taiwan and Wang Jyh-Perng a reserve captain of the Taiwan Navy .Asia Sentinel

Singaporean Prime Minister’s Look at the Road Ahead

The world has recovered remarkably quickly from the financial crisis. But growth is now on two tracks: Developed economies still struggling with fiscal, financial and structural problems, while emerging economies, especially in Asia, are growing robustly.

The resulting global imbalances have created international tensions.

The Group of 20 has emerged as a forum to tackle these issues. It was especially effective during the crisis, and remains valuable as it is more inclusive than the Group of Eight.

The most consequential relationship in the world today is between the United States and China. There has been significant friction, notably over exchange rates.

The yuan issue is politically hard — the United States sees an undervalued Chinese currency as unfair competition, while China fears that sharp revaluation will disrupt its economy, causing unemployment and unrest.

But from an economic point of view, this needn’t be a win-lose battle.

A gradually appreciating yuan will encourage Chinese export industries to restructure and upgrade, help distribute the gains from growth more broadly beyond exports to the rest of the economy and mitigate inflation, which is a growing problem in China.

It will also help ease political pressures in the United States and tensions in the relationship.

The United States and China need to build mutual trust in order to cooperate on a range of tough international issues, including Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea.

Otherwise, each side will doubt the other’s motives, especially when problems arise, such as over competing claims in the South China Sea.

The world is witnessing a gradual shift in the relative balance of influence and economic power.

The United States will remain the pre-eminent superpower for decades.

But Asian countries see and sense China’s growing influence and are adjusting their stances to benefit from that nation’s growth.

Yet almost all of them wish the United States to stay engaged in Asia.

They want to be friends with both the United States and China, and not be forced to choose sides.

The Chinese are aware of foreign perceptions that with growing strength, it has become more assertive.

China’s leaders have emphasized that the country is committed to peaceful development and has no aggressive intentions.

China’s domestic challenges are numerous and daunting. Its government must uplift hundreds of millions who remain in poverty, create social safety nets for its people and maintain social and political stability so progress can continue.

China has its own domestic politics that it can’t ignore. China’s leaders need to explain this reality, and their basic thinking, convincingly to international audiences, who see Beijing and Shanghai and think that is China.

But countries will also watch China’s actions — how it conducts itself on international issues such as climate change and what its leaders say to their own people about China’s role in the world.

As world economies recover, governments must continue promoting global trade. The win-win results of freer trade will boost demand and growth.

During the crisis, protectionist pressures were a real worry. Fortunately, governments took fewer protectionist and retaliatory actions than many feared.

In the United States, there is little political appetite for free trade; hence the slow progress of its bilateral free-trade agreements and the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round.

But there are some recent positive developments.

The renegotiated FTA between South Korea and the United States was settled recently, though not yet ratified.

The United States is also negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership, which will be a pathway toward the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s vision of a free-trade area in the region.

Countries shouldn’t rest there.

Leaders need to persuade electorates worried about unemployment and apprehensive about the future that free trade will benefit them in the long term.

Globalization poses significant challenges to countries.

Competition is intense, change is continuous and the fruits of prosperity are unevenly distributed.

But trying to shut out competition or freeze the status quo will fail; nor will currency realignments create real, sustainable prosperity.

The only reliable strategy for improving the lives of citizens is for countries to upgrade the skills of their people and the capabilities of their economies.

This means educating people to enhance their earning power, investing in technology and boosting infrastructure to raise productivity.

Beyond promoting growth, governments must build political support for free markets and economic integration.

Growth has to benefit the many, not just a few.


Lee Hsien Loong is the prime minister of Singapore.

(Jakarta Glove) Bloomberg