Kerry B. Collison Asia News

Is Atheism Allowed in Indonesia?

2012-01-27T13:47:00.000-08:00

Alexander Aan, a civil servant in Dharmasraya, West Sumatra, was beaten and charged with blasphemy after writing “God does not exist” on his Facebook page.

The response has ranged from condemnation by several international organizations to support by local citizens and the Indonesian Council of Ulema. Many people have invoked the first principle of Pancasila, the state ideology, to make the argument that atheism — and Alexander — have no place in Indonesia.

But is this really the case? Has atheism been banned by Pancasila since the dawn of the Indonesian state? Since the argument is based on the text of a legal document, let’s examine this question from a legal perspective.

The first principle of Pancasila says the nation of Indonesia shall be based on the belief in the one and only God. It is usually interpreted literally. As a result, nonbelievers, and atheists in particular, are often accused of violating the nation’s philosophical foundation. Their way of thinking is seen as incompatible with the country’s fundamental “monotheistic” tenet.

This is a naive and simplistic view of Pancasila. Interpreting any philosophy is not all about the exact meaning of the words; it is about context and the systematical connections.

In legal science there are two methods of interpretation: historical and teleological. A historical interpretation requires an examination of the historical context in which a statute was created. With teleological reasoning, it is the goal of a statute that matters most.

Historically, the first principle of Pancasila, belief in one supreme God, has been a compromise between secular nationalists, Islamic nationalists and nationalists from other religions. It had its origins in the first principle of the Jakarta Charter, the obligation to hold Muslims to Shariah law.

When the non-Muslim nationalist founders protested the charger, a compromise was reached: The belief in one supreme God was codified into Pancasila instead.

If this historical context is further analyzed in a goal-oriented, teleological way, it is evident that the first principle of Pancasila was not intended to ban atheism. It was meant to bring together the different religions of Indonesia in a fair-minded, compromising manner.

Some might still insist that every statute must be interpreted precisely as it was written. This, of course, is exceedingly problematic if you consider the six officially “recognized religions” of Indonesia: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Confucianism, Hinduism and Buddhism.

If the notion that the first principle requires monotheism is correct, then at least two of Indonesia’s recognized religions are obviously incompatible with Pancasila.

Hinduism is henotheistic, meaning Hindus acknowledge the presence of other gods despite worshiping only one. That is why we see many gods in India such as Ganesha, Vishnu and Shiva.

Buddhism includes no concept of a divine creator or deity; it is considered a nontheistic religion. Sometimes the words “a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned“ in Buddhist scripture are cited to support the claim that Buddhism has a creator. But a closer look at the text shows that the words refer to nirvana, not to a god.

Are Hinduism and Buddhism unconstitutional? Do they deserve no place in Indonesia? Should they be banned? Our founding fathers should have anticipated this problem.

Meanwhile, even if the misguided literal interpretation prevails, the people who lean on that to justify their stance against atheism will run into another problem.

There is another foundational passage in Pancasila that addresses religious beliefs. This one stipulates that “the belief in one and supreme God must not be forced on another person.”

This point is specific in nature, while the first principle is general. According to the legal doctrine of lex specialis, specific laws overrule general laws. This means that atheists have a right to their beliefs, and cannot be forced to espouse the views of others. Ironically, this shows that the people who try to force God on atheists are actually the ones infringing on Pancasila.

Atheism does not violate Pancasila. All Indonesians may consciously and rationally choose their own beliefs. The country’s very foundation protects their right to do so.

Jakarta Globe, written by Yordan Nugraha student of international and European law at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

The World War on Democracy

2012-01-26T13:02:00.000-08:00

January 19, 2012 by John Pilger

Znet

Lisette Talate died the other day. I remember a wiry, fiercely intelligent woman who masked her grief with a determination that was a presence. She was the embodiment of people’s resistance to the war on democracy. I first glimpsed her in a 1950s Colonial Office film about the Chagos islanders, a tiny creole nation living midway between Africa and Asia in the Indian Ocean. The camera panned across thriving villages, a church, a school, a hospital, set in a phenomenon of natural beauty and peace. Lisette remembers the producer saying to her and her teenage friends, “Keep smiling girls!”

Sitting in her kitchen in Mauritius many years later, she said, “I didn’t have to be told to smile. I was a happy child, because my roots were deep in the islands, my paradise. My great-grandmother was born there; I made six children there. That’s why they couldn’t legally throw us out of our own homes; they had to terrify us into leaving or force us out. At first, they tried to starve us. The food ships stopped arriving [then] they spread rumours we would be bombed, then they turned on our dogs.”

In the early 1960s, the Labour government of Harold Wilson secretly agreed to a demand from Washington that the Chagos archipelago, a British colony, be “swept” and “sanitised” of its 2,500 inhabitants so that a military base could be built on the principal island, Diego Garcia. “They knew we were inseparable from our pets,” said Lizette, “When the American soldiers arrived to build the base, they backed their big trucks against the brick shed where we prepared the coconuts; hundreds of our dogs had been rounded up and imprisoned there. Then they gassed them through tubes from the trucks’ exhausts. You could hear them crying.”

Lisette and her family and hundreds of islanders were forced on to a rusting steamer bound for Mauritius, a distance of 2,500 miles. They were made to sleep in the hold on a cargo of fertiliser: bird shit. The weather was rough; everyone was ill; two women miscarried. Dumped on the docks at Port Louis, Lizette’s youngest children, Jollice, and Regis, died within a week of each other. “They died of sadness,” she said. “They had heard all the talk and seen the horror of what had happened to the dogs. They knew they were leaving their home forever. The doctor in Mauritius said he could not treat sadness.”

This act of mass kidnapping was carried out in high secrecy. In one official file, under the heading, “Maintaining the fiction”, the Foreign Office legal adviser exhorts his colleagues to cover their actions by “re-classifying” the population as “floating” and to “make up the rules as we go along”. Article 7 of the statute of the International Criminal Court says the “deportation or forcible transfer of population” is a crime against humanity. That Britain had committed such a crime -- in exchange for a $14million discount off an American Polaris nuclear submarine -- was not on the agenda of a group of British “defence” correspondents flown to the Chagos by the Ministry of Defence when the US base was completed. "There is nothing in our files,” said a ministry official, “about inhabitants or an evacuation.”

Today, Diego Garcia is crucial to America’s and Britain’s war on democracy. The heaviest bombing of Iraq and Afghanistan was launched from its vast airstrips, beyond which the islanders’ abandoned cemetery and church stand like archaeological ruins. The terraced garden where Lisette laughed for the camera is now a fortress housing the “bunker-busting” bombs carried by bat-shaped B-2 aircraft to targets in two continents; an attack on Iran will start here. As if to complete the emblem of rampant, criminal power, the CIA added a Guantanamo-style prison for its “rendition” victims and called it Camp Justice.

What was done to Lisette’s paradise has an urgent and universal meaning, for it represents the violent, ruthless nature of a whole system behind its democratic façade, and the scale of our own indoctrination to its messianic assumptions, described by Harold Pinter as a “brilliant, even witty, highly successful act of hypnosis.” Longer and bloodier than any war since 1945, waged with demonic weapons and a gangsterism dressed as economic policy and sometimes known as globalisation, the war on democracy is unmentionable in western elite circles. As Pinter wrote, “it never happened even while it was happening”. Last July, American historian William Blum published his “updated summary of the record of US foreign policy”. Since the Second World War, the US has:

Attempted to overthrow more than 50 governments, most of them democratically-elected.
Attempted to suppress a populist or national movement in 20 countries.
Grossly interfered in democratic elections in at least 30 countries.
Dropped bombs on the people of more than 30 countries.
Attempted to assassinate more than 50 foreign leaders.

In total, the United States has carried out one or more of these actions in 69 countries. In almost all cases, Britain has been a collaborator. The “enemy” changes in name – from communism to Islamism -- but mostly it is the rise of democracy independent of western power or a society occupying strategically useful territory, deemed expendable, like the Chagos Islands.

The sheer scale of suffering, let alone criminality, is little known in the west, despite the presence of the world’s most advanced communications, nominally freest journalism and most admired academy. That the most numerous victims of terrorism – western terrorism – are Muslims is unsayable, if it is known. That half a million Iraqi infants died in the 1990s as a result of the embargo imposed by Britain and America is of no interest. That extreme jihadism, which led to 9/11, was nurtured as a weapon of western policy (“Operation Cyclone”) is known to specialists but otherwise suppressed.

While popular culture in Britain and America immerses the Second World War in an ethical bath for the victors, the holocausts arising from Anglo-American dominance of resource-rich regions are consigned to oblivion. Under the Indonesian tyrant Suharto, anointed “our man” by Thatcher, more than a million people were slaughtered. Described by the CIA as “the worst mass murder of the second half of the 20th century”, the estimate does not include a third of the population of East Timor who were starved or murdered with western connivance, British fighter-bombers and machine guns.

These true stories are told in declassified files in the Public Record Office, yet represent an entire dimension of politics and the exercise of power excluded from public consideration. This has been achieved by a regime of un-coercive information control, from the evangelical mantra of consumer advertising to sound-bites on BBC news and now the ephemera of social media.

It is as if writers as watchdogs are extinct, or in thrall to a sociopathic zeitgeist, convinced they are too clever to be duped. Witness the stampede of sycophants eager to deify Christopher Hitchens, a war lover who longed to be allowed to justify the crimes of rapacious power. “For almost the first time in two centuries”, wrote Terry Eagleton, “there is no eminent British poet, playwright or novelist prepared to question the foundations of the western way of life”. No Orwell warns that we do not need to live in a totalitarian society to be corrupted by totalitarianism. No Shelley speaks for the poor, no Blake proffers a vision, no Wilde reminds us that “disobedience, in the eyes of anyone who has read history, is man’s original virtue”. And grievously no Pinter rages at the war machine, as in American Football:

Hallelujah.
Praise the Lord for all good things ...
We blew their balls into shards of dust,
Into shards of fucking dust …

Into shards of fucking dust go all the lives blown there by Barack Obama, the Hopey Changey of western violence. Whenever one of Obama’s drones wipes out an entire family in a faraway tribal region of Pakistan, or Somalia, or Yemen, the American controllers in front of their computer-game screens type in “Bugsplat”. Obama likes drones and has joked about them with journalists. One of his first actions as president was to order a wave of Predator drone attacks on Pakistan that killed 74 people. He has since killed thousands, mostly civilians; drones fire Hellfire missiles that suck the air out of the lungs of children and leave body parts festooned across scrubland.

Remember the tear-stained headlines when Brand Obama was elected: “momentous, spine-tingling”: the Guardian. “The American future,” wrote Simon Schama, “is all vision, numinous, unformed, light-headed ...” The San Francisco Chronicle’s columnist saw a spiritual “lightworker [who can] usher in a new way of being on the planet”. Beyond the drivel, as the great whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg had predicted, a military coup was taking place in Washington, and Obama was their man. Having seduced the anti-war movement into virtual silence, he has given America’s corrupt military officer class unprecedented powers of state and engagement. These include the prospect of wars in Africa and opportunities for provocations against China, America’s largest creditor and new “enemy” in Asia. Under Obama, the old source of official paranoia Russia, has been encircled with ballistic missiles and the Russian opposition infiltrated. Military and CIA assassination teams have been assigned to 120 countries; long planned attacks on Syria and Iran beckon a world war. Israel, the exemplar of US violence and lawlessness by proxy, has just received its annual pocket money of $3bn together with Obama’s permission to steal more Palestinian land.

Obama’s most “historic” achievement is to bring the war on democracy home to America. On New Year’s Eve, he signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a law that grants the Pentagon the legal right to kidnap both foreigners and US citizens and indefinitely detain, interrogate and torture, or even kill them. They need only “associate” with those “belligerent” to the United States. There will be no protection of law, no trial, no legal representation. This is the first explicit legislation to abolish habeus corpus (the right to due process of law) and effectively repeal the Bill of Rights of 1789.

On 5 January, in an extraordinary speech at the Pentagon, Obama said the military would not only be ready to “secure territory and populations” overseas but to fight in the “homeland” and provide “support to the civil authorities”. In other words, US troops will be deployed on the streets of American cities when the inevitable civil unrest takes hold.

America is now a land of epidemic poverty and barbaric prisons: the consequence of a “market” extremism which, under Obama, has prompted the transfer of $14 trillion in public money to criminal enterprises in Wall Street. The victims are mostly young jobless, homeless, incarcerated African-Americans, betrayed by the first black president. The historic corollary of a perpetual war state, this is not fascism, not yet, but neither is it democracy in any recognisable form, regardless of the placebo politics that will consume the news until November. The presidential campaign, says the Washington Post, will “feature a clash of philosophies rooted in distinctly different views of the economy”. This is patently false. The circumsc ribed task of journalism on both sides of the Atlantic is to create the pretence of political choice where there is none.

The same shadow is across Britain and much of Europe where social democracy, an article of faith two generations ago, has fallen to the central bank dictators. In David Cameron’s “big society”, the theft of 84bn pounds in jobs and services even exceeds the amount of tax “legally” avoid by piratical corporations. Blame rests not with the far right, but a cowardly liberal political culture that has allowed this to happen, which, wrote Hywel Williams in the wake of the attacks on 9/11, “can itself be a form of self righteous fanaticism”. Tony Blair is one such fanatic. In its managerial indifference to the freedoms that it claims to hold dear, bourgeois Blairite Britain has created a surveillance state with 3,000 new criminal offences and laws: more than for the whole of the previous century. The police clearly believe they have an impunity to kill. At the demand of the CIA, cases like that of Binyam Mohamed, an innocent British resident tortured and then held for five years in Guantanamo Bay, will be dealt with in secret courts in Britain “in order to protect the intelligence agencies” – the torturers.

This invisible state allowed the Blair government to fight the Chagos islanders as they rose from their despair in exile and demanded justice in the streets of Port Louis and London. “Only when you take direct action, face to face, even break laws, are you ever noticed,” said Lisette. “And the smaller you are, the greater your example to others.” Such an eloquent answer to those who still ask, “What can I do?”

I last saw Lisette’s tiny figure standing in driving rain alongside her comrades outside the Houses of Parliament. What struck me was the enduring courage of their resistance. It is this refusal to give up that rotten power fears, above all, knowing it is the seed beneath the snow.

Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon

2012-01-26T12:54:00.000-08:00

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW BRIEFING

Jakarta/Brussels, 26 January 2012: Involvement in violent campaigns against vice and religious deviance has become one pathway to terrorism in Indonesia.

Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the radicalisation of a group from Cirebon, West Java that was behind the 2011 suicide bombings of a mosque and a church. It argues that ideological and tactical lines within the radical community are blurring, making it harder to distinguish "terrorists" from hardline activists and religious vigilantes.

“The Cirebon men moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing 'deviance' to using bombs and guns, and this may become the common pattern”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group's Senior Adviser.

Poorly educated and underemployed, the Cirebon men represent a generational shift from the jihadists trained abroad or those who fought a decade ago in two major communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. They were radicalised through attending public lectures by radical clerics; most had taken part as well in attacks on stores selling liquor and anti-Ahmadiyah activities. They had been members of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), an extremist organisation founded by well-known cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008, but then left to form their even more militant group.

The two suicide bombers, Mohamed Syarif, who blew himself up at a Cirebon mosque on 15 April 2011, and Ahmed Yosefa Hayat, who died in an attack on a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September, taught themselves bomb-making from the Internet and worked on their own. The others preferred targeted assassinations to suicide attacks and learned bomb-making from friends in a Solo-based group of vigilantes-turned-bombers.

The briefing notes that the merging of vigilantes and jihadists has been facilitated by the proliferation of Islamist civil society organisations and the popularity of public taklim (religious lectures), as forums for spreading radical views. The government needs a strategy, consistent with democratic values, to counter clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or tyrants (thaghut), frequently meaning Indonesian officials and, especially, the police. The problem is that there is no agreement within the country's political elite on the nature of the threat.

If the radicalisation of groups like the Cirebon men is to be halted, the government needs to build a national consensus on what constitutes extremism; directly confront hate speech; and promote zero tolerance of religiously-inspired crimes, however minor, including in the course of anti-vice campaigns.

“Expressions of shock and horror every time there is an incident of religiously-motivated violence as in Cirebon or Solo are not a substitute for prevention”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group's South East Asia Project Director.

Chinese Community Part of the Indonesian Nation’s Fabric

2012-01-24T14:36:00.000-08:00

Ethnic Chinese communities across the world celebrated Lunar New Year on Monday as they welcomed the Year of the Dragon. With the rise of China during the past three decades, Lunar New Year celebrations have been given greater prominence in the global media.

Here in Indonesia, Chinese citizens can once again freely celebrate their culture in the open. Indeed, Chinese New Year has since 2001 been a national holiday and an important date in the nation’s cultural calendar. More so, retailers now hawk Chinese New Year goodies while the Barongsai dance is performed throughout the country.

Perhaps it is an indication of how far this nation has come in terms of ethnic integration that visitors passing through Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta International Airport or visiting any of the malls in the capital will be welcomed by Barongsai performers all this week. This is pleasing and laudable.

The nation is stronger if it incorporates all its ethnic minorities into its fold. During the course of its long history, the nation has welcomed peoples from all over the world to its shores, and the Chinese were among the first to arrive. Over the course of time, they have contributed significantly to the nation’s development in all spheres of life.

Preserving such cultural traits strengthens the national fabric. As pointed out by J.J. Rizal, a history researcher with the University of Indonesia, many of the country’s current cultural traits were inspired by the activities of Chinese ethnic communities. Many members of the community were also active in the country’s struggle for independence, although their contributions are not well-promoted.

The Chinese community has in the past faced discrimination on multiple levels, but it has never stopped feeling Indonesian. For various reasons, their economic success being a dominant one, the Chinese have at times been treated as outsiders in this country.

It is a testament to this nation’s strong sense of social justice that the Chinese community is once again allowed to flourish. This will be an advantage as the economy continues to grow, as the country elevates its presence on the global stage and as it deepens its cultural heritage.

Happy Lunar New Year to all our Chinese friends

Addressing the protracted Burmese refugee situation in Thailand

2012-01-24T14:28:00.000-08:00

Migrants have escaped intra-national conflict within Burma by seeking refuge in Thailand for over 30 years.

But recent development projects in eastern Burma have further displaced segments of Burma’s ethnic population, with approximately 150,000 refugees now dispersed throughout nine refugee camps in Thailand. Additionally, an estimated 2–4 million ‘self-settled’ refugees reside in communities along the Thai-Burmese border and in Thailand’s larger cities. Both categories of migrants are referred to as the ‘asylum-migration’ nexus, and represent the visible side of human rights abuse in Burma.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) regards these Thai refugee camps as one of 29 protracted refugee situations in the world, with the Burmese refugees currently living in such camps suffering long-standing human rights abuses. They can often stay in camps for decades with little hope of any long-term solution to their plight, and other migrants from Burma live in constant fear of deportation.

The Burmese refugees in Thailand’s border camps remain dependent on charity for survival, as they do not have freedom of movement. And since they are not integrated into the local community, they cannot work and be self-sufficient either.

Worryingly, if Burmese refugees and migrants maintain their current rate of inflow and departures to third countries, this pool of refugees in Thailand will exist for another 30 years.

Most of the self-settled migrants from Burma work in the manufacturing, food processing and agricultural industries throughout Thailand, contributing 6.2 per cent (US$11 billion) to Thailand’s GDP. Further to the constant fear and threat of deportation, they work in poor conditions with neither basic rights of association, nor employee and health rights. The experiences of these two different groups of forced migrants are liminal in that they are ‘betwixt and between’, excluded from mainstream society. Only some forced migrants choose to officially seek asylum and reside under the protection of UNHCR. Other forced migrants decide to earn a living within the informal economy and endure the risks of being deported. This protracted refugee process means the actual refugee camp populations are made up of women, children, the elderly and disabled, as the able-bodied men and women seek work elsewhere. This ‘left behind’ population is prey to corrupt practices such as people and drug trafficking, smuggling, and child labour. The self-settled group is vulnerable to these practices as well, since they have no effective legal protection.

Globally, asylum seekers and refugees pose huge challenges for the world’s destination countries. Developed countries struggle to maintain a balance between controlling national borders and offering protection to millions of displaced people. Overall, there is a tendency for developed countries to be slow in assessing asylum seekers and letting developing countries bear the burden of cross-border forced migration.

The three durable solutions for refugees are repatriation, integration and resettlement, but there are unique barriers to these solutions for Burmese migrants in Thailand. Repatriation is not feasible, as the Burmese military junta cannot guarantee protection of human rights for Burmese refugees. Integration is resisted because of historical conflicts between Burma and Thailand. In addition, Thailand does not want all the responsibility for Burmese refugees when other developed countries are not sharing the burden. Resettlement to third countries has slowed because of the global financial crisis and amidst fears that terrorists may reside in refugee populations.

Two possible solutions to this situation are ‘sustainable living’ and dealing with forced migrant groups as collectives. Sustainable living involves refugees using their skills to develop self-sufficiency through engagement with local communities and their economy. This integration may be a temporary solution or a durable one. Either way, refugees maintain their dignity and decrease their dependence on aid. Self-settled refugee groups need formal processes to develop sustainable living in order to remove fear of deportation.

Dealing with forced migrant groups as collectives involves the provision of democratic freedoms and responsibility to elect representatives. These representatives in turn determine their communities’ sustainable living options for immediate and short-term outcomes; facilitate self-government in complex and difficult circumstances where resources are scarce; and participate in decision making for long-term outcomes for their communities.

Countries in the Asia Pacific region have the opportunity to address these problems and become leaders in reshaping global migration management by relating to the asylum-migration nexus as responsible actors rather than victims. As responsible actors they can encourage the development of sustainable living and democratic principles of self-organisation, eventually electing representatives and facilitating personal dignity through self-sufficiency. In addition, countries in the Asia Pacific can harness their untapped resources so that refugees become national and international assets rather than burdens.

By Mary Ditton Senior Lecturer in Health Management at the University of New England, Australia. East Asia Forum

Thailand’s politics hamstrings economic progress

2012-01-23T13:49:00.000-08:00

While Thai politics has long been unruly, it has rarely been so unsettled and intractable as in 2011.

Thailand has entered 2012 bruised and battered, even compared to previous bouts of political instability. This year will see more of the polarisation and conflict that have underpinned the Thai landscape since a 2006 military coup deposed Thaksin Shinawatra. But Thailand’s focus will increasingly shift from Thaksin’s glaring defects to the exposure of his adversaries’ deficiencies and shortcomings. Paramount among the structural issues here will be the untenable hegemony of Thailand’s monarchy-centred socio-political hierarchy in the late twilight of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s reign. Political manoeuvring and machinations will characterise this contested, overarching superstructure in search of a new balance.

To be sure, the past year was not set up to be another annus horribilis for Thailand. But after former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva called an early election in May, voters on 3 July overwhelmingly returned Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party and his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, to power. Soon after taking office, Yingluck’s government went into a tailspin as central Thailand was gripped by its worst floods in years. Structural problems from decades of neglect and poor development plans were compounded by bureaucratic ineptitude and government mismanagement. But while her government was weakened by the floods, Prime Minister Yingluck emerged more intact than anticipated.

After the floods, a stalemate between Thailand’s competing political forces seems to have taken hold. The Yingluck government is upholding the sanctity of the monarchy through repression and crackdowns on dissent and freedom of expression. And unsurprisingly, Article 12 of the Criminal Code — the lèse-majesté law — and its related Computer Crimes Act have been enforced with growing frequency. In return, the government is able to rule without debilitating street protests from yellow-clad and multi-coloured royalist groups or coup threats from the army. The Yingluck government does not have the wherewithal to amend or challenge these laws head on. Nor can Thailand’s establishment muster enough strength to initiate more rounds of party dissolutions and changes of government — let alone a military coup.

The stalemate will encourage various interest and advocacy groups to air their grievances and clamour to get their way. Chief among them this year will be Thaksin’s manoeuvres to return home. He has won four consecutive Thai elections over the past decade, but has also left a trail of liabilities — corruption convictions, conflicts of interest and human rights violations — which will hamper any future ambition to rule. Yet he lurks and rules from abroad. Whether Thaksin comes back this year will depend on his patience and his opponents’ willingness to make a deal, although there may now be too much bad blood for any lasting deal to take place. At the same time, that Thaksin could return in simple defiance should not be dismissed. It would lead to a showdown but could also accelerate Thailand’s endgame.

His former loyalists in the Thai Rak Thai Party (which the judiciary dissolved in May 2007) will be eligible to retake political office after May 2012. Whatever talent Thai politicians have to offer, much of it was systematically banned for the past five years. The 111 former Thai Rak Thai MPs are likely to provide a broad boost to the Yingluck government as they re-enter the political fray, notwithstanding any potential intra-Pheu Thai squabbling.

The charter-change movement is likely to gather steam in 2012. As the pro-coup forces introduced the current constitution back in 2007, the document is essentially anti-politician and anti-political parties. A self-respecting democracy that ensures justice and equality can hardly grow out of it. Any changes to the charter will be mired in acrimony though, and could be a flashpoint of renewed conflict if taken too far.

Thailand’s polarisation is now between traditional monarchists and electoral democrats, with substantial overlap between them. The monarchists do not reject elections and democratic rule as long as it privileges the monarchy-centred hierarchy as a linchpin of Thai society. Most democrats are supportive of the monarchy but they want their votes to count and reject the undemocratic interventions by royalist groups and judicial institutions since the coup.

But the ideals of monarchy are stronger among the democrats than those of democracy are among the monarchists. Changing times ushered in by the end of the Cold War — which was instrumental in fostering Thailand’s monarchy-military dominance — new media technologies, younger generations, and international norms around democracy and human rights are putting pressure on Thailand’s hierarchy to adjust.

Still, any new order could be even more unwieldy and unstable. If the incumbency has to go, there are no guarantees that any replacement will not be worse. The best outcome would be for the incumbency to adapt while in a position of strength rather than having to change when its hand is weaker. This year, like those that preceded it, offers yet another opportunity for such adjustments. Whether monarchists and democrats can find a way forward will determine if Thailand can get out of its holding pattern, which has hamstrung its foreign policy and economic growth.

By Thitinan Pongsudhirak Professor and Director at the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
This article is part of a special feature: 2011 in review and the year ahead. East Asia Forum

Pakistan’s clash of institutional authority

2012-01-22T13:59:00.000-08:00

Pakistan experienced dramatic political crises in 2011, including the covert raid carried out by the US on 2 May, which killed Osama bin Laden, and the killing of two civilians by CIA contractor Raymond Davis.

It was in these circumstances that an American businessman of Pakistani origin, Mansoor Ijaz, wrote a ‘memorandum’ to the US military commander urging an intervention on behalf of Pakistan’s elected government, which seemed on the verge of being toppled by the country’s historically powerful military establishment. Mr Ijaz, for reasons that are not yet clear, later alleged that this memorandum was written on behalf of Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Hassain Haqqani, a close aide of President Asif Ali Zardari.

The scandal threatens to sink the fragile government, with the courts — as well as the military — now bearing down on Pakistan’s embattled politicians. The Supreme Court has created a high-powered judicial commission to investigate the origins and veracity of the memo. But the government seems set to fight what it sees as the military establishment, the court and the opposition’s common designs to oust an elected president. There is some basis for such paranoia. Every elected leader in Pakistan’s history has been proclaimed a threat to national security at some stage by the military establishment in an effort to justify greater say in the country’s affairs. Pakistan has undergone three major coups, and the military has ruled the country for nearly half of its post-colonial existence. Even during this latest period of elected rule the military has remained powerful, as the government ceded to it ultimate responsibility for territorial defence, national security and foreign policy.

What is different in this round of tussles between the military and the elected leadership is the role of the superior judiciary. The current Supreme Court is a different constitutional creature from the courts that validated or acquiesced in previous military takeovers. Its Chief Justice was dismissed twice in 2007 by then President and military chief General Pervez Musharraf. On both occasions he was restored to his position, due to a populist movement led by the country’s lawyers, civil society and broad coalitions of opposition political parties. The movement cost President Musharraf his grip on power and paved the way for general elections in early 2008, which brought to power the incumbent government. But this same administration also refused to restore the Chief Justice and nearly 60 other superior court judges who had been unconstitutionally dismissed by the Musharraf regime. The government eventually relented in the face of a ‘Long March’, in which millions demonstrated their support for an independent judiciary in March 2009.

The stance taken by the government’s advocates, who claim the Supreme Court has sided with the military and the opposition, arguably has some justification. But this is also the first instance in the country’s history when serving army and intelligence chiefs, having been made respondents to petitions before the court, have voluntarily submitted responses to the court’s notices. The court has held national security matters to be justiciable before the superior courts, crossing the final frontier of executive prerogative and entering territory forbidden to courts in democratic and authoritarian states alike. This precedent is likely to be as wearisome for the military in the future as it is now for the government.

Current events aside, conflict between the courts and the government has been brewing since the restoration of an independent judiciary in Pakistan. The Supreme Court has taken up several high-profile corruption cases and unveiled irregularities in transactions and appointments. These cases highlight corruption and mismanagement at the highest levels of government. One case in particular has brought the Supreme Court and the presidency into direct conflict and is currently receiving considerable attention, threatening to bring down the Zardari government. The Supreme Court has directed the government to contact prosecution authorities in Switzerland in order to re-initiate corruption and money-laundering cases against President Zardari. The government managed to stall this process for over three years. But it now appears the Supreme Court’s patience has run out and enforcement proceedings are likely to lead to contempt charges and an attritional battle with the government.

What is significant about the memo incident is less that the Supreme Court has decided to side with the military but more that the country’s military establishment appears to have aligned itself with the courts. As Pakistan lurches toward general elections scheduled for early 2013 — and with Zardari facing calls to hold these elections earlier — the current government is coming under increasing pressure from all political quarters, including the courts. But the Supreme Court will do itself and the nation considerable disservice if it is seen to play a direct role in the ouster of President Zardari and his government. It will win itself tremendous credit if it ensures fair elections and adherence to constitutional norms and processes by all, including the military. If it does that, 2012 might become a year of hope — despite the political, economic and foreign policy crises on Pakistan’s horizon.

By Moeen Cheema Teaching Fellow at the ANU College of Law. East Asia Forum

Vietnam: the beginning of another economic transformation?

2012-01-21T14:20:00.000-08:00

Consensus-based policy making is a salient feature of Vietnam, where important decisions are collectively made.

Consensus is needed not only for the formulation of a reform vision but also for the elaboration and implementation of this vision. Doi Moi, the most successful economic reform to date, would certainly not have occurred in 1986 if no consensus were reached at the VI Party Congress.

A series of events in 2011 indicate that a vital consensus for the acceleration of economic reforms has been attained. Vietnam’s first major economic event for 2011 was the Communist Party Congress held in January, which set out Vietnam’s development strategy for the next 10 years. Like its predecessor, the 2011–2020 Strategy adopted at the Congress places great emphasis on rapid economic growth, with a target of 7–8 per cent average annual GDP growth over the next decade. The strategy puts increased attention on the quality of growth, including targets on macroeconomic stability and requirements for clarifying the role of the state in a market economy. Nevertheless, the ambitious quantitative growth target suggests a continuation rather than a fundamental break with previous strategies.

But events took a significant turn just a few weeks after the Congress. In late February the government issued Resolution 11, aiming to restore Vietnam’s macroeconomic stability and cool down an overheated economy. Specifically, the resolution sought to address high levels of inflation, tension in the foreign exchange market, high nominal interest rates and declining foreign exchange reserves. The implementation of Resolution 11 remained a top priority in the government’s agenda throughout 2011, and reviews of its implementation continue to take place regularly. Resolution 11 represents a decisive switch from growth to stability. For the first time, there is an official government policy document that completely neglects the term ‘growth’ in its targets. Its longevity signals a significant change in the mindset of Vietnam’s policy makers.

Signs of a radical shift in economic strategy became more evident when the new administration came into power in July. Several workshops and focus group discussions were held to facilitate policy dialogues regarding the restructuring of Vietnam’s economy to improve efficiency and competitiveness. From this process, consensus was reached on Vietnam’s strategic development priorities, identifying major areas for reform in the coming years. This consensus argues for radical transformation in three areas: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the financial sector and public investment. The need for reform was also officially documented in the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) for the period 2011–2015, which was approved by the National Assembly in November.

Following these events, Vietnam recorded good economic growth in 2011, with an estimated rate of GDP growth at 5.8 per cent. Exports performed very well, increasing by 33 per cent despite a significant decline in global demand. This robust GDP and export growth prevailed over a significant contraction in fiscal and monetary policy, and Vietnam’s strong export performance contributed notably to the reduction of trade deficits and the foreign exchange market’s stabilisation. The rate of inflation also slowed in the last four months, largely due to the implementation of Resolution 11.

The adoption of Resolution 11 and the SEDP in particular indicate that Vietnam has achieved consensus on accelerating market-based reforms in ‘difficult’ reform areas, namely SOEs, the financial sector and public investment. The recent release of an ambitious proposal for SOE reform through to 2020, developed by the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development, provides further evidence of this consensus. According to the proposal, about 44 per cent of the remaining 1300 full SOEs will be equitised in the next four years.

In this context, 2012 will be a very challenging year for Vietnam. The country still has to deal with an overheating economy, and inflationary pressures remain a genuine threat to the country’s economic stability. The banking sector is vulnerable, with a rising share of non-performing loans resulting from a long period of extraordinary credit growth. Challenges also lie in transforming the SEDP’s vision into specific actions. The plan calls for a fundamental restructuring of the economy, and while many agree on the vision of the reform, the formulation of a feasible action plan will take time, owing to the likelihood of resistance from economically strong interest groups.

The Vietnamese government is developing a detailed action plan for its ambitious restructuring strategy. It is expected that this plan will be approved by the end of the first quarter of 2012. The timeframe looks very ambitious as consensus for detailed actions still needs to be built. But there is a significant factor which may speed up the implementation process: while the market economy was an unfamiliar concept in previous times, it now receives strong support from the vast majority of Vietnamese people.

By Dr Doan Hong Quang Senior Economist at the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Vietnam. East Asia Forum

East Timor's Stolen Children

2012-01-20T15:21:00.000-08:00

Families seek young taken away during Indonesia's occupation

From his village around 160 km from East Timor's capital Dili, Miguel Amaral recalls the day his 6-year-old son Cipriano was taken away.

“It was 1977 and the Indonesians came in a military helicopter," he says. "We had no warning. We just saw a helicopter flying away with our son in it.”

Many of East Timor’s missing children have found their way home, but hundred of parents like Amaral are still dreaming of the day they will be reunited with their lost sons and daughters. During Indonesia’s brutal occupation of East Timor, some 4,000 Timorese children were taken out of the country by Indonesians.

Cipriano was taken along with his uncle Urbano, where they were held in an orphanage run by the Indonesian military.

“In 1978 the wives of some Indonesian soldiers came to visit," he recalls. "Cipriano was a cute looking boy with white, pale skin and he and another girl were chosen and taken away. He has been missing since.”

Urbano was later taken to an orphanage in Java and given a free education until high school. It wasn’t until he graduated from university in 2008 that he returned to his birthplace, now an independent nation. For Urbano, it was a bittersweet return. He was reunited with his family and also a grieving Amaral, who is still searching for his lost son.

After gaining independence from Indonesia in 1999, East Timor set up a fact-finding commission called CAVR to investigate what had happened to the Timorese people during the Indonesian occupation. A small part of the report published seven years ago acknowledged that children were taken out of the country.

The current head of the commission, Agustinho de Vasconcelos, says there is not much more they can do to try and find East Timor’s lost children.

“Basically the least we can do is keep collecting information about these cases, but then we have to wait and see how we can proceed from there. To be truthful, there are just too many cases for us too handle,” he says.

Vitor da Costa heads the Jakarta-based Families of Missing People Association. His Timorese parents died when he was young and his relatives agreed to allow an Indonesian family to adopt him because they were so poor. While his stepfather always made it clear to him that he was Timorese, it was not till he was 34 years old that he went home.

“For a long time it was just a dream in my heart. I didn’t have the money and I didn’t know how I could go home. So I just pushed the idea aside,” he says.

Deciding to take a month off work, he traveled to East Timor to look for surviving members of his family.

“When I reached East Timor, I felt really happy, but I was also confused. I did not know where to go or who to meet. I wanted to look for my family but I did not know who to ask. The only people I could count on were friends from human rights community in Dili,” he says.

It was through them that he finally got in contact with his family, but he was not welcomed back into his village straight away.

“They said I was considered dead, so they had built a small grave in between my parents’ graves. I have to be brought back to life again through some rituals. I felt sad... and angry,” he says. “I was angry with my family, but they said the situation back then was different. They did not know where and how to find me.”

Six years later, after saving enough money to pay for the necessary rituals, Vitor de Costa went back to East Timor again and met with his family.

“That was the happiest moment in my life. I was so thankful that I got to experience it. Even though I was not able to meet my parents,” he says, pointing to photos of his Timorese relatives hanging on the wall.

Today, de Costa says he is determined to help more divided Timorese families reunite and rediscover their roots.

Back in East Timor, Urbano and Amarel hope they will be reunited with Cipriano one day.

“I have a message for Cipriano,” Urbano says. “We’re waiting for you. Every time your parents hear your name, their eyes are filled with tears.”

Written by Citra Dyah Prastuti
(This article was first broadcast on Asia Calling, a regional current affairs radio program produced by Indonesia’s independent radio news agency KBR68H and broadcast in local languages in 10 countries across Asia. You can find more stories from Asia Calling at www.asiacalling.org.)

No resolution to conflict in southern Thailand

2012-01-19T14:08:00.000-08:00

On the evening of 25 October 2011 the southern Thai town of Yala was shaken by a string of 30 explosions that caused great terror and loss of life. The following day the neighbouring province of Narathiwat saw a similar wave of attacks.

This latest bombing campaign was a stark reminder from southern Thailand’s insurgency movement of the seventh anniversary of the Tak Bai massacre.

The violent conflict still ravaging southern Thailand has claimed more than 5000 lives since the eruption of violence in 2004, and is concentrated in the three Malay-Muslim majority provinces, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, as well as four districts of neighbouring Songkhla.

This historically rebellious region has seen waves of uprisings against the Thai state since it became part of Thailand through the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty. Many of the armed movements that have fought for independence over the years have emerged as reactions against recurring efforts by Bangkok to exert increased authority over the region. The 1970s and 1980s saw an extended separatist campaign by the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), which relied on traditional guerrilla warfare conducted from jungle bases. This was effectively suppressed by a combination of conventional military campaigns and amnesty programs. Following the decline of PULO, BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C) emerged as the main insurgent group, and the movement made a number of strategic shifts away from its predecessors’ failures. BRN-C also focused on initially conducting a systematic mass-indoctrination of the local southern population in order to build a solid political base before eventually launching its violent struggle.

Maintaining separate political and militant cells in villages throughout the Malay-Muslim south, BRN-C has built a strong base and effectively undermined state control in the region. Rather than relying on a regular guerrilla force, the movement relies on part-time fighters organised in autonomous cells acting in their own communities. This mode of operation provides a challenge for state security agencies employing traditional counter-insurgency tactics. The largely Thai-Buddhist police and military is simply incapable of separating friend from foe when operating in the ‘Deep South’.

The current wave of violence began in 2004 with a bold raid on the Chulaporn military camp, where the separatists made away with a large weapons cache. The security agencies initially tried to counter the insurgency using cruel repression: the infamous massacres at the Kru Se mosque and later at the police station in the small town of Tak Bai are two clear examples. While outside attention has largely focused on these symbolic events, the bulk of casualties have been caused by a drawn-out campaign of daily acts of violence using small arms, explosives and arson attacks. The security agencies’ mismanagement of the initial round of violence has also contributed to its steady escalation.

The spread of violence has pushed state power back from the south, leading to increased lawlessness and secondary violence in the form of revenge killings, settling of scores among criminals and extra-judicial executions at the hands of rogue elements within Thailand’s security agencies.

Instances of violence tend to follow linguistic and religious patterns, reinforcing the view that southern insurgents rely on ethnic and religious identities for mobilisation. While the Thai state has maintained an inclusive policy toward religious minorities, language policies are extremely conservative. Standard Thai is the sole medium of communication with government officials, for example, leaving the south’s Malay-speaking population feeling largely alienated. Economic disadvantage also adds to the sense of exclusion, as the region is among the poorest in the country, and significantly less developed than Thai-Buddhist provinces to the immediate north.

The central Thai government has been largely ineffective at handling the violence in the south. Efforts to mediate in the conflict are hampered by the hyper secrecy maintained by BRN-C leaders and the state’s unwillingness to make any concessions. Consequently, serious proposals for handling the conflict have principally been found outside this bloc, and include academic blueprints for increased self-determination. Researchers at the Prince of Songkla University in Pattani have suggested that autonomy through the creation of a Pattani Metropolitan Administration could allow space to pursue local identity within the bounds of the Thai state — and undermine local support for the armed uprising.

In the July 2011 election, several parties floated policies for autonomy or decentralisation, with the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party adopting the Pattani Metropolitan Administration proposal as party policy. In the end, the pro-establishment Democrat Party triumphed in the Deep South, taking nine of 11 parliamentary seats. The party benefited from a spilt of the Malay-Muslim vote between large numbers of candidates contesting the elections after the break-up of the Wadah faction, which had dominated Malay-Muslim politics for decades.

The failure of Pheu Thai to gain any seats in the south leaves them without clear electoral support to pursue autonomy. Back-tracking on their election promises, the party has recently floated alternative ideas for preserving strong central government control over the south, even while increasing the army’s role in handling the situation. The lack of meaningful effort at decentralisation can only prolong the conflict.

By Anders Engvall recent PhD graduate in Economics from the Stockholm School of Economics, where he is now an assistant professor.
This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Where is Thailand Headed?‘

Very Wealthy It May Be, but Not All Is Well in Singapore

2012-01-19T14:03:00.000-08:00

With the end of 2011, Singapore’s policy makers have ample reason to be satisfied with their economic management, and the results of the long-prevailing business location growth model.

Singapore’s macroec onomic indicators, excepting the inflation rate, exhibited encouraging trends in 2011. Real economic growth is projected at around 5 percent for the year, generating about 100,000 new jobs in 2011, which is equivalent to 2.6 percent of the total workforce. An impressive 61.5 percent of Singapore’s total population was employed.

Still, the inflation rate, measured by the consumer price index, has hovered around 5 percent, while the domestic supply price index surged by 9.3 percent in the third quarter of 2011. These rates are uncomfortably high compared to those that Singapore is normally accustomed to.

The general and presidential elections held in 2011 highlighted the electorate’s growing concern with quality-of-life issues that encompass more than material living conditions. This is apparent across divergent demographic and economic groups. Citizens perceive that their quality of life does not reflect the wide range of options and choices they expect of an affluent country with a per capita gross domestic product of $43,867 in 2010, at current market prices. Their concerns have more recently manifested in demands for greater policy, media and electoral contestability.

There is substantial infrastructure investment currently under way in transport, health, housing and education, which could help narrow the gap between rapid demand increases and the supply response. But much more emphasis needs to be placed on the softer aspects of health care, childcare and education to mitigate concerns about poor quality of life for schoolchildren, as well as working mothers.

The generational shift, particularly as younger citizens have grown up in an affluent environment, has accentuated this perception of quality of life in Singapore. An important element in this perception is that citizens’ upward-mobility prospects are being limited by the presence of disproportionately large numbers of foreign workers, particularly at the professional and executive levels. In the middle of last year, only 63 percent of Singapore’s total population of 5.2 million were citizens, 10 percent were permanent residents and 27 percent foreign workers. The share of foreign workers in the labor force is much higher, and could reach two-fifths of the total labor force by the end of this decade.

Another important element is an increasing recognition of the growing inequalities in income and wealth to which government policies have contributed. Such policies include strong adherence to the business location growth model, with its concomitant rise in foreign workers; light taxation of capital income; and very limited measures designed to provide adequate retirement income and mitigate against retirement income risks.

The population, meanwhile, is aging rapidly due to the ultra-low fertility rate of 1.15 births per woman in 2010 (when 2.15 is the replacement rate) and improved life expectancy.

These trends will lead to an increase in the median age (38 years in 2011) and in age-related social expenditures, whose burden needs to be shared equitably, not disproportionately by the individuals as is currently the case.

Policy makers appear to recognize these concerns, but their actions suggest a continued belief in the adequacy of enacting relatively minor changes in the business location growth model, with its serious reliance on foreign workers; planned infrastructure expenditure; and minor refinements in the mandatory savings scheme (as administered by the Central Provident Fund).

It is the excessive single-minded zeal in pursing these policies, when circumstances require their moderation and the introduction of additional measures, that has led to quality-of-life concerns. More could be done, for instance, by focusing on relative poverty rather than absolute poverty. This policy approach will likely be tested in the coming years as aging accelerates, and the electorate’s expectations and aspirations continue to diverge from the outcomes of the current assumptions underlying Singapore’s social and economic management.

Singapore’s prospects for 2012 depend on the global economy. The euro zone is experiencing a serious economic crisis, and growth in other industrial countries is expected to be anaemic. China and India are also facing challenges in sustaining relatively high growth.

But Singapore is well positioned to benefit from any positive developments in the regional global economies, and to cushion any downside risk. Singapore’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations — billed as a new-generation preferential economic agreement — is one indicator of its future economic preparedness.

East Asia Forum By Mukul Asher professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

MALAYSIA: Anwar in the Mix

2012-01-19T13:55:00.000-08:00

For the past 13 years Malaysian politics has been on a loop the political equivalent of “Groundhog Day” as events (most notably opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim’s two sodomy trials) are repeated ad nauseam

Last week, thankfully, the cycle was smashed. The acquittal of the former deputy prime minister has given the country an opportunity to move forward — all the more so since national polls must be held before mid-2013.

Why is this so? Well, as mentioned at the start, the seemingly endless cycle of political missteps in Malaysia over the past decade has had an enervating effect on its people. Faith in national institutions has been eroded. The judiciary and the police have become increasingly distrusted.

The many instances of corruption, abuse of power and perceived selective persecution have whittled away at Malaysians’ faith in their country and one another. The attendant suspicion has made moving the nation forward, whether socially or economically, very difficult.

The Anwar decision provides a glimmer of hope because it shows there have been some people working toward a regeneration of the country’s damaged institutions. This has engendered a slow revival of Malaysia’s public institutions and a realization that some form of political liberalization is unavoidable.

The most notable figure has been Malaysia’s fearless auditor general, whose regular reports have continued to highlight government mismanagement and negligence. There are also the reforms of Prime Minister Najib Razak which, while tentative and timid, have shown that the government does recognize that the civil liberties agenda is unavoidable even if the net result has been half-baked and ill-conceived such as the controversial Peaceful Assembly Bill and election reform.

Indeed, it would seem that the people staffing these institutions have come to realize they have a larger duty to the people and that this surpasses any political pressure that may be brought upon them. Such sentiments are crucial if the country is to progress.

There will always be questions over Anwar’s character and judgment. Nevertheless, we cannot dismiss the psychological impact of the trial. It is proof that Malaysia’s judiciary is more independent than commonly thought and that all Malaysians can seek justice.

As I said, it’s a start — but only that. The real question is, where do we go from here?

For the ruling Barisan Nasional and its Malay-majority UMNO lynchpin, the challenge is whether it will continue be able to promote a more positive, less-racially divisive national agenda. Will Najib’s party rise to the policy challenges presented by the opposition? Can the UMNO learn to engage Anwar and the Pakatan Rakyat opposition on a level playing field, which includes equal access to the tightly-controlled media?

Najib has the talent and willingness to do so, but his efforts at reform have been stymied by members of his own party.

Whatever UMNO chooses, Anwar and Pakatan are now a fact of life that the BN will have to deal with.

Anwar has made his political career operating outside the establishment. The various personal attacks on him, as well as UMNO’s use of sectarian rhetoric, have only made the opposition stronger as public disdain for “dirty tricks” grows.

For the opposition, Anwar’s acquittal is a sign that it’s time to get down to business. Pakatan has been distracted by its leader’s personal dramas for far too long at the price of being able to articulate coherent policy positions. There should be no distractions now.

Now, Anwar’s acquittal spices Malaysian politics up considerably. The next general elections, which are expected to happen later this year, will be more closely-fought with two brilliant but cagey protagonists — Najib and Anwar — at their respective helms.

Indeed, it’s very difficult to say who will come out on top. There are so many “wild cards,” not least how Sabah and Sarawak will vote. It could very well be that we could be looking at status quo: namely a BN re-election, but without regaining what it lost in 2008.

This may disappoint eager supporters on both sides, but it also means that the gains Malaysians have made in terms of reform will not be swept away, or become an uncontrollable flood.

Malaysians will have to learn — like Indonesians have — that democracy is a slow, tedious process but one that’s ultimately necessary if a country is to progress. The country itself will be the ultimate winner.

By Karim Raslan columnist who divides his time between Malaysia and Indonesia.

India’s identity scheme

2012-01-18T13:57:00.000-08:00

The magic number

A huge identity scheme promises to help India’s poor—and to serve as a model for other countries

INDIA’S economy might be thriving, but many of its people are not. This week Manmohan Singh, the prime minister, said his compatriots should be ashamed that over two-fifths of their children are underfed. They should be outraged, too, at the infant mortality, illiteracy, lack of clean drinking water and countless other curses that afflict the poor.

Poverty has many causes, and no simple cure. But one massive problem in India is that few poor people can prove who they are. They have no passport, no driving licence, no proof of address. They live in villages where multitudes share the same name. Their lack of an identity excludes them from the modern economy. They cannot open bank accounts, and no one would be so foolish as to lend them money.

The government offers them all kinds of welfare, but because they lack an identity, they struggle to lay hands on what they have been promised. The state spends a fortune on subsidised grain for the hungry, but an estimated two-thirds of it is stolen or adulterated by middlemen. The government pays for an $8 billion-a-year make-work scheme for the rural poor, but much of the cash ends up in the capacious pockets of officials who invent imaginary “ghost workers”.

Suppose those thieving middlemen were obliged to deliver grain, not to poor people in general but to named individuals who could confirm receipt by scanning their fingerprints? And suppose those ghost workers had to undergo an iris scan before being paid? If poor Indians each had an identity number tied to unique biometric markers, it would be much harder for the powerful to rob them. Sceptics will scoff that the Indian government is far too incompetent to implement such a scheme. But the sceptics are wrong.

This month India’s unique identity (UID) scheme will enroll its 200 millionth member, having had almost none only a year ago (see article). By the end of this year, says Nandan Nilekani, a former software mogul who runs the project, the tally could stand at 400m, a third of all Indians. The scheme is voluntary, but the poor are visibly enthusiastic about it. Long lines wait patiently in the heat to have their fingerprints and irises scanned and entered into what has swiftly become the world’s largest biometric database.

For the poor, having a secure online identity alters their relationship with the modern world. No more queueing for hours in a distant town and bribing officials with money you don’t have to obtain paperwork that won’t be recognised if you move to another state looking for work. A pilot project just begun in Jharkhand, an eastern state, will link the new identities to individuals’ bank accounts. Those to whom the government owes money will soon be able to receive it electronically, either at a bank or at a village shop. Ghost labourers staffing public-works schemes, and any among India’s 20m government employees, should turn into thin air. The middlemen who steal billions should more easily be bypassed or caught.

That is just the start. Armed with the system, India will be able to rethink the nature of its welfare state, cutting back on benefits in kind and market-distorting subsidies, and turning to cash transfers paid directly into the bank accounts of the neediest. Hundreds of millions of the poor must open bank accounts, which is all to the good, because it will bind them into the modern economy. Care must be taken so mothers rather than feckless fathers control funds for their children. But most poor people, including anyone who wants to move around, will be better off with cash welfare paid in full. Vouchers for medical or education spending could follow.

Companies—and their customers—stand to gain from the system too. Mr Nilekani talks of India stealing a march on other countries if firms have an easy, secure way of identifying their customers. Banks will be more likely to lend money to people they can trace. Mobile-phone firms will extend credit. Insurers will offer lower rates, because they will know more about the person they are covering. Medical records will become portable, as will school records. Ordinary Indians will find it easier to buy and sell things online, as ordinary Chinese already do. Just as America’s Global Positioning System, designed for aiming missiles, is now used by everyone for civilian navigation and online maps, so might UID become the infrastructure for India’s commercial services.

They’ve got your number

India’s scheme holds three lessons for other countries. One is that designing such a scheme as a platform for government services, not security, keeps the costs down and boosts the benefits. Another is to use the private sector. From the start, Mr Nilekani harnessed the genius of Indians abroad, including a man who helped the New York Stock Exchange crunch its numbers and one of the brains behind WebMD, an American health IT firm. Both public and private actors (mostly tech firms that enroll participants and process data) are paid strictly by results. The cost of enrolling each person is a little over 100 rupees ($2). Many other poor countries could afford that.

And the third is that, alas, even a brilliant idea has enemies. India’s stubborn home minister, P. Chidambaram, is now blocking a cabinet decision to extend the UID’s mandate, which is needed for the roll-out to continue. Parliamentarians and activists have raised worries over India’s lack of strong privacy and data-protection laws; they also complain about the weak legal basis for the scheme.

These complaints have some validity, but not enough to derail the scheme. For instance, India plainly needs better data-protection laws, but even if the existing rules remained unchanged, the threat to liberty would be dwarfed by the gains to welfare: to people who live ten to a room, concerns about privacy sound outlandish. Some of the resistance is principled, but much comes from the people who do well out of today’s filthy system. Indian politics hinge on patronage—the doling out of opportunities to rob one’s countrymen. UID would make this harder. That is why it faces such fierce opposition, and why it could transform India. The Economist

Assessing Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2012

2012-01-18T13:49:00.000-08:00

The Foreign Ministry has explained that Indonesian foreign policy in 2012 would manage and promote change in order to establish common stability, security and prosperity at regional and global levels. What are the capabilities and challenges for Indonesia in conducting its foreign policy in 2012?

Indonesia, in my opinion, has the capability as a mediating power sufficient to create and preserve common stability, security and prosperity. Indonesia has a coordinating role, foreign policy competence and can respond to the regional and global challenges. However, Indonesia also has challenges in determining and improving its foreign policy in the regional and global arena, such as in the complexity of domestic situations.

Indonesia is known as a mediating power among developing countries. This means that Indonesia has the power to mediate between developed and developing countries and to negotiate for a collective position among developing countries, such as on developmental and environmental issues. Indonesia’s position is central among countries in regional and global forums. For example, Indonesia holds a crucial role in providing a balance in Southeast Asia in specific and in the Asia-
Pacific region.

Indonesia is also recognized for its role as a coordinating actor within Southeast Asia. It can use its influence to pursue and coordinate all ASEAN countries in supporting the realization of the ASEAN Community and in actively shaping the coherence of ASEAN in international fora.

The goal of Indonesia is to create a dynamic equilibrium based on the principle of the Axis of Symmetrical Interests in the Southeast Asia region and the East Asia region.

Indonesia can influence ASEAN countries to engage with key players within these regions and persuade them to respect common rules, regulations and policies that may provide collective security and foster economic development in these regions. For example, Indonesia has contributed positively to the evolving regional architecture, such as the ASEAN Community and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

Indonesia has foreign policy competence to pursue its goal in regional and international arenas. Indonesia has 130 representative offices worldwide, which consists of 95 embassies, three permanent representatives, 29 consulate general offices and three consulate offices. Indonesia plays an active role in prominent regional and multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN, G-20 and EAS.

Indonesia has non-state actors, such as NGOs and the business community, which have linked internationally with their partners and networks outside the country. This foreign policy competence can support Indonesian diplomacy.

Indonesia has faced several challenges that may shape and influence Indonesia’s capabilities.

First, there is a lack of coordination among ministries and state institutions in Indonesia. There is an overlap between central and local governments within Indonesia when they conduct their various foreign economic policies in inviting foreign investors. Bear in mind, Indonesian foreign policy is not solely dominated by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. The role of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry is to coordinate Indonesian diplomacy.

As a coordinator, the Foreign Ministry needs support from other ministries and local governments in order to formulate and conduct Indonesia’s foreign policy in an effective way. In order to manage good coordination among ministries and local governments, effective institutional machinery within all stakeholders related to Indonesia’s diplomacy is a must.

Second, there is a need to realize the economic development which can be felt by most Indonesians. In 2011, economic growth in Indonesia reached 6.5 percent based on macroeconomic measurement.

However, this economic growth depends more on consumer spending and financial investments rather than the production of goods and services.

There are some challenges for Indonesia, such as the potential high inflation rate, the total number of unemployed people being 8.02 million in 2011, the total number of poor people being around 30 million based on the government’s poverty line of people with incomes below Rp 233,740 per month. The economic situation above will make the government focus more on domestic affairs rather than foreign issues.

Third, Indonesia has yet to deal with rampant corruption scandals, such as Bank Century and the bribery scandals involving the last 26th SEA Games building project, among others. The Corruption Eradication Commission has attempted to investigate and prosecute such corruption cases through the courts. Still, the score of Indonesia’s Corruption Perception Index in 2011 was rated 3, putting the country at 100th position out of 183 nations.

It means that Indonesia still needs to improve its law enforcement against corruption. Such an unfavorable situation will seriously impact the efforts by all Indonesia’s representative offices in promoting the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Development (MP3EI),
designed to attract foreign investment to Indonesia.

We will see how the government of Indonesia can demonstrate its capabilities and face challenges in a balanced way.

By Beginda Pakpahan, lecturer at the University of Indonesia and a researcher with the University of Edinburgh, UK.

Death and Impunity in Philippine Journalism

2012-01-18T13:42:00.000-08:00

A Mindanao city becomes the world’s journalist murder capital

General Santos City, at the very bottom of southern Mindanao, is becoming the journalist murder capital of the Philippines, and perhaps the world.

Christopher Guarin, the publisher of a local community newspaper and radio commentator was the latest to die, on Jan. 5 when he was shot six times by a gunman riding in tandem on a motorcycle that pulled up beside his car and opened fire.

Guarin tried to drive away as the gunman kept shooting. Eventually he stopped the car and got out, begging for his life as the two gunmen kept shooting. His wife, Lyn, who was riding in the car with him along with the couple’s nine-year-old daughter, told local media that “I could not count the number of shots made by the suspects. But I saw my husband lying on the ground helpless, pleading before the suspects not to kill him. His pleading fell on deaf ears."

A statement from the media support group Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists said Guarin's death is "one more indication of the persistence of the culture of impunity that encourages the killing of journalists and media workers in the Philippines."

Guarin himself was questioned by police in connection with the murder of the circulation manager of a rival tabloid, the Brigada News, two months earlier. The circulation manager, Alfredo Velarde, was driving to collect the day’s edition when a gunman appeared behind his car and shot him dead. Guarin’s wife, however, said he was cleared of any involvement in the Velarde killing.

The publisher of Tatak Bigtime News, one of five print dailies and a radio commentator in General Santos City, population 675,000, Guerin was the 10th media personality to be slain in the city since 1986 – not counting 14 journalists and media workers who were among the 33 who were killed in Maguindanao Province in November 2009 in a slaughter allegedly ordered by warlord Andal Ampatuan Junior, who is currently on trial in Manila for the murders in a trial that observers say could take a decade given the slow progress of Philippine justice.

The country ranks third on the Committee to Protect Journalists' global Impunity Index, a quantitative measure of the number of journalists killed for their work without justice worldwide. At least two Filipino journalists were shot and killed in relation to their work in 2011, according to research by the committee. Both were local radio announcers. CPJ is investigating the murders of three other journalists last year, but it is not clear if their deaths were related to their work as journalists. All three were local radio announcers as well.

Guarin was the first journalist killed in 2012 in the Philippines. He probably won’t be the last. A total of 72 journalists have been killed in the country since 1992 although local media groups say the total is much higher, with 150 reporters killed in the country since 1986.

"The murder of journalist Christopher Guarin speaks to the Benigno Aquino government's growing failure to protect journalists and live up to its reform rhetoric," said Shawn Crispin, CPJ's Southeast Asia Representative. "How many journalists must be killed with impunity before Aquino's government takes seriously and acts decisively against the threat faced by all journalists across the Philippines?"

While authorities have not yet determined a motive behind the killing, CPJ said Guarin had received anonymous death threats by text message before his murder, according to his wife and work colleagues quoted in local press reports. Hours before his murder he read on air one of the text-message threats, which warned him against leaving the radio station where he anchored a "block-time" radio program or risk being killed, according to Freddie Solinap, a manager at Tatak News.

Guarin's death is typical of many killings of journalists in the Philippines, according to CPJ. Block-timing is a practice in which a broadcaster leases air time from a radio station and is responsible for bringing in advertising money to cover the program's expenses. A number of block-time commentators, many with affiliations to local politicians, have been killed in the Philippines, according to CPJ research. Very often the killings come at the hands of assailants on motorcycles.

So far three journalists from the defunct RGMA Super Radyo, including Guarin, have been murdered. In 2004, Super Radyo reporter Jonathan Abayon was shot and killed moments after leaving the house of then rising boxing star Manny Pacquiao. A former Pacquiao bodyguard and suspect remains at large. In 2009, Neneng Montaño was among those killed in the Ampatuan Massacre. Montaño was sales account executive and a Super Radyo part-time reporter.

Local journalists have raised a reward for the arrest of the mastermind behind Guarin’s killing, rising to more than P88,000 (US$2,000) following an additional P20,000 donation from a concerned citizen who declined to be identified. A prominent personality, who also requested anonymity, earlier pledged P50,000 for the arrest of Guarin’s killer and those behind the attack. The amount is expected to rise as more pledges are being made. Asia Sentinel

Buyer Beware: Burma's Investor Graveyard

2012-01-18T13:34:00.000-08:00

It may not be as easy as it looks

Resource-rich Burma is looming as one of the world’s final investment frontiers for Western companies battling a prolonged downturn in the EU and feeble growth in the US.

Subject to Western sanctions for decades but possessing a population of nearly 60 million, as well as abundant reserves of natural gas and other natural resources, Burma, also represents one of Asia’s last untapped paradises for potential investors. It can also represent one of Asia's biggest traps.

Visit the sleepy Myanmar International Terminal Thilawa (MITT) complex in Kyauktan township outside Yangon and you might just find a cement bagging factory bearing the logo of French company LaFarge. Opened in 1997 by then-Prime Minister Khin Nyunt -- who was released from house arrest only last week after falling out with other members of the junta -- the plant never filled a single bag of cement. Today the gate is locked and overgrown with weeds and the guard’s hut has been vacant for a long time.

Malaysian billionaire Robert Kwok likewise invested heavily in the 1990s through his Shangri-La group. The company’s Traders Hotel has benefited from the recent influx of business and leisure travellers but other ventures, such as the seemingly abandoned condominium towers at the edge of Kandawgyi Lake and his port at MITT, have not fared so well.

More recently, Burma’s newly installed, notionally democratic government led by President Thein Sein has exhibited a populist streak absent under the former military leaders, and axing unpopular projects regardless of their size or cost.

In September last year Thein Sein suspended the widely unpopular Myitsone dam project in Kachin State, which had an estimated price tag above US$20 billion and was being developed by China Yunnan Power Investment to ship 80 percent of the power to China.

Then, just a fortnight ago the government announced that Italian-Thai Development, which is building a $58 billion deep-sea port, special economic zone and 4000-megawatt powerplant in Myanmar’s southeastern town of Dawei in Tanintharyi Region, via the media, that it could no longer use coal to fuel the power plant.

U Khin Maung Soe, Minister of Electric Power 2, told journalists on Jan. 9 at the Yangon Electricity Supply Board headquarters in Ahlone township that the ministries of energy, industry and electric power 1 and 2 had decided to stop the plant going ahead.

He cited “fear of the adverse effects on the environment” as the reason for the cancellation.

Ital-Thai is cooperating with Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holdings to develop the plant and Ratchaburi president Noppol Milinthanggoon told Bangkok Post on Jan. 11 that his company had not received an official notice from the government.

"It needs to be verified thoroughly before making any comment," he said, adding that it would be better to let Italian-Thai Development speak because that company holds 25 percent of the proposed power project.

But Somchet Thinaphong, the managing director of Dawei Development Co, the company established by Ital-Thai to oversee the Dawei project, said: “If they don't want coal-fired power plants, we have to look for other fuel sources. It could be natural gas, and we'd need to discuss how to supply that."

The highly publicized case of Australian newspaper publisher Ross Dunkley, spectacularly captured in the documentary movie “Dancing With Dictators,” ought to make any foreign investor pause and reconsider.

Dunkley was arrested and jailed on charges stemming from an alleged incident with a prostitute, who claimed the colourful Australian had beaten her, fed her illicit drugs and detained her against her will.

Despite her later efforts to have the charges withdrawn, Dunkley spent 47 days in jail.

Just months before the incident Dunkley received a letter from Minister for Information Kyaw Hsan demanding that he hand over control of the Myanmar Times newspaper to his Burmese partner, Dr Tin Tun Oo, who holds 51 percent of Myanmar Consolidated Media, publisher of The Myanmar Times.

Despite those cases, as Asia Sentinel detailed in a Jan. 10 article, over recent weeks a stampede of prospective investors has expressed interest in the country, including a Japanese delegation, the Templeton Emerging Market Group, Colliers International Thailand and others.

Myanmar "represents not only an export manufacturing base but a significant future domestic market as well," said associate director Antony Picon of Colliers. "This is a key component for even export-led manufacturers. It also ticks all the right boxes in tourism such as beaches, culture, temples and an aesthetic commercial centre in Yangon.

“Companies from all fields such as hospitality, manufacturing, medical services, banks and fund management are all interested. Myanmar will not be a niche market but a fully-fledged economy,” he added.

Dr Nicholas Farrelly, an Australian National University academic and moderator of the New Mandala website, said the damage to company image from investing in Burma was fading but hasn't disappeared.

“Boycott campaigns get less traction than ever before but there is still a sense in Australia, as elsewhere, that regressive moves by the government could still occur. That's the risk for Australian businesses. They don't want to get caught if the wind changes direction,” he said.

“Western democracies and their business elites want to see Myanmar move so far ahead that it can never go back,” he added.

But Myanmar has a rich history of backtracking on reforms and potential investors would do well to consider both recent events and those that occurred as the Asian Financial Crisis swept the region in 1997.

Since it opened up to foreign investment in 1988 following Ne Win’s disastrous socialist economic policy, known as the Burmese Way to Socialism, Burma has been a graveyard for many an unwary foreign investor.

That said, removal of sanctions obviously opens the field for investment dramatically, and importantly it changes their nature. Previously, it was necessary to do business with members of the junta on a large-ticket basis. As in Indonesia and China, to name two, it is necessary to take a local partner, preferably one with guanxi. It is difficult to say who the new parties will be, although many of the groups that have been at the trough through the decades are a potential serious liability to foreign partners, because any investigation of previous recent deals won't be pretty.

Investors should be looking for new "cleaner" players. Steven Law, the old buddy of Asia World fame and others are seen by some influential new groups and by new blood in the cabinet as having done quite well enough in the past and it's time to lessen government reliance on them.

It will remain very difficult to do business, however. The entire economy and governance need to be rebooted, which will take time although removal of the sanctions broadens everyone's opportunity and is a critical first step in the process. It must be noted that, importantly press freedom is evolving quite rapidly as is internet access and usage, which can be expected to raise the level of scrutiny on every major project and deal, which should represent a new playing field.

Potential investors are clearly aware of the risks of doing business. Douglas Clayton, chief executive of Leopard Capital, a private equity investor in frontier markets, told the BBC on January 5 that the greatest fear for investors is that the recent political reforms could be reversed.

“Perhaps the most feared risk is a rollback of the entire liberalisation agenda, should impatient democracy advocates or separatist insurgents provoke globally-unacceptable military crackdowns," Clayton said. “It is easy to imagine that hardliners lurk within Burma's military who would like to derail the ambitious democratization and economic liberalisation process.”

And those who expect US sanctions to be removed in the short term are likely to be disappointed.

James M Roberts, lead expert in economic freedom and growth at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative US think tank, said: “Lifting the sanctions is a long, very involved political process here, closely tied to meaningful systemic political reform in Burma.” Asia Sentinel

Thailand: from financial crisis to financial resilience

2012-01-17T15:37:00.000-08:00

The development of Thailand’s financial sector has been a story of restructuring, adjustment and renewal, following the devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.

The crisis was very costly to the Thai financial system, with an estimated gross fiscal loss equivalent to about 33 per cent of 2006 GDP. At the peak of the crisis, the Thai banking sector had large net losses, a declining net interest margin, low capital levels and a non-performing loan ratio that peaked at 43 per cent of total loans in 1998.

But the manner in which the Thai banking problem was tackled, beginning in 1998, shows how authorities might successfully overcome a systemic banking crisis. The government embarked on a comprehensive restructuring of the financial sector, intervening in weak banks and focusing on recapitalisation, debt restructuring, reform of the regulatory and supervisory framework, strengthening corporate governance of banks, and introducing initiatives to deepen and broaden the capital market.

Thai authorities then proceeded aggressively with regulatory and supervisory reforms aimed at moving Thailand’s financial regulation and supervision towards a risk-based framework on par with international best practice. Key elements of the reforms centred on risk-based supervision under Basel II (an accord on banking regulations), consolidated supervision and the phased implementation of IAS 39 (a more rigorous method of measuring financial transactions). Financial institutions were also restructured to rationalise and consolidate the financial system under a ‘One Presence’ policy. These reform efforts were coordinated under the broad agenda of the Financial Sector Master Plan Phase I (2004–08) which aimed to improve the financial system’s efficiency, broaden access to finance, and improve consumer protection.

By mid-2007, when the global financial crisis erupted, many weaknesses in Thailand’s regulatory and supervisory framework had been reduced. Consolidation in the financial system brought the number of deposit-taking institutions down to 45 from 124 before the 1997/98 crisis, while the process of deleveraging in the private sector was more or less complete, with the debt-to-equity ratio declining from 1.2 in 1998 to 0.7. The domestic capital market also grew rapidly in response to the funding needs of Thailand’s government and firms, further strengthening the system’s resilience. Importantly, these improvements resulted in much stronger balance sheets for firms and banks.

The immediate impact of the global financial crisis on the Thai economy and the financial sector was limited, due to the funding structure of Thai banks and the low exposure of the Thai banking sector to subprime assets. This structure was based on domestic deposits that helped insulate Thai banks from the tight liquidity conditions abroad. The second-round effects from the decline in economic activity and deleveraging were slightly more pronounced, and a policy response was required at the macroeconomic- and finance-sector levels. The key challenge for Thailand has been to help small and medium enterprises adjust to the impact of the global slowdown while maintaining confidence and ensuring a normally functioning financial sector.

By 2010 the Thai economy was on a firm path to recovery, supported by fiscal stimulus, low interest rates and a fully functioning banking sector. Lessons from the global financial crisis point clearly to the importance of having a sound and resilient financial system to prevent the risk of crisis and help the economy adjust to shocks. Reflecting this, reforms to strengthen the financial sector continue under the broad agenda of the Financial Sector Master Plan Phase II. The plan focuses on improving the financial system’s efficiency through greater competition, reducing the financial system costs, expanding access to financial services, and strengthening banks’ risk-management capacities by developing better and more complex financial markets and infrastructure.

In parallel with domestic reform, the landscape for the global regulatory and supervisory framework is also changing rapidly in the wake of the global financial crisis. The most important item here is the introduction of the Basel III standards, to be implemented in 2013. The aim of Basel III is to make banks resilient to stress through stronger capital bases, better liquidity positions and more comprehensive risk management. Although the capital position of Thai banks is robust, the industry’s longer-term strength will benefit from a continued improvement in capital, liquidity, governance and risk management.

The key future regulatory issue for Thailand, therefore, is how to adapt to the new global regulatory process without harming economic recovery. This must happen while also ensuring the finance industry is contributing to the economy’s efforts to address post-crisis challenges, which are expected to be different and more complex.

Important in this context is the role the financial system must play to promote domestic demand as a key engine for growth, and the task of more successfully transforming the country’s high rate of savings into productive investment.

By Bandid Nijathaworn former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand and is Chairman of the Thai Bond Market Association and President and CEO of the Thai Institute of Directors, Bangkok. This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Where is Thailand Headed?‘

From the US Heartland to Indonesia

2012-01-16T13:27:00.000-08:00

Events over the last year — from young protesters overthrowing dictatorial governments in the Middle East to the devastating natural and nuclear disaster in Japan and the floods in Thailand and the Philippines — make it impossible to not recognize that we are living in an ever-increasingly interdependent world. Unfortunately, once the television crews leave the scene, too often American interest quickly leaves as well.

America’s Attention Deficit Disorder with Southeast Asia, as I have dubbed it, has produced unfortunate results. Few people in the US Congress, not to mention the everyday Americans in communities across the country, could point to Indonesia on the map before the devastating tsunami in 2004.

However, there was a tremendous effort of assistance and cooperation among US military, government and nonprofit organizations to help the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the international community respond to this cataclysmic humanitarian crisis. But after the immediate crisis waned, so too did America’s engagement with Indonesia, and with much of the region.

While the United States’ ADD with Southeast Asia has primarily been benign, the consequences have at times been devastating. For instance, since the terrible abuses committed by the TNI in East Timor, the United States has imposed on-again, off-again restrictions on our relations with the Indonesian Military, including the still-imposed “lethal” weapons sales ban.

Despite important reforms the military made in training and doctrine to instill respect for human rights, civilian control and military professionalism, US policies largely went unchanged. The most heartbreaking result of this policy I saw firsthand when I was in Banda Acheh following the devastating tsunami. Because of the military restrictions, Indonesia was denied the ability to purchase necessary spare parts for its C-130 fleet, leaving its fleet of 24 planes largely inoperable and slowing the arrival of aid.

In today’s fast-paced and interconnected world, this American ADD is outdated, and, when it comes to Southeast Asia, economically unwise. After all, Asean is America’s fifth largest overseas market.

Indonesia in particular is key to America’s economic future; with 240 million people, Indonesia has the largest economy in Southeast Asia, one of the fastest growing economies globally and is located along the world’s major trade routes. Indonesia is also key to the US security future, playing a balancing role to the growing dominance of China and acting as a key ally in combating terrorists.

Despite the compelling case that Indonesia and Southeast Asia as a whole presents to the United States, American ADD has prevented US government leaders from acting on free trade agreements, easing punitive policies that discourage US investment in the region and supporting the necessary level of investment in smart-power programs like the Peace Corps and humanitarian and development assistance initiatives.

President Barack Obama and his administration have taken important steps to counter this lack of focus on Southeast Asia, appointing the first US ambassador to Asean, joining the East Asian Summit, participating in regional forums and signing the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, to name a few. While this administration undoubtedly has strengthened America’s relationship with Indonesia and the region, much more must be done.

Recently I served as a member of the US-Asean Strategy Commission organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Our report made the case that the United States can no longer afford to sit on the sidelines in engaging Southeast Asia. We also laid out critical recommendations to help American policy makers develop a long-term strategy to deal with the region.

These recommendations include actions that would strongly signal that the United States is serious about being a key player on trade and investment, such as declaring our intention to negotiate a US-Asean FTA.

Equally important, our commission advised the United States to act now to increase people-to-people ties between our countries, including educational exchanges. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is himself an example of these ties, having completed his MBA at Webster University in St. Louis.

Of course, it is far easier to offer recommendations than to put them into action. Which is why this week, I am leading a trade delegation from my home state of Missouri in America’s heartland to Indonesia. In partnership with the St. Louis World Trade Center, this trade and investment delegation is made up of representatives from small, medium and large businesses as well as universities.

Our delegation will be visiting Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung and Surabaya where we will meet with government and business leaders to explore mutually beneficial economic and commercial opportunities. There is much Missouri can offer Indonesia in the areas of food security, agribusiness, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

The same is true of people-to-people ties. This week representatives from some of Missouri’s top universities will meet with Indonesian education officials to discuss building an even deeper partnership among schools in both our countries. Also, since 2004 Missouri’s second largest city, St. Louis, has had a Sister Cities’ relationship with Bogor, which we will celebrate and strengthen at a signing ceremony with Mayor Diani Budiarto.

There are a number of global challenges on the horizon that we must all come to the table to deal with. But too often, the common enemies of ignorance and intolerance result in gridlock. Increasing people-to-people interaction is one of the best solutions to addressing this challenge. And people-to-people ties will help educate Americans about the importance of Indonesia and help break through our Attention Deficit Disorder.

The more we take the time to work together, learn from each other and exchange ideas, we quickly learn how much we have in common. We all want to ensure a better life for our children, to worship and practice our religion in peace, and provide for the safety and well-being of our families. With our shared democratic values of peace, tolerance and pluralism, Indonesia and the United States are natural partners in creating that hopeful future.

By Christopher S. Bond former US senator from Missouri.Jakarta Globe

Measuring America's Commitment to Asia-Pacific

2012-01-15T13:05:00.000-08:00

How much is the United States willing to commit in protecting its interests and the region's?

The average western citizen has probably never heard of the Paracel Islands, an archipelago of 30-plus specks located in the South China Sea. There’s not much to suggest. It’s a good place to fish and perhaps drill for oil, but on the whole the islands are inconsequential. They are not game changers in the sense that control over them would shift geopolitical standings.

Yet for centuries the Paracels have been hotly contested, changing hands between the Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, and French at one point or another. Today the islands are claimed by both China and Vietnam, although it is China that has controlled and garrisoned troops on them. A long and complicated history of ownership has merely added the Paracels to an equally long and complicated list of territorial disputes between China and Vietnam.

Given the less than strategic nature of the islands, however, they are valuable to use to as a measure of the United States’ commitment to Asia and the Pacific.

Expectations

Although China seized the Paracels in the 1970s, their continued control is a demonstration of continuing Chinese regional military might. The China in the 1970s was vastly different from the China today -- predominantly closed to the global community, starved and poor. What can be achieved by today’s China can be much more, and this newfound confidence and capability have worried its neighbors, who have looked to the United States for support to act as a counter-balance to China’s rising influence, But what exactly can these countries expect from the US?

President Barack Obama has more than once expressed American commitment to the Asia-Pacific, economic and security-wise. However, it is questionable just how much the US can do in the region, both financially and militarily. This is not to say that the US has lost its position in the world as a global superpower, but it can no longer wield its influence worldwide as it once did post-Second World War.

One could argue that the US has maintained its resolve but that its capability to project power has dwindled. Economic reality has forced Obama to reduce the US armed forces, while politics and his re-election in particular have made discussion on foreign policy secondary to domestic issues. It is customary, if not necessary, for politicians to talk about issues that interest voters. Elections and re-elections are won by convincing the people that you, as the candidate, have their best interests at heart, and that one's opponent is the source of all the people’s woes.

If those Asian nations currently following the US presidential elections are looking for some clue, some hint as to how the US would approach the region in 2012 and beyond, they are perhaps better off scavenging the Internet for information. This is not to say that US foreign policy has disappeared completely, but it has instead faded into the background.

Looking ahead at more of the same

For the moment, interested parties can only participate in the guessing game. With Obama’s re-election in the balance, there is no telling how the US will approach the Asia-Pacific. However, the Democrats and Republicans are probably not so different with respect to the Asia-Pacific. The rise of China and the rapid growth of the Asian markets, and how the US could benefit from this, are of interest to both political parties.

Should Obama win his bid for a second term, expect him to carry on as he is currently. However, he will undoubtedly put forth more manageable promises given that his focus would be to help lead the US economy back to good standing. A cabinet reshuffle might occur, but it is unlikely that such an event would seriously alter Obama’s foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific.

On the other hand, should Obama lose the White House this November, the Republicans would likely delay addressing Asia-Pacific issues, as there is greater priority in fulfilling campaign promises on the domestic front. Moreover, should the Republicans win, you can expect the first term to be one where foreign policy (save for American commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the volatile nature of Iran) takes a back seat. Those Asian nations looking to the US for support should expect more or less the same if Obama had won—four years of expedient, politically safe forays.

Testing the water

As much as the battle between China and Vietnam over the Paracels in 1974 was a test of the international community’s reaction to China’s seizure of territory, China’s rise this past decade and for the years ahead is a test of the US's commitment to the region. As in the past, and as it appears today, the US has neither the inclination nor the political will to engage in additional and potentially costly foreign operations (Libya being an exception, where the US played a supporting role rather than a leading one).

Where does this leave the Asia-Pacific? On the list of issues to address, Asia would fall somewhere after Iran but before the International Space Station. The reality for politicians is that there is too much to do and too little time to do it. Political agendas are always bigger than reality permits, and, unfortunately but inevitably, that means carrying out said agenda almost always fall short of expectations.

But is this a reflection of the US’s weakening military might, popular discontent at home, or the byproduct of economic difficulties? The answer is perhaps all the above in varying degrees. The US armed forces are indeed shrinking, but the country is still capable of projecting power abroad. Voters, reflecting the attitude of the population as a whole, have expressed their dissatisfaction with Washington DC, in its handling of the recession.

Priorities have changed to focus overwhelmingly on domestic affairs, although one could make the argument that foreign affairs have solely been the domain of Washington politics, with or without the consultation of the American people. And of course, economic constraints have forced the US to reassess its commitments at home and abroad.

The reality is that the potential for US support exists but will be limited. Hindsight being 20/20, however, perhaps I will be proven wrong. Perhaps the US will withdraw from the region or (and maybe a little more likely) the US will commit completely and without reservation. Nevertheless, as long as China remains part of the discussion, so will the United States, that much is certain.

(By Khanh Vu Duc Vietnamese Canadian lawyer in Ottawa, focusing on various areas of law. He researches on International Relations and International Law.)Asia Sentinel

Why democracy will foster ethnic reconciliation in Myanmar

2012-01-14T12:53:00.000-08:00

Recent developments in Myanmar have generated considerable optimism about the country’s long-impending democratisation.

But will democracy foster ethnic reconciliation, essential for Myanmar’s domestic stability? A cross-country comparison with Sri Lanka and an examination of Myanmar’s demography and geographic distribution of resources indicate that despite sharing an otherwise similar trajectory with Sri Lanka, Myanmar’s emerging democracy could foster ethnic reconciliation, even after more than 60 years of ethnic insurgency.

Geographically, Myanmar belongs to mainland Southeast Asia. But culturally it belongs to the Theravada Buddhist world, along with countries like Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. These countries are all alike insofar as their constitutions symbolically link the legitimacy of the state to Buddhism or, at the very least, extend special treatment to the majority Buddhist community. But to the extent that each was affected by colonialism and communism/socialism, these Theravada countries can be classified into three groups: Thailand, which was never directly colonised and remained largely immune to communism; Laos and Cambodia, erstwhile French colonies, which were strongly influenced by communism; and Sri Lanka and Myanmar, former British colonies, where socialism had considerable appeal. More recently in Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka minority insurgencies have contested the authority of the state. With these commonalities in mind (among others), Sri Lanka is clearly the Theravada country whose path most closely resembles that of Myanmar.

In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese Buddhist-dominated state militarily defeated the Tamil ethnic minority insurgency, but then refused to honour its commitment to reconciliation. While the Sri Lankan Buddhist majority is unwilling to hold the government accountable in this regard, the Buddhist majority in a democratic Myanmar is unlikely to behave in a similar fashion. At the moment, it seems the process of democratisation in Myanmar is entirely controlled by the military regime. But the regime is introducing political reforms and trying to initiate peace talks with ethnic militias only because it is increasingly unable to sustain itself in the absence of popular support, while its legitimacy as the guardian of the majority Burmese Buddhists’ interests remains questionable. So, the democratisation of Myanmar, whenever that happens, will be a people’s victory against an authoritarian state — much different to the case of Sri Lanka.

There are two more structural reasons why majority–minority relations will not be overtly antagonistic in a democratic Myanmar. First, Myanmar’s population is not divided into two antagonistic camps. This is unlike Sri Lanka, where there remains a clear division between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority in the north.

In contrast, insurgents in Myanmar are divided along ethnic lines — and none of the groups has managed to establish its authority over the rest, as was the case in Sri Lanka, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam dominated the scene for more than two decades. Moreover, the Burmese Buddhists are also divided into a number of camps with fundamentally different approaches to the ethnic question. Second, unlike Sri Lanka, the Burmese minority insurgent groups are not devoid of members from the majority community.

In short, religious, ethno-linguistic and political divides are not co-extensive in Myanmar. This has two consequences. First, it is highly unlikely that one political party will emerge as the sole representative of all the major ethnic minorities. So, the ethnic minorities are unlikely to pose a unified political threat to the Burmese Buddhists. Second, one political party is unlikely to maintain a majority with only the Burmese Buddhist vote. Parties representing the majority community would also need the support of ethnic minority parties. Consequently, political contests are unlikely to divide the polity into two clearly demarcated camps.

In addition, unlike the stronghold of the Sri Lankan Tamils, which is resource poor and located in one corner of the country, the strongholds of ethnic minorities are distributed along the entire periphery of Myanmar. The strongholds of Burmese ethnic minorities are not only resource-rich regions that should attract major international investment following democratisation, but they also control Myanmar’s access to key neighbours like China, India and Thailand. Given the country’s decades-long economic stagnation, it is unlikely that the Burmese Buddhists will overlook this.

In sum, although demography and geographic distribution of resources failed to restrain ethnic conflicts immediately after independence, they will play a different role in a democratic Myanmar. A cursory acquaintance with Myanmar’s post-colonial history will convince the majority Burmese Buddhists of the impossibility and futility of any attempt to subjugate the minorities. This time, history should bear out the limits that demography and other factors place on ethno-political polarisation and help foster ethnic reconciliation.

Vikas Kumar is Assistant Professor at Azim Premji University, Bangalore.East Asia Forum

The International Crisis Group is pleased to announce its next Asia Briefings,

2012-01-13T13:48:00.000-08:00

Asia Briefings 2012
The International Crisis Group is pleased to announce its next Asia Briefings, taking place in Singapore and Jakarta on 21 and 23 February 2012. These exclusive, one-day summits offer members of the business and diplomatic communities the opportunity to interact with Crisis Group President Louise Arbour and senior analysts working in Jakarta, Beijing, Seoul, Bangkok and elsewhere across Asia on political developments and security risks in the region. This year’s events will examine concerns related to political polarisation in Thailand, China’s policy towards South East Asia, reform underway in Myanmar and countering extremism in Asia, among other key topics.
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DATES & LOCATIONS
Singapore Briefing: Tuesday 21 February 2012,
York Hotel (21 Mount Elizabeth, Singapore 228516)
Sponsored by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Jakarta Briefing: Thursday 23 February 2012,
Mandarin Oriental Hotel (Jalan M.H. Thamrin, PO BOX 3392, Jakarta 10310, Indonesia)
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AGENDA & FORMAT
The current briefing agendas are available here:
Singapore Agenda | Jakarta Agenda
The briefings will take place in English. There will be plenary sessions as well as simultaneous lunchtime roundtable discussions. Please rank your lunchtime roundtable session preferences on the registration forms (see below).
Each session will involve interaction and discussion between panelists and participants, and will follow the Chatham House Rule.
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TARGET PARTICIPANTS
Crisis Group briefings are primarily targeted for senior representatives from corporations, governments, multilateral organisations, think tanks, foundations, media, NGOs and universities.
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REGISTRATION PROCESS
All conference registrations must be made using the online registration forms available on the Asia Briefing section of Crisis Group’s website. Expressions of interest to participate in the briefings will be reviewed and accepted on a rolling basis. Following the receipt of your registration, you will receive a confirmation email with details concerning payment.
The deadline for applications is 15 February 2012.
Register for Singapore | Register for Jakarta
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DETAILS & COSTS
The participation fee for each briefing is $1,000USD, payable within 15 business days of receipt of an acceptance letter. The fee includes refreshments, lunch and an evening reception.
Registrations received by 15 January 2012 will be eligible for a discounted early bird fee of $850USD.
Thank you for your interest in the Asia Briefings.
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation covering over 60 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Bridging the Religious Divide Between Muslims in Indonesia

2012-01-12T13:01:00.000-08:00

An angry mob torched an Islamic boarding school, an adjacent mosque and a row of houses in Sampang, East Java, last Thursday. In February last year, a pesantren, or Islamic boarding school, in Pasuruan, also in East Java, was attacked by a mob for no apparent reason. Four students suffered head injuries.

These incidents were not the first for the two schools. The attacks on these schools, which belong to the minority Shi'ite sect of Islam, raised concern over possible sectarian strife breaking out in Sunni-majority Indonesia, given such conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The attacks placed in a spotlight the Shi'ite minority and its relations with the Sunni majority in Indonesia. Unlike in Malaysia and Singapore, where a Shi'ite minority has always been present, Indonesia's Shi'ites became more prominent only after Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, when some Sunnis converted to Shi'ism and Indonesian scholars returned from study in Iran. Before the revolution, there were a small number of Shi'ites, mainly Arab descendants who kept a low profile.

But Shi'ism is not a new phenomenon as many Shi'ite elements are found in classical Indonesian literature and even in cultural traditions. One such tradition is commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, Prophet Muhammad's grandson. However, the Shi'ite faith is not embedded in Indonesia's religious beliefs.

The conversion of Sunni activists has raised the Shi'ite community's profile, carving out a space as a well-defined religious group, establishing schools, mosques and civil society organizations, and publishing Shi'ite literature in Bahasa Indonesia.

But with this development comes rising tension with the Sunnis. Since the 1980s, various Sunni groups have been asking the government to ban Shi'ism, but the sect cannot be proscribed because it is still part of Islamic orthodoxy. The sect was formed following a political split after the death of Prophet Muhammad, when the minority who wanted his cousin Ali to succeed him became Shi'ites, while the majority who chose Abu Bakar became Sunnis.

The closest that the Indonesian authorities have come to restricting the sect was a 1984 statement by the Council of Ulama (MUI) that Shi'ism was different from Sunni Islam, and that Sunnis must stay clear of its influence. No fatwa has been issued to declare Shi'ism deviant, unlike the MUI ruling on the Ahmadis as heretic because of their belief in a prophet after Prophet Muhammad. The tension created by the opposition to Shi'ism and the Shi'ites' insistence of their right to their faith resulted in last week's attacks.

What then was the trigger? The two boarding schools are located in Java's conservative heartland, where the Muslim populace is normally loyal to its religious leaders. The schools' presence is resented by Sunni clerics who feared competition. Police said their investigation into the Sampang attacks showed how a private dispute between two brothers who were prominent religious figures from opposing sects grew into a sectarian fight.

Second, the perception of a small minority with its boarding schools and other Muslim services posing as a formidable threat to Sunni orthodoxy could be the spark for animosity towards the sect. Agitation by anti-Shi'ite community leaders such as Habib Achmad Zein Alkaf of the Yayasan Albayyinat, who said 'Shias (Shi'ites) are more dangerous than the Ahmadis', feeds into the average Indonesian's ignorance of Shi'ism.

Weak law enforcement also emboldened perpetrators of sectarian violence to commit the crime again. Human rights activists complained that the police were hard-pressed to stop the mob because they were outnumbered and feared the backlash, allowing many culprits to get away scot-free. Those convicted in court were usually given light sentences that hardly served as deterrents.

Sectarian flare-ups are bound to happen again even if the community in Sampang is relocated, and there is no guarantee it would be accepted at the new site. The authorities have shown indifference to the attacks. Top security minister Djoko Suyanto was nonchalant when he shifted the task of finding a solution to Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali, who he said was 'best equipped' to deal with religious conflict. Mr Suryadharma himself reacted only four days after the incident, not saying much beyond condemning the violence and reiterating that the existing religious harmony committees could tackle the problem.

Perhaps what Indonesia needs is a form of 'Islamic ecumenical' movement to bridge the gap between the two sects of Islamic orthodoxy. In an initiative towards rapprochement in May last year, the Indonesian Sunni and Shia Council was formed by the Indonesian Mosque Council, a Sunni body, and the Association of Ahlul Bayt, a Shi'ite organisation, to promote dialogue and understanding between them. Although a commendable move, it will take time for the council to improve harmony between Sunnis and Shi'ites.

Indonesia will have to fall back on its national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or unity in diversity, to strengthen tolerance and the spirit of coexistence. The motto should not only be acceptance of diverse religions, but also of diversity within one religion.

Reprinted courtesy of Straits Times Indonesia. Jakarta Globe .Salim Osman - Straits Times Indonesia

America’s threat to trans-Pacific trade

2012-01-11T14:06:00.000-08:00

As if undermining the WTO’s Doha Round of global free-trade talks was not bad enough (the last ministerial meeting in Geneva produced barely a squeak), the US has compounded its folly by actively promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
President Barack Obama announced this with nine Asian countries during his recent trip to the region.

The TPP is being sold in the US to a compliant media and unsuspecting public as evidence of American leadership on trade. But the opposite is true, and it is important that those who care about the global trading system know what is happening. One hopes that this knowledge will trigger what I call the ‘Dracula effect’: expose that which would prefer to remain hidden to sunlight and it will shrivel up and die.

The TPP is a testament to the ability of US industrial lobbies, Congress and presidents to obfuscate public policy. It is widely understood today that FTAs, whether bilateral or plurilateral (among more than two countries but fewer than all), are built on discrimination. That is why economists typically call them preferential trade agreements (PTAs). And that is why the US government’s public-relations machine calls what is in fact a discriminatory plurilateral FTA a ‘partnership’, invoking a false aura of cooperation and cosmopolitanism.

Countries are, in principle, free to join the TPP. Japan and Canada have said they plan to do so. But a closer look reveals that China is not a part of this agenda. The TPP is also a political response to China’s new aggressiveness, built therefore in a spirit of confrontation and containment, not of cooperation.

The US has been establishing a template for its PTAs that includes several items unrelated to trade. So it is no surprise that the TPP template includes numerous agendas unrelated to trade, such as labour standards and restraints on the use of capital account controls, many of which preclude China’s accession.

From the outset, the TPP’s supposed openness has been wholly misleading. Toward this end, the TPP was negotiated with the weaker countries like Vietnam, Singapore and New Zealand, which were easily bamboozled into accepting such conditions. Only then were bigger countries like Japan offered membership on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.

The PR machine then went into overdrive by calling the inclusion of these extraneous conditions as making the TPP a ‘high-quality’ trade agreement for the 21st century, when in fact it was a rip-off by several domestic lobbies.

American regionalism closer to home shows the US now trying to promote the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). But its preferred template was to expand the North America Free Trade Agreement (Canada, Mexico and the US) to the Andean countries and include huge doses of non-trade-related issues, which they swallowed.

This was not acceptable to Brazil, the leading force behind the FTAA, which focuses exclusively on trade issues. Brazil’s former President Luiz Lula Inácio da Silva, one of the world’s great trade-union leaders, rejected the inclusion of labour standards in trade treaties and institutions.

The result of US efforts in South America, therefore, has been to fragment the region into two blocs, and the same is likely to happen in Asia. Ever since the US realised that it had chosen the wrong region to be regional with, it has been trying to win a seat at the Asian table. The US finally got it with the TPP, simply because China had become aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and vis-à-vis India and Japan.

Many Asian countries joined the TPP to ‘keep the US in the region’ in the face of Chinese heavy-handedness. They embraced the US in the same way that East Europeans rushed to join NATO and the European Union in the face of the threat, real or imagined, posed by post-Soviet Russia.

America’s design for Asian trade is inspired by the goal of containing China, and the TPP template effectively excludes it, owing to the non-trade-related conditions imposed by US lobbies. The only way that a Chinese merger with the TPP could gain credibility would be to make all non-trade-related provisions optional. Of course, the US lobbies would have none of it.

By Jagdish Bhagwati Professor at Columbia University and Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, and is the author of Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements undermine Free Trade.

This article was originally available here at Project Syndicate and is published here with the permission of the author. East Asia Forum

Acquittal of Opposition Leader May Level Field in Malaysia

2012-01-10T13:10:00.000-08:00

(Accusations had a familiar ring)
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia — The surprise acquittal of Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian opposition leader, of sodomy charges is likely to make the country’s next national elections a tightly contested affair, analysts said Monday after the verdict was announced.

The verdict ended a politically charged trial in which Mr. Anwar, 64, faced as many as 20 years in prison. A conviction could have effectively ended his political career as well as possibly the opposition’s best chance at toppling the governing coalition.

There had been widespread speculation that Mr. Anwar would be found guilty of sodomizing a former political aide, Saiful Bukhari Azlan, a charge Mr. Anwar said was politically motivated. Instead, the ruling paves the way for Mr. Anwar to compete in elections — which must be held by mid-2013, although many in Malaysia say they could be held within months — and to capitalize on the gains his coalition made during the 2008 vote.

But in a two-minute speech that delivered a swift end to a nearly two-year trial, Justice Mohamad Zabidin Diah told a packed courtroom that DNA evidence presented by prosecutors could not be relied upon for a conviction. He said that in sex-offense cases, the court was reluctant to impose a conviction without corroborative evidence.

“This court at this stage could not with 100 percent certainty exclude the possibility that the sample is not compromised,” Justice Zabidin said. “Therefore it is not safe to rely on the sample.”

When he announced the acquittal, the courtroom erupted in cheers as Mr. Anwar hugged his family members, many of whom began to cry.

“Thank God justice has prevailed,” Mr. Anwar said. “I’ve been vindicated.”

The government said the decision proved that the judiciary was independent.
Sodomy, even between consenting adults, is still a crime in Muslim-majority Malaysia. A prison sentence of a year or more would have barred Mr. Anwar, a former deputy prime minister, from public office for five years after his release.

The charges against Mr. Anwar came several months after the opposition made historic gains in the 2008 elections, depriving the governing party of the two-thirds majority in Parliament for the first time since independence in 1957. He has said the administration of Prime Minister Najib Razak had a role in orchestrating the charges in a bid to damage his image. The government has denied the accusation.
There had been speculation that the opposition could suffer a leadership crisis if Mr. Anwar were jailed, as many thought he would be.

Ibrahim Suffian, director of the Merdeka Center, an independent polling company, said that the conclusion of Mr. Anwar’s trial meant that the next election would be based on policy ideas relating to governing and the country’s development.

Mr. Ibrahim said that the verdict would vindicate Mr. Anwar’s claim of a “political frame-up,” but the acquittal could also benefit the government. “It allows the prime minister to burnish his credentials as a reformer and is in keeping with his New Year’s message that he wants Malaysia to be a more democratic country,” Mr. Ibrahim said.

Mr. Najib has introduced a series of changes in recent months, but rights groups and the opposition have criticized him for not going far enough.

“I think both sides will benefit out of this, but it benefits Anwar a bit more,” Mr. Ibrahim said. “Anwar has been under this case for nearly three years. This has in some sense created a problem for him in terms of his domestic image with the Malay Muslim electorate, and today’s judgment allows him to be free from that.”

Ooi Kee Beng, deputy director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, said the verdict would provide a “morale boost” for Mr. Anwar, who had been in political limbo for the duration of the trial.

But Ong Kian Ming, a political analyst and lecturer at UCSI University in Kuala Lumpur, said the acquittal would deny the opposition the extra support a guilty verdict would have delivered. “The sympathy factor that would have given a 1- to 2-percent swing in favor of the opposition will not be present now,” he said.

In a statement, the information, communications and culture minister, Rais Yatim, said, “Malaysia has an independent judiciary, and this verdict proves that the government does not hold sway over judges’ decisions.”

This is the second time Mr. Anwar has fought sodomy charges. He was found guilty of sodomy and abuse of power more than a decade ago on charges that were also criticized by his supporters as politically motivated. He served six years in jail before the sodomy conviction was overturned in 2004.

After Monday’s verdict, three explosions were heard near the court, where thousands of supporters were celebrating. The police said five people suffered minor injuries.
Outside the court, Mr. Anwar told supporters the case was not about the freedom of one man.

“Our duty now is to free the rakyat,” he said, according to Malaysiakini, a news Web site, using the Malay word for people. “We want real democracy, free media and a just economy. Let us all unite and now save Malaysia.”

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: January 9, 2012
An earlier version of this article overstated the scope of the High Court’s 2004 action on Mr. Anwar’s earlier conviction for sodomy and abuse of power. The court overturned only the sodomy portion, not the entire conviction.
International Herald Tribune

When It Comes to Building Infrastructure, 2012 Looks Like a New Year in Indonesia

2012-01-10T13:01:00.000-08:00

As we start a new year, it’s fitting to look back and see what progress was made toward the building of Indonesia’s much-needed infrastructure in the past year. On average, Indonesia needs to spend at least $30 billion every year for the foreseeable future, with $18-20 billion per annum coming from the private sector.

While much of the government budget for infrastructure is essentially spent across the country, including that required for maintaining existing assets, precious little was achieved last year in the area of new construction. The pressure to bring new infrastructure onto the market increased.

However, looking through what has been prepared would suggest that 2012 will see the start of some key projects.

On toll roads, the end of last year brought a surprise with the passage of new legislation on land acquisition. The Public Works Ministry should now get down quickly to preparing the complementary implementing regulations, although this will take several months at best.

In terms of toll road build-out, there would seem to be progress toward construction starts during 2012. The short missing W2 section of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road and the lengthy and important Trans Java stretch between Cikampek and Palimanan, where it is reported that land acquisition is well-advanced, would seem to be welcome likely candidates.

Completion of both will have an immense impact on easing the flow of traffic around Jakarta in the case of W2 and in traffic going and coming along the eastern part of the north corridor in West Java.

Work is under way on the E2 link aimed at providing Tanjung Priok with alternative toll road access, and perhaps there will be some start, if only land acquisition, on the long-overdue link around Jababeka between Cibitung on the Cawang-Cikampek Toll Road, connecting at Cilincing with the E2 link. There is also much activity going on behind the scenes on some other key sections.

The six Jakarta city toll links were posted recently. However, at a cost of $4.5 billion, the proposal that these should be let as one package is a tough one for most parties interested in investing in toll roads. There must be a strong case for presenting these links in at least two, if not three, packages. This would also introduce an element of competition.

Many mostly small- to medium-sized water investment projects have been listed and a few of these are now appearing for tender, with the Lampung scheme receiving support from the Indonesia Guarantee Fund. Hence the year should see the implementation of some water projects, not to mention the long-overdue construction of the important large Umbulan project in East Java.

The main port project in the public eye is the desperately needed $1.5 billion first-phase Kalibaru container port expansion at Tanjung Priok. A government decision on how this is to be progressed was yet to be delivered. A decision that allows as fast a start as possible would be welcome.

On railways, there has recently been renewed interest in progressing the proposed rail link to the airport from Jakarta. One hope is that whatever is decided — and several options have been considered in the past — the journey time is acceptable and the city center connections to road transport are efficient.

Double-tracking sections and station upgrading are ongoing, but much needs to be done to improve operations and the skills base of staff.

On the main commodity rail links planned for transporting coal from mines located well inland, the highlight of late last year was the signing of the contract for the funding from China of the proposed 274-kilometer link from the South Sumatra Bukit Asam mine to port facilities in Lampung.

The rail links planned for Kalimantan remain some distance from achieving financial support, and the public sector element of the PPP approach ascribed to these projects is not yet sufficiently robust to provide adequate comfort against risk issues to seal private sector interest.

The airline sector is showing strong upward growth, such that the required airport support capacity is falling behind. The private airlines of Lion Air and AirAsia with large fleet expansions are showing spectacular growth. Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, the country’s main point of entry, is now supporting passenger traffic levels well beyond design capacity.

The new proposed international airport in West Java, to the east of Jakarta, aims to support the fast-expanding industrial growth emanating the area. This project, which is to have larger capacity than Soekarno-Hatta, needs to be pushed ahead as soon as possible, especially since good land transport links will be in place before the airport is completed. The new airport for Bali, currently going through early development phases, also needs to be pushed ahead quickly. Indonesians are on the move.

An interesting presentation at the Asean Summit in Bali in November was given by aircraft manufacturer Embraer, which was fully privatized by the Brazilian government in 1991. The release of this public sector corporation to the private sector, led to spectacular growth and the creation of the third largest aircraft manufacturer in the world. This should serve as a message to the legislature in Indonesia that holding onto state-owned enterprises acts as a brake to their potential for greater expansion.

In the area of power generation, the construction of one 2,000 megawatt coal-fired station is about to commence. It will be a welcome contribution to the critical undersupply to the Java network.

On the other hand, Perusahaan Listrik Negara has had to cancel four proposed gas-fired projects because of a lack of gas. There has been increasing interest in development of geothermal plants in Java and Sumatra following the gradual improvement in tariff structures; further contribution to the overall supply from this clean energy source should be seen from 2012 onwards.

There remain a large number of hydro projects listed, and while a few developments are being or are about to be progressed, the rate needs to accelerate.

There is increasing interest from overseas funding in Indonesian infrastructure. The big question is whether the rules of engagement have been sufficiently improved to maintain this level of interest and secure a percentage of it. While this remains to be seen, the evidence is growing that when it comes to infrastructure project development, 2012 is a new year.

By Scott Younger president commissioner of Glendale Partners, an infrastructure project management firm that holds a large stake in the consortium that owns Aetra Air Jakarta, which manages half of Jakarta’s piped water supply. This article also appears in the January issue of GlobeAsia.

Indonesia at a Crossroads

2012-01-09T13:02:00.000-08:00

Dependence on natural resource exports must change

In late December, two leading national daily newspapers carried a huge ad by the “Keluarga Besar BUMN” (“The Big Family of State-Owned Enterprises”), titled “Indonesia itu Mengecewakan’ (“Indonesia Disappoints”). Inspired by the wry humor of Chatib Basri, one of Indonesia’s sharpest young economists, it was a satirical take on criticism of Indonesia’s economy, which grew by 6.5 percent in 2011.

The ad said that this was “disappointing” to both optimists (who feel that the nation could do much better) and pessimists (who are hoping for it to fail). It then concludes by saying that Indonesia is only disappointing to those “whose hobby is to be disappointed.”

Humorous as it is, it marks the real crossroads that Indonesia finds itself at this new year. No one can deny that Indonesia has turned the “corner.” Almost 15 years after the Asian economic crisis and the fall of Suharto, the Southeast Asian giant has made a stupendous recovery marked by two major milestones. First, rating assessor Fitch Ratings in mid-December upgraded Indonesia’s sovereign debt rating from BBB- to BB+, marking a return to investment grade after it was lost in 1997. Next, its annual gross domestic product per capita has passed $3,000.

While these are welcome developments, economics is not a straight-line discipline and present success is no guarantee of future prosperity. The speed of the European and American decline is, if anything, proof of how quickly fortunes can turn and the need to plan ahead.

In this sense, the longstanding policy failures of the West — the introduction of the euro without sufficient political safeguards to ensure its viability, and American profligacy, leading to crippling debt —have returned to haunt these nations. Moreover, it’s increasingly apparent that the overly generous welfare systems of these countries have damaged their work ethic and altered their social dynamic.

Indonesia is confronted with a fundamentally similar set of choices. Its leaders have a chance to plan for the long-term health of the country, or let the opportunity pass. What exactly is at stake?

It ought to be stressed that the Indonesian economy will continue to grow. It is ironically enjoying the benefits of previous underinvestment, but also a demographic dividend (with about 29 percent of its 240 million population aged under 14) and a rich supply of natural resources at a time of escalating demand by China and India.

Still, Indonesians need to ask if they are taking advantage of this to lay the foundations of future growth and prosperity, or merely creating a bubble. For all its promises, the Indonesian economy still faces two major obstacles.

On one hand, a solely natural resources-driven economy is unsustainable in the long run. The cost to Indonesia’s environment may be too high a price to pay. Furthermore, relying too much on mineral wealth robs a country of the incentive to innovate or add value. Indonesia’s growth cannot be kept up if it fails to diversify its exports. Indeed, Indonesia is considering restricting the export of natural resources like coal and gas to meet local demand and boost its downstream industries.

Then there’s the issue of its vast domestic market. Again, the challenge here is to develop a manufacturing sector that is globally competitive in the face of the East Asian juggernauts. While pricing is critical, there’s also an element of consumer preference that policy makers need to consider. More should be done to make Indonesians aware of the importance of supporting local produce and wares.

Indeed, we can detect in Europe, America and Japan an attempt to move back to smaller-scale production of consumer goods that also stresses location, design and ethical components. We only need to look at how lucrative the market is for iconic French terroir, or indigenous/local, goods such as Champagne, foie gras and Armagnac brandy to see the potential of such an approach.

Indonesia is making some progress in this regard, such as the Ministry of Trade’s 2009 “100 percent Cinta Indonesia” (“100 percent Love Indonesia”) campaign. Interestingly, this movement has also spread to the regions, with Solo Mayor Joko Widodo championing small- and medium-industries promoting distinctive, local brands in his city. He has backed Solo’s famous Batik Keris and Dana Hadi brands, as well as smaller-scale producers, to compete with foreign textiles.

Indonesia is at a crossroads. It can easily end up as just another fad that petered out. On the other hand, with courage, foresight and imagination, it can take its rightful place at the forefront of a changing world.

(By Karim Raslan columnist who divides his time between Malaysia and Indonesia.)

Vietnam, India Join to Face China

2012-01-08T12:12:00.000-08:00

As US power wanes and China's waxes, other countries start looking for allies
As US power declines along with its role as Asia's peacemaker and tensions rise, Vietnam has been looking abroad for potential allies in hedging against Chinese hegemony in the region. India, with its own strategic concerns about Beijing, is emerging as a prospective benefactor and partner.

The urgency of Vietnam's search for new allies came into sharp relief after Chinese naval vessels cut the cables of two Vietnamese oil exploration ships in May and June 2011, well within what Vietnam considers its Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea -- called the East Sea by the Vietnamese. The incident kicked off weeks of demonstrations in Vietnam -- a rarity in a country run by a repressive government that allows few demonstrations of any kind. Eleven anti-China protests were held between June and August.

“It was a big shock that basically mobilized a lot of Vietnamese public opinion against China. It also forced quite a number of Vietnamese political and military leaders to state unequivocally their stance on South China Sea, and how to deal with China on that issue,” says David Koh, an expert on Vietnamese politics and civil society at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

“Initially the demonstrations served the government’s purpose because they signaled to China that its assertiveness in the South China Sea was having a counterproductive impact on bilateral relations,” says Carlyle Thayer, a professor of Vietnamese domestic politics at the University of New South Wales.

However, these rare expressions of public sentiment were eventually halted by force. “As the demonstrations wore on they became a potential liability on the Vietnamese government’s diplomatic approaches to China,” Thayer says.

The fact is that Vietnam can't afford to push China too far because of the asymmetry of their relationship. “I have termed this the tyranny of geography,” says Thayer, “Vietnam can't pick its neighbor. At 89 million people or the 12th most populous country in the world, Vietnam is only a middle sized Chinese province. The Vietnamese government is divided between those who understand the need to act with prudence towards China and those who would like to see a more assertive stance. ”

Instead of directly antagonizing the Chinese, Vietnam has chosen to look elsewhere for support. At the East Asia Summit in November 2011, other countries in the region joined together with the United States to demand that maritime disputes be resolved multilaterally, rather than bilaterally as China prefers.

“This form of assertiveness in the South China and East China Sea is not confined to Vietnam. This is part of a broader assertiveness [from China]. This concerns all of China’s neighbors who share land and maritime borders with China. At the East Asia Summit it was made clear to China that they cannot approach this bilaterally, it needs to be multilaterally,” said Gopalapuram Parthasarathy, the former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar.

As an indication of that concern, Vietnam's defense minister. Gen. Phuong Quang Thanh, invited Myanmar's top military official, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, to make his first trip abroad in November to Vietnam. Min Aung Hlaing did so, conspicuously not choosing China as his predecessors have done. Although there was no detailed announcement of the defense chief's itinerary, military observers say the visit was intended to both cement bilateral cooperation between the two countries as well as signaling an attempt to put some space between Myanmar's previous close relationship to China.

"China realizes that India represents one of a number of countries that are concerned about its assertiveness in the South China Sea. China therefore fears that an anti-China coalition may emerge," Thayer said.

India remains the major new focus of Vietnam's diplomacy. The Vietnamese President, Trung Tan Sang, visited India for the first time in October. “It was a significant visit and I think the timing of the visit was serendipitous. India is one strong anchor to the far west of the Asia continent for Vietnam,” Koh says.

Vietnam has sought cooperation from India in the form of military training, with both countries using Russian equipment extensively. They are also expected to purchase submarines and are hoping to get approval to buy land-based anti-ship cruise missiles from the South Asians.

In exchange, India gets to partake in Vietnam’s oil hunt, and perhaps more significantly their navy gets to use the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang, which could result in a significant Indian naval presence in the South China Sea.

The South China Sea plays an important part in India’s strategic considerations. As former ambassador Parthasarathy points out, 40 percent of Indian trade with the US goes through the South and East China seas, as does trade with Korea and Japan, two of India’s biggest trade partners.

Then there’s the oil. “Everybody gains from oil explorations. China cannot dictate to us where we look for oil,” Parthasarathy says.

The largest democracy in the world has considerable beef with its communist counterpart. There are major territorial disputes over large swathes of the land border shared by the two neighbors. India is nervous too about the pace of Chinese growth, and what it views as Chinese incursions into the Indian Ocean. China has recently built ports in Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

China has also been called the “all-weather friend” of India’s arch-rival Pakistan, who is regarded by Beijing as a way to box in New Delhi’s ambitions in Central Asia.

Analysts warn that China will take kindly to India’s move into its backyard. “Can there be advantages for China if the India navy has the occasional cruise in the South China Sea?” Koh asks.

“The negatives for China are immanent, not imminent. It establishes the precedent of the presence of out-of-area navies in the disputed areas,” says Bharat Karnad, a former member of the National Security Council of India.

But hawks in India like Parthasarathy want to see their country bring China back a peg or two, and increased friendship with Vietnam is one way to achieve this goal.

“We are not claiming the Indian Ocean as Indian territory, like the Chinese are with the South China Sea,” Parthasarathy says. “Our relations [with Vietnam] have been good even before Chinese-Vietnam relations soured. We were one of the guys who said no to the American war, we made our displeasure quite clear.”

“The Chinese are operating all over our backyard, why should they get bothered about this? If you think we’re running scared of the Chinese I can assure you we’re not,” he concluded.
Asia Sentinel

Détente and the Myanmar spring?

2012-01-07T13:54:00.000-08:00

President Thein Sein’s actions over the last few months suggest he is a skillful leader who has the ability to balance the push for critical reforms while also preventing a backlash from more conservative elements within the military.

New laws have been passed in quick succession, allowing citizens a range of rights denied since the 1962 coup. Myanmar’s citizens now have labour rights, including the right to strike and form unions, and the right to conduct peaceful protests. Social liberalisation also seems to be gaining momentum, with the emergence of an increasingly vibrant and critical media, and a growing range of independent political and civil society groups. Issues that would have been taboo in the past are now openly discussed in public circles, and NGOs have formed broad alliances while campaigning on issues of national importance, which would have been impossible in early 2011.

The significance of the changes taking place is exemplified by the National League for Democracy’s re-registration as a legitimate contender in the upcoming by-elections. The party’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has already expressed her interest in running for a seat in parliament. Additionally, the president and the speaker of the lower house publicly assured US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her landmark visit to Myanmar, that the country’s ongoing changes are ‘real and irreversible’.

The government has also initiated re-engagement with various armed ethnic groups. Though there are still clashes between the government and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Thein Sein recently ordered government troops to pull back from their military offensive against the KIA. In separate negotiations, the Shan State Army-South, one of the largest armed insurgent groups, and another armed rebel Karen faction recently signed official ceasefire agreements with the government. Both groups are already holding discussions with the government on issues such as combating illicit drugs and the establishment of liaison offices.

Alongside these developments, the Obama administration has committed to rebuild the US’ presence in the Asia Pacific. This re-engagement in the region will undoubtedly benefit Myanmar as it seeks closer relations with Western countries and injections of foreign capital. But in order to ensure the country continues its path toward greater transparency, accountability and sustainable development, the international community must move beyond symbolic engagement with the regime, and make concrete policy changes.

The ASEAN bloc has long committed to constructive engagement with the Burmese regime and promised the 2014 ASEAN chair to Naypyidaw. The US also responded favourably in recent meetings, where Hillary Clinton stated that the US would consider upgrading its diplomatic relationship with Myanmar if reforms are maintained. Similarly, Ms Clinton stated that the US would ease restrictions on the World Bank and UN agencies’ mandates in the country. The US and Myanmar must continue to find common ground for dialogue, and the détente between the two countries must be maintained for their mutual benefit.

Looking forward, 2012 will be a critical year for Myanmar as several challenges lie ahead that could derail the recent reforms. First, the military remains the most important political force in the nation. The 2008 constitution guarantees a wide range of special privileges for the military, giving it the legal power to seize control of the government during times of national emergencies. Thus any policy changes in Myanmar in the near future will likely be limited when it comes to matters considered core interests by the military.

Second, despite constructive re-engagement between the government and different insurgent groups, the latter diverge in their interests and vision for Myanmar. A lasting peace is not guaranteed, especially if individual armed militias find themselves deprived of any potential benefits from government reforms.

Third, and in some ways perhaps the nation’s biggest challenge, is the country’s critical underdevelopment. Years of economic mismanagement and isolation have crippled the country on many fronts. National infrastructure is woefully inadequate, with poor transport links, frail communication networks and an archaic financial system. Institutionally, the government has yet to develop a mature bureaucracy at the local and national levels. The country also faces a serious brain drain, with a lack of talent both in the private and public sectors.

As Myanmar heads into 2012, much more needs to be done to ensure recent reforms really are irreversible. All sides must realistically understand the challenges that lie ahead and have the wisdom and restraint to recognise that the fruits of their labours will not come overnight — Myanmar is reforming, but at its own pace. If any one of the stakeholders grows impatient with the process and takes a more confrontational position, this could return the country to the polarising politics of the past, and the current fragile peace and reforms may not last.

By Roger Lee Huang PhD student at the Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong. East Asia Forum

Thailand’s soldiers of political fortune

2012-01-07T13:47:00.000-08:00

In the lead-up to Thailand’s July 2011 election the tough-talking army chief, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, weighed into the political debate, insisting that voters should defend the king and elect ‘good people’

General Prayuth hoped, no doubt, that his efforts to sway popular sentiment would lead to a victory for the embattled Democrat Party.

But when Thais went to the polls they passed a very different judgment, determining that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his Democrat-led coalition government deserved electoral oblivion.

The election of Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of deposed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, to the nation’s highest political office would have come as a shock. General Prayuth may, at least for a day or two, have wondered whether a coup would be a reasonable response.

Despite persistent claims to the contrary, Thailand’s army is still in the coup-making business and, since toppling Thaksin in September 2006, has shown a dogged commitment to political intervention.

This reality contradicts the army’s stated goals. Over the past two decades the army has sought to professionalise its image and develop a leaner, better-educated and more technologically proficient force — and professional soldiers will theoretically avoid political entanglements. Better training and non-partisan indoctrination will encourage them to ‘stay in their barracks’, leaving politicians to take care of political matters.

But Thailand’s increasingly professional army is yet to disentangle itself from politics: it remains a potent political force and has proved willing to make abrupt interventions to protect its role.

What explains this situation?

A big part of the answer lies in the relationship between the palace and the army. Even in 2011, Thai generals still ostentatiously prostrate themselves in front of King Bhumibol Adulyadej and claim a supreme role in the defence of the royal institution.

The monarch — who carries the title ‘great warrior’ (phramahakasat) and who still regularly wears his military uniforms — has reigned since 1946 with the reciprocal consent of generations of army commanders. His inner circle is dominated, even today, by some of Thailand’s most famous military men, including privy councillors and former prime ministers like General Prem Tinsulanonda and General Surayud Chulanont. These senior generals are keepers of the army influence that works in tandem with palace prerogatives. The professionalisation of Thailand’s armed forces is also one of their long-term preoccupations.

Observers agree that in many respects Thailand’s army has become more professional over the past two decades. It has more resources than ever before, with consistent access to overseas training, especially at prestigious institutions like West Point, the Virginia Military Institute and the Australian Defence Force Academy. It also enjoys grand investments in cutting-edge technologies and is now one of the best-equipped armies in Southeast Asia, arguably second only to high-tech Singapore.

Thai army units that were deployed to East Timor for the UN peacekeeping mission demonstrated respectable standards and were well regarded by other foreign forces.

Yet there is little sign that this investment in professionalism is reflected in the army’s organisation or many of its operations.

One reason for this is that the best-endowed and most influential army units are still based in Bangkok and its surrounding provinces. The 1st Division (King’s Guard), 21st Regiment (Queen’s Guard) and the 9th Division, which are all based in or near the capital, are the key units for political contingencies. Both General Prayuth and his predecessor as army chief, General Anupong Paochinda, are former commanders of the Queen’s Guard Regiment. The 9th Division’s mission, for example, includes explicit responsibility for Thailand’s ‘internal security’.

This means that for recent operations in the restive southern provinces and along the Cambodia and Burma borders, the army has relied not on these elite divisions but on paramilitary taharn phran (rangers) and a smorgasbord of quasi-civilian security forces. These are the least professional of Thailand’s security elements and have been implicated in a wide range of criminal and political activities.

At the same time, the increasingly professional cadre of technologically competent and foreign-trained officers is still largely captured by the culture which has consistently dragged the Thai army into the heart of national politics.

Why is this situation allowed to persist?

There are three reasons why greater investment has not created an entirely depoliticised and professional army.

First is the army’s role in the uncertain palace transition when 84-year-old King Bhumibol dies. The army still considers itself the primary defender of palace prestige and position, and it will be looking to provide leadership in the aftermath of the king’s passing. The army will prove crucial to whatever happens next and, in the meantime, will not surrender any of its hard-earned status or resources. Army commanders feel, perhaps with a certain justification, that they must be ready for anything.

Second, Thailand continues to allow professional officers to take on explicitly political roles, both before and after retirement. Part of the attraction is certainly financial, but the trend is also born of a culture that sees no problem with army involvement in national politics.

Third, civil society and the media are not currently forcing the army into ever-greater professionalisation, since the latter is adept at hiding its political activities; it has seemingly mastered the dark arts of public-relations spin. As a result, opposition is relatively meek by historical standards, and even in the wake of the army-led crackdown on popular protests in April–May 2010 there was, all things considered, surprisingly little critical attention of the army’s role.

Official efforts to investigate the crackdown have also stalled.

Thailand’s new professional soldiers have become very adept at old political games, but in an era when most major military operations are necessarily joint (army, navy, air force, police) there are operational implications that must be considered.

Thailand’s stated ambitions to deploy drones or use cyber-warfare capabilities will remain unconsummated until there is a concerted effort to develop joint-headquarters structures that have real capacity. Politics often gets in the way of being truly ready to fight.

For now, what matters most for the senior army leadership is that at the end of the current king’s reign the army is inexorably tied to the palace transition and the defence of the dynasty. This means attention will remain focused on the central region and priority will go to the Bangkok-based units which guarantee dynastic control. In this context, serious security threats — such as the border disputes with Burma, Cambodia and Malaysia — are relegated to lesser importance.

General Prayuth and other senior army officers are entrusted with the sacred protection of the royal family. They want to control a political future where the roles of the royal family and the army are secure beyond doubt, so they will continue to play a political role for as long as required. Professional soldiers are, in Thailand, still defined by political fortune.

Desmond Ball is Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.

Nicholas Farrelly is a Research Fellow at the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Where is Thailand Headed?‘

Malaysia’s fiscal and political uncertainties continue through 2011

2012-01-06T13:52:00.000-08:00

After registering an impressive 7.2 per cent growth in 2010, the Malaysian economy visibly slowed down in 2011. GDP growth moderated to 5 per cent in the first half of the year, due mainly to sluggish export growth, but increased to 5.8 per cent growth in the third quarter, thanks to commodity exports and domestic demand. Manufactured exports, the main driver of growth, did not fare well over the year, owing to depressed demand conditions in the US and EU.

Malaysia should still be able to post 5 per cent growth for the year as a whole, but only if it can muster 4.2 per cent growth in the fourth quarter. This pall on the Malaysian economy is likely to worsen in 2012 with the export sector facing headwinds. Reputable think tanks and rating agencies have now revised down their 2012 GDP growth forecasts to a narrow range of 4.2 to 4.6 per cent.

The financial sector remained healthy throughout 2011, with stable monetary expansion, inflationary pressures notwithstanding. The consumer price index also edged up to 3.4 per cent year-on-year in September, a mild increase by regional standards. In the face of rising liquidity and bleak growth prospects, the central bank stopped raising the interest rate bar by keeping its official policy rate at 3 per cent.

But the fiscal side of the coin is tainted with perennial budget deficits spanning the last 14 years. In fact, Malaysia’s fiscal record is quite dismal; successive governments have pursued overwhelmingly pro-cyclical fiscal policies over the last five decades, without any serious effort to balance the books (with the exception of surpluses from 1993–97).

Government expenditure has risen disproportionately while tax revenue continues to trend down. About 40 per cent of government revenue comes from oil and gas, which is unsustainable in the long term. Federal revenue as a percentage of GDP has dropped from a 10-year average of 34 per cent of GDP to 22 per cent, a serious cause for concern, and attempts throughout the year to introduce a goods and services tax were scuttled by political expediency. The upshot of all this is the soaring government debt, hovering at around 54 per cent of GDP.

Looking to the future, Malaysia’s challenge is to free itself from the middle-income trap. Its vision is to achieve developed country status by 2020 with a per capita income of US$15,000. To be in the league of high-income economies, Malaysia needs to reinvent its economy and move up the value chain. This requires bold policy reforms, which do not sit well with the country’s powerful vested interests — the beneficiaries of the current order premised on patronage.

The country’s political landscape has changed dramatically since the 2008 general elections which deprived the ruling coalition of its traditional two-thirds majority. The opposition, led by former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, poses a serious threat to the ruling coalition in Malaysia’s upcoming general elections, which must be held before 2013, raising their importance for the year ahead. This opposition is drawing large support from online media with unprecedented outreach, and is being fanned by numerous issues relating to governance and integrity. All indications are that Malaysia is moving toward a two-party system, with the opposition increasingly perceived as a credible alternative. But the ruling coalition of race-based component parties — which has ruled the country for 54 years since independence in 1957 — maintains a huge incumbency advantage, given its extensive control of the mainstream media and government machinery.

Be that as it may, gone are the days when Malaysia’s election results were a foregone conclusion, now that the constituencies are more demanding and discerning. It is estimated that there will be six million new voters at the next election, making the elections process a totally new ball game. Not surprisingly, the incumbents and the challengers are all out to win the hearts and minds of these young voters.

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict what will happen when Malaysia goes to the polls next — and where this will take the country after 2011. The ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, is working hard to regain the two-thirds majority it lost in the 2008 elections. Yet the opposition, Pakatan Rakyat, is confident it can form the next federal government. While only time can tell, Malaysia is getting closer and closer to a tipping point. For now, only one thing is certain: politics in Malaysia will never be the same — and 2012 certainly will not be business as usual.

By Mohamed Ariff Professor at the Department of Economics and Governance, International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance, Malaysia. East Asia Forum

Local trends in Indonesian terrorism

2012-01-06T13:43:00.000-08:00

Australia’s first academic conference on Indonesian terrorism was held at the Australian National University (ANU) early in December.

Entitled ‘Indonesian Terrorism in a Global Context’, the conference brought together researchers specialising in the study of Indonesia’s jihadists and scholars working on global trends in terrorism. The various topics covered, and insights drawn from related discussions, help build a picture of the current state of terrorism in Indonesia.

Rice University’s David Cook, gave the keynote address, tracing the history of jihad as a concept, first from its understanding in classical Islamic texts and then through its subsequent reinterpretation. Militant groups have used this later interpretation to help justify the use of terror as a tactic, and to provide a theological basis for suicide attacks in particular. Cook discussed the critiques of terrorist acts that have come from within militant circles, and argued that the most salient protest against terrorism is the rejection of indiscriminate violence against civilians, especially fellow Muslims. This critique is of particular significance because it undercuts claims that terrorists are acting in defence of the Muslim community.

Nelly Lahoud, from West Point’s Counter-Terrorism Center, examined the doctrine of defensive jihad, and how terrorists have reinterpreted this concept, especially those associated with al Qaeda, to be a duty incumbent on each individual Muslim, rather than a more diffuse collective responsibility. The diaries of al Qaeda operative, Fadil Harun, reveal, according to Lahoud, the essentially pragmatic nature of al Qaeda and the absolute primacy it gives to the doctrine of defensive jihad over all other aspects of religiosity. Additionally, she argued that the Arab Spring had dramatically undermined the jihadist project, because it grew as a democratic protest movement — rather than being led by terrorist groups — and was aimed at removing corrupt, repressive Muslim regimes.

Quinton Temby examined the murky relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda. He adduced new evidence of the close collaboration between key figures in the 9/11 plot, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and JI leaders like Hambali. Sidney Jones, senior researcher with the International Crisis Group in Jakarta, reviewed recent developments within JI, contending that it is now a largely non-violent organisation, but has the capacity to regenerate and provide logistical support to more extremist jihadists. She identified the successful police operation against the group’s operations in Poso, Central Sulawesi in 2007 as the ‘knock-out blow’ to JI. This operation, which led to the arrest of key leaders, pushed the organisation toward preaching and education and away from jihad.

Solahudin, an independent terrorism researcher, looked at case studies of two terrorist groups which he argues are unique: Jemaah Imron and Laskar Hisbah. Jemaah Imron, formed in 1980, was Indonesia’s first home-grown terrorist organisation and carried out the hijacking of Garuda flight DC9 Woyla in 1981. The second group, Laskar Hisbah, was involved in a series of attempted assassinations and bomb plots in Solo and Klaten, Central Java in early 2011. Solahudin argued that both groups mutated from being radical to terrorist because of the presence of a charismatic leader. ANU’s Greg Fealy looked at the nature and role of apocalyptic literature within Indonesian jihadism, paying special attention to the idea that the Antichrist (Dajjal) is present on earth and leading the forces of evil against Islam. For jihadists, perceptions of the approaching end of time — preceded by a cataclysmic struggle between Islam and its enemies — is a powerful factor in their beliefs about the need for physical struggle to defend their faith. Angus McIntyre examined the motivations of the Bali bomber Imam Samudra, contending that Samudra’s narcissistic personality led him to use terrorism as a means of disowning his own sense of humiliation at being unable to defend his community from Western ‘attack’.

Reflecting these international considerations, Curtin University’s Ian Chalmers also argued that a paradigmatic shift has occurred in Indonesian jihadism, and the terrorists’ ‘struggle actions’ are increasingly justified on global rather than local grounds.
Sally White, from ANU, discussed the case of Putri Munawaroh — a jihadist widow — and the reaction to her circumstances within jihadist circles. Despite reports that Putri wanted to die a martyr, White used analysis of jihadist web and blog sites to argue that Putri’s views on the virtues of martyrdom do not reflect growing radicalisation among jihadist wives in general.

A number of speakers addressed issues of disengagement from terrorism and deradicalisation. Julie Chernov-Hwang, from Goucher College, has conducted research among former jihadists and identified a number of factors that have led to individuals leaving terrorist activities. Most former jihadists cite the importance of building new relationships outside jihadist circles as crucial to their turning away from violence, even if they still ascribe to radical ideas. The terrorism researcher and journalist Noor Huda Ismail also discussed his personal experience of helping numerous jihadists disengage through productive work and by pursuing opportunities for broader social interaction.

By Greg Fealy Associate Professor at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University. Dr Sally White is Senior Research Associate at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University. East Asia Forum

Changing terrain of terrorism in South-East Asia

2012-01-06T12:48:00.000-08:00

South-East Asian governments continue to manage home-grown extremism reasonably well, but the problem is not going away. Indonesia used to have one major attack a year - last year, there were seven separate plots, of which five ended in violence, although the efforts were amateurish and the casualty rate was low.

Several factors could affect the development of terrorism over the coming year: the increasingly frequent alliance, particularly in Indonesia, between jihadists, armed with bombs or guns, and thuggish anti-vice or anti-apostasy militants, who in the past have preferred rocks and sticks; the coming of age of younger siblings of slain or detained terrorist suspects; revival of the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM) under another name in the Philippines; and possibly, fallout from the Arab Spring, particularly in Yemen.

Indonesia remains the stronghold of extremism in the region, by virtue of its size, openness and lack of consensus among the moderate majority about the nature of the threat. As larger jihadi organisations like Jemaah Islamiah have fragmented, new groups have emerged without the trained leadership or lengthy recruitment and indoctrination process that characterised the old ones.

Their members are often educated in state high schools, not Muslim boarding schools, and radicalised by clerics who lecture openly about the need to fight enemies of Islam, including the government.

In the past, there were clear ideological lines within the radical fringe between Islamist thugs and jihadists. Today those lines have blurred, making deterrence more difficult.

For the last two years, the focus of Indonesian terrorists has been overwhelmingly on domestic targets, primarily the police, but also local Christians. The focus on foreigners has receded to the background and is likely to stay there - even the killing of Osama bin Laden at American hands did not bring it back.

Nevertheless, it could return under certain conditions and within a few limited constituencies. For example, a few Indonesians studying in Pakistan or Yemen could be recruited by extremists, as has happened in the past, and return home committed to the global jihad. New militants could also emerge from the remnants of terrorist leader Noordin Top's group - particularly younger siblings of those arrested or killed after the second Bali bombing in 2005 or the twin hotel bombings in Jakarta in 2009.

The Philippines is also a place to watch. Early last November, a man calling himself Abu Jihad Khalil al-Rahman al-Luzoni (that is, from the island of Luzon, not Mindanao) posted a video in Arabic on YouTube asking for support. Many believe he is in fact Khalil Pareja, a former prisoner and leader of the RSM. The organisation of mostly converts to Islam worked with the Abu Sayyaf group in the past but fell into decline in recent years. If Khalil is back on the job, looking for funds and recruits, it could mean that Manila will see more systematic jihadi activity.

Finally, there is the Arab Spring, which has had very little impact thus far in South-east Asia. Yemen could be the exception, where some 2,000 Indonesians were studying before the political turmoil began, most at non-radical schools in the Hadramaut. A few have had more sinister links, including one of those involved in the Jakarta bombings. If the Islamist element in the country should grow stronger, then the prospect of more Indonesians or other South-east Asians being recruited could grow.

All of this suggests a need for continued vigilance and improved regional cooperation. Last July and November, police in Indonesia and Malaysia arrested 30 members of an organisation known as the Abu Umar group, after its leader. The group's reach extended through Jakarta, Sulawesi and East Kalimantan in Indonesia to Sabah in Malaysia and Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga and Jolo in the Philippines - its full extent remains under investigation. Its existence underscores how much the terrorism problem transcends national boundaries and how much law enforcement officials in the region need to learn from one another.

But it also underscores how easy recruitment into violent groups continues to be and how much more effort needs to be put into strengthening community resistance to extremist doctrine. The problem, at least in Indonesia, is that no one can agree where the threat is coming from, and fear of stigmatising Islam remains high. The result is political paralysis on counter-radicalisation efforts, despite good law enforcement. Many Muslim leaders at the district level remain convinced that the terrorism issue is a plot by the police to divert attention from corruption scandals and keep the counter-terrorism funds flowing. Until the region's largest country can come to grips with the issue domestically, broader regional efforts will be hampered.

Sidney Jones, senior adviser at the International Crisis Group based in Jakarta.

The Indonesian economy : a precarious balance

2012-01-04T13:17:00.000-08:00

Indonesia’s economic growth remained strong in 2011 despite continued turmoil in the international financial markets, due to the euro crisis, and weakened global growth.
Significantly, this slow down also affected China, which has become one of Indonesia’s major export markets, but Jakarta was able to see off this risk. In the third quarter of 2011 economic growth reached 6.5 per cent year-on-year for the third consecutive quarter, mainly supported by strong private consumption and exports (although exports were slightly down from the second quarter).

For this reason the Indonesian economy remains relatively well positioned to weather future external shocks, although the World Bank has lowered its 2012 growth forecast for Indonesia to 6.2 per cent — slightly lower than its forecast of 6.3 per cent in October. Still, the growth forecast for 2011 has remained unchanged at 6.4 per cent.
A freezing up of the international financial markets or a severe prolonged global slow down could adversely affect portfolio inflows, the prices of Indonesia’s primary commodity exports, and domestic and external demand. Although so far the impact of weakening global activity on the Indonesian economy is relatively limited, there have been some portfolio outflows. FDI inflows also declined in the third quarter, although they are still higher than the country’s average inflows over the past two years.

Indonesia’s current account maintained its positive importance in the third quarter of 2011 with a small surplus of US$0.2 billion — but this current account surplus was inadequate to cover the capital and financial account’s deficit of US$3.4 billion. As a result, Indonesia’s overall balance of payments posted a US$4 billion deficit, which reduced the country’s foreign exchange reserves to US$114.5 billion by the end of the third quarter of 2011. This is sufficient for 6.6 months of imports and official external debt service payments. But Indonesia’s balance of payments is forecast to regain a surplus for the whole of 2011, which will continue into 2012, supported by an increasing surplus in the capital and financial account due to strong portfolio and FDI inflows.

During the past year inflationary pressures have also tended to decline in line with global commodity prices. The declining price of gold and the adequate supply of food — due to increased production and imports, better distribution, and lower inflationary expectations — have been instrumental in this process.

In affirmation of Indonesia’s continued economic progress, the Fitch Ratings Agency has recently upgraded Indonesia’s long-term and local currency ratings to ‘investment grade’, a move that will further boost Indonesia’s standing among global investors. To this end, the Indonesian government has worked hard to ensure macro-economic stability. It is crucial that the government continues its reform program and strengthens its macroeconomic fundamentals.

But despite continued growth rates, Indonesia’s growth strategy has not achieved ‘welfare’ in the broad sense of the word. While estimates by the Central Agency of Statistics show that the number of poor people declined to 12.5 per cent of the population in 2011 (or a little more than 30 million people), many in Indonesia are still poor. This is clear from the large number of beggars in the cities, and the amount of workers in the informal sectors — which account for about two-thirds of Indonesia’s total labour force of more than 100 million people.

There is also the fact that males and young male graduates respectively have much better access to education and employment than their female counterparts. Access for the rural poor to basic health care in their villages is also limited or inadequate, if it exists at all. Clean air and water and the protection of biodiversity are inadequate, and similarly for anti-corruption measures. Indonesia’s struggle against the vested interests of the economic elite, which often distorts or adversely influences government policies, is generally ineffective or unsuccessful.

Indonesia’s rapid population growth of 1.5 per cent — in a country of more than 240 million people — also adversely affects quality of life. This is, among other issues, reflected by the UNDP’s recently published Human Development Index, which ranks Indonesiaat number 124 among the 187 listed countries — lower than Bosnia at number 74, or even Palestine at number 114. So in addition to pushing economic growth to higher levels, in 2012 the Indonesian government should prioritise Indonesia’s social development to enhance the quality of economic growth.
Thee Kian Wie is a Senior Economist at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.
East Asia Forum

North Korea - For Agents of Change in Pyongyang, the First Step Is Debunking the Kim Mythology

2012-01-03T13:14:00.000-08:00

What would you do if you were Kim Jong-un, or indeed the relatives some see as the power now behind the North Korean throne? Alternatively, what would you do if you were a top general who was outwardly loyal to the Kims but secretly harbored a burning hatred of the dynasty, or were simply ruthless and ambitious? Or were a family member removed from power but with friends in high military places?

It is easy enough to condemn the late Kim Jong-il and indeed the whole Pyongyang setup as a tyranny that has simultaneously oppressed and starved its people to an almost unique degree to sustain a regime that uses the crudest nationalism as its cover. But condemnation offers no guidance to those actually in power, or near power, in Pyongyang as to how to change without inviting their own instant destruction.

As things are, it seems unlikely that such a brutal and secretive dynastic regime can end in any way other than bloodshed. A popular uprising is perhaps possible but a more likely scenario is an elite revolt involving the assassination of as many Kim relatives as necessary to kill the mythology the family has built around itself. As often in closed regimes, rivalries are settled by assassination or execution.

For outsiders, even the United States, to make relatively friendly noises toward the new leader makes sense, but it is probably wishful thinking to expect Jong-un and his immediate advisers to harbor any reform notions.

A Swiss education, as enjoyed by Jong-un, is probably irrelevant to the palace politics of Pyongyang and the consensus that Jong-il seems to have tried to build knowing that he would probably die relatively young. Even if they do not believe their own propaganda, the Kims surely know that preserving the status quo is their easiest option.

They have their bomb as a bargaining chip with the outside world. They have grudging Chinese support. And they have good reason not to follow the Chinese or Vietnamese path of combining economic opening with one-party rule. They know that significant economic opening must mean being swamped either by South Korean capital and industry, or becoming little more than a province of China. A market economy will undermine the role of the army as well as the party.

Their biggest problem, however, is the unique one they have created for themselves: the dynastic mythology. No other country has seen this combination of a quasi-Leninist party with dynasty worship. Economic change must not only open the country to capitalist and market methods but make the Kims claims as laughable to North Koreans as they are to the outside world.

Certainly, change for North Korea would be very much easier if the interests of the family could somehow be detached from those of the army and party without undermining the whole system. But already the propaganda machine is busy creating more myths about the genius and accomplishments of the pudgy 27- or 28-year-old now proclaimed as leader.

Could he have the sense and power to deny this adulation, end the dynasty and allow someone else to climb to the top? It seems unlikely but perhaps there are pragmatists in the regime who can gradually move the system away from family infallibility to something more like other mature communist regimes.

However, it would surely be a lot easier if the Kims were booted out by an internal coup. The 70-plus-year-olds of Kim Jong-il’s generation and earlier may feel no need for change. But younger members of the elite must surely look to their own future and recognize that ultimately the system is unsustainable and that their own chances of surviving and prospering lie with changing before it is too late.

They may see a need to sacrifice much of their political power and the privileged position of a tiny elite for the mix of political influence and money power achieved by their counterparts in China.

They do have two weapons at their disposal. The first is the nuclear bomb, which the nation will not totally forsake but can be fenced by enough inspections and safeguards as to satisfy even the Americans. In return they could get the prize of US recognition and even some aid. The second is the nationalism that they have always worn on their sleeve, the pretence that they, not the South, have always been the guardians of Korean identity and self-reliance.

This is of course largely a lie given their years of dependence on the Soviet Union and then China. Yet they do, as China has repeatedly found, have a core of almost fanatical nationalism that is constantly fed by the propaganda machine. The main enemies are the United States and Japan, but the Russians are now regarded as false friends and the Chinese with suspicion and little gratitude.

The regime’s place in Korean history can only be saved if it finds a way to move toward Korean unification. The almost equally nationalist South Koreans would forgive much if the Pyongyang regime was to accept a unification timetable that not only kept the North’s elite alive and out of jail but got them government posts, board seats and perks of the advanced, outward looking economy that a united Korea could be.

Unification need not be an economic horror story. South Korean capital and skills could revive the North’s economy quickly and many Korean factories in China could relocate to the North. Even China, Japan, Russia and the United States might welcome a Korea that was united and neutralized in place of a division that has long been a potential source of conflict that could drag in outside powers.

It is even possible that Kim Jong-un and his relatives could negotiate such a transformation in the name of the dynasty’s founding father, Kim Il-sung. Re-writing history and varying interpretations of nationalism come easily enough in a Korea where the North’s inspiration, Il-sung was a Russian stooge and the South’s best known president, Park Chung-hee, an officer in the Japanese Army. For now, though, the Kim dynasty is the main barrier to Korean unification.

Asia Sentinel

By Philip Bowring Hong Kong-based columnist

Vietnam's Development Dilemma

2012-01-03T12:54:00.000-08:00

Sustainability or exploitation

Last December, the five-nation Mekong River Commission agreed to delay the Xayaburi dam project on the lower Mekong River in Laos pending further study, with Vietnam playing a major role in the decision.

It was a rare victory for the environment in Vietnam, however. At a national level, the country remains far from implementing the environmental laws and regulations necessary to guarantee the government’s stated goal of sustainable development. In fact, the Xayaburi opposition appears to critics to be an anomaly. In recent years, not only Mekong projects have raised criticism, but also many others that Vietnamese authorities have planned, including the Son La dam project in Northwest Vietnam, whose construction has already forced the relocation of 100,000 people--mostly from ethnic minority groups.

“Vietnam needs energy to support its economic growth” is the refrain. With economic and industrial growth second only to China, Vietnam’s economic targets are linked to significant increases in air pollution and environmental problems.

According to data published by the UN, Vietnamese greenhouse gas emissions in 2007 were 111.38 million metric tons of CO2, an increase of 420.3 percent since 1990. This raises a number of interconnected problems. First, foreign direct investment is not yet regulated in accordance with rules aimed at sustainable growth, and thus risks undermining the country’s future.

In many cases, Foreign Invested Enterprises are guilty of using equipment and machines that cause environmental pollution, or continue to defy business ethics and sometimes even violate the law. Second, Vietnamese environmental laws lack real enforcement, according to ministry officials and local media.

With gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at $1,160 in 2010, Vietnam is now in the group of low medium-income nations. Even in the midst of the global economic crisis, GDP continued to grow at 6.2 percent in 2008, at 5.3 percent in 2009 and at 6.78 percent in 2010. These numbers clearly show the results in which FDI, together with domestic investment, contributes an important part. By the mid 1990s, FDI into Vietnam was over US$2 billion per year. Due to regional economic crises, the flow then decreased, only to surge once again in 2006 when Vietnam was admitted into the World Trade Organization, reaching an estimated US$10-11 billion in 2010.

Apart from the positive results, however, FDI has focused on short to medium-term targets and the large number of projects in real estate and the hospitality and mining industries confirms this. By contrast, few can be considered long-term investment projects in sectors such as technology, environment, renewable energy or training.

Tran Dinh Thien, director of the Vietnam Institute of Economics, estimates that on average, the capital of FDI projects in the hospitality sector is US$160 million, in real-estate US$150 million, and in the mining industry US$79 million.

Vietnam's ability to attract outside capital and foreign companies' tendency to skirt the rules have contributed to stellar economic results and to a poverty reduction trend welcomed also by international organizations. But at what cost? The young do not receive adequate training, with the country still lacking a highly-skilled workforce that can compete with those of other countries.

“It seems that foreign investors come to Vietnam to set up production bases because they want to exploit the cheap and large labor force in the country,” a Vietnam Business News article complained in November 2010.

But more serious is the environmental impact in a region that is experiencing the effects of climate change. In the medium to long term, the cost of environmental rehabilitation, adaptation and mitigation may exceed the income derived from mining, tourism and the export of low-cost commodities.

The law on environment protection was promulgated in 2005, but as reported on the web site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, “only in December 2010, the decree on specifying damages was promulgated.” Although the 1999 Criminal Code included a chapter stipulating 10 counts of environmental crimes, “until 2009, the competent agencies still had not released any legal document guiding the investigation and judgment of the criminals.”

Amendments to some provisions of the 1999 criminal code took effect on Jan.1, 2010. But “Meanwhile, the legal document guiding the investigation, prosecution and judgment of environmental criminals has not come out yet,” The ministry said

By the end of 2010, environment police had detected more than 11,000 violations over the previous four years including discharging polluted wastewater, smoke and hazardous solid waste into the environment without treatment.

The Bay Ha Long Company Ltd in the Hiep Phuoc commune of the Nhon Trach district in Dong Nai province, is just one example. The enterprise “received money every month to treat waste, but it never treats waste, and just dumped rubbish at refuse tips,” the environment ministry reported.

More recently, in late November, two companies in the southeastern province of Dong Nai, AB Mauri Ltd. Co and Kim Phong Commercial Production Investment JSC, were suspended for polluting the environment. The cases bring back memories of Vedan, a Taiwanese-invested monosodium glutamate maker caught discharging untreated effluent through secret underground pipes into a local river for at least 14 years. The company was fined 267 million dong (US$13,000), and was asked to pay 127 billion dong ($6.3 million) in order to compensate communities polluted by its operations.

The Vedan case exemplifies Vietnam’s main two problems: lack of rule implementation at national and local levels and a lack of ethics on the part of foreign companies, as always ready to exploit the situation.

“Actually we decide to invest in countries like Vietnam just because of this lack of rules and the ambiguity of clear procedures. We do in developing countries what is no longer permitted in ours,” a western entrepreneur who asked for anonymity told Asia Sentinel.

This behavior also relates to trade. According to the environment ministry: “From 2003 to September 2010, more than 3,000 containers of waste docked at Vietnamese ports which were found unable to meet the requirements to be imported,” containing dioxin and outdated equipment used in the 1960s.

Last but not least, a government announcement that Vietnam will establish a legal environment for green economic development lacks credibility because of the delay in applying the laws already in place.

Vietnam's location makes it one of the countries most vulnerable to the impact of climate change. The rise in sea levels could submerge tens of thousands of hectares of cropland, forcing thousands of families in coastal areas to relocate and dramatically affecting the rise in production.

If Vietnam wants to realize a truly sustainable economic growth, trying to improve its efficiency on mitigation and adaptation programs, it is crucial that the government review the entire policy of foreign and domestic investment and force private companies doing business locally to invest in renewable energy, training and technology, rather than on large resorts with golf courses.

It would be encouraging if Vietnam acted firmly, forcing foreign governments and companies to support decisions based on sustainable economic and industrial growth, a path with substantial room for improvement and development.

Looking at the internal debate among ministerial agencies and a growing public awareness of environmental problems, there are signs that the government is slowly forging this approach. But it is very slowly indeed.

(By Roberto Tofani freelance journalist and analyst covering Southeast Asia. He is also the co-founder of PlanetNext, an association of journalists committed to the concept of information for change.)

Happy New Year

2011-12-31T12:20:00.000-08:00

Wishing you all a prosperous and happy 2012
Cheers
Kerry (my 1971 photo at Senayan with Pak Suharto)

China's Shaky Economic Foundation

2011-12-30T11:20:00.000-08:00

Two weeks ago peasants in Wukan, a fishing village in the prosperous southern Chinese province of Guangdong, took over their village, throwing out local leaders.

Because of long unanswered grievances, they risked their lives, barricading roads into the village and facing down the police. Their central concern was the sale of collectively owned village land to property developers, which has impoverished most residents while enriching their leaders.

Residents of Wukan, China, at a village meeting on Dec. 21. The poster is of Xue Jinbo, who died in police custody after he was chosen to negotiate land deals with authorities.

As the Wukan protests evolved into an international media event, a provincial party official, under pressure from Beijing, stepped in and swiftly negotiated a truce acceptable to the villagers. This week Prime Minister Wen Jiabao asserted that “China can no longer sacrifice farmers’ land rights for the sake of reducing the cost of urbanization and industrialization.”

Once again China’s leadership has succeeded in the complex task of managing social unrest. The eye of the world is now shifting away.

This is a serious mistake. Like China’s leadership, the world should continue to play close attention to Wukan and to the tens of thousands of incidents of rural unrest that occur each year in China, the vast majority resulting from land grabs. Why? Because what happens to China’s peasants is crucial to our collective future.

China’s rural population is at the bottom of the global commodity chains of both Chinese and transnational corporations. Unhindered by regulations, these companies utilize China’s land and rural labor for the environmentally and socially unsustainable production of goods consumed the world over. While consumers everywhere benefit from inexpensive products and corporate profits, the real costs are borne by China’s most vulnerable.

The Wukan incident reveals the shaky foundation of China’s rise to economic super power: it is built upon an unresolved land struggle with hundreds of millions of lives in the balance. Anything that negatively alters the quality of life of China’s rural majority has the potential to impact the already fragile global economy, sending ripples across the world.

As I have seen first-hand during nearly 30 years of research in rural China, land grabs have been central to China’s economic “miracle.” Local governments take over land for real estate development, industrial expansion, roads, dams and power plants.

Having government and party connections to get a hold of prime real estate in urban cores and suburban fringes has enabled massive fortunes in property development.

Eight out of China’s top 10 billionaires made their fortunes through land grabs.
Similar land grabs have occurred in China’s rural hinterlands where there is little oversight by the central government. Of the 1.1 million hectares taken away in 2011, according to China’s State Council, 700,000 were transferred illegally. The result is the complete loss of land for approximately 75 million peasants, who join the over 200 million rural residents migrating around China daily in search of work.

Land loss leaves many rural families — still the majority of China’s population — without access to enough land to produce their food. Wukan’s villagers not only saw 400 hectares of shared land sold to a property developer, but their common fishing grounds were sold off as well to a large seafood company. This severely reduced many villagers’ basic subsistence. Their rising anger and desperation is seen in other rural areas nationwide.

Land grabs are part and parcel of growing social inequality in China. Despite increasingly strong populist rhetoric from the government, along with significant rural investment to counter rising discontent, China today rivals the most unequal countries in the world. The 400 million Chinese at the bottom face continual threats to their livelihoods through land loss.

Beijing’s success in quelling daily unrest around the country, mainly through the use of local officials as scapegoats, fails to address the fundamental problem: a development path built on an eroding foundation of unjust land grabs, environmental destruction, social polarization and the resulting vulnerability of the country’s poorest and most marginal people. Until these structural issues are addressed, the Wukan incident will only be a harbinger of things to come.

By Joshua Muldavin professor of human geography at Sarah Lawrence College. International Herald Tribune

Forced democracy will not work in the Islamic world

2011-12-29T13:56:00.000-08:00

This year witnessed unexpected political changes in the Middle East; the sand storm raised by the "Arab Spring" has not yet settled as it still continues to move through Yemen and Syria with peoples' sustained strength, while Bahrain and other regimes are trying hard to curb its resurgence.

The general notion of democratic exception in the case of the Muslim world does not seem to hold water anymore. The Muslim masses have been engaging in the struggle for democracy since the end of the colonial era but have not succeeded in attaining it due to obstruction from internal authoritarian political actors, be it armies, monarchies or self-made leaders like Gadhafi, Saddam Hussain, the Assads of Syria or Suharto in indonesia. The struggle for democracy in the Muslim world is also subject to the state of sectarian relations, as witnessed in power conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Iran, Bahrain and Pakistan.

There are two types of democracies in the Muslim world - one is of imposed democracy such as in Iraq and Afghanistan; the second is emerging democracy based on grassroots movements that began in Tunisia and are threatening to sweep all of the Middle East. Both of these models are facing considerable challenges that come in various forms - such as the sectarian character of Muslim societies, the massive power of the Arab monarchies, authoritarian states, military institutions, remnants of the toppled regimes, and the destruction in the aftermath of war and sectarian conflict. The recent deadly sectarian attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, where the sectarian conflict is being played at the top level in Shia and Sunni political factions, shows that, as the United States withdraws its troops, Iraq continues to be unstable.

In Iraq there is a contest for power between the pro-Iran Shia government vis-a-vis the secular Sunni and ethnic Kurdish minority political factions. In Pakistan there is a contest for power between the military, the mullahs and the democratic forces, which has intensified since the time of the Ziaul Haque regime and the related Afghan war; this competition continues to menace the securing of democracy there. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani fears a coup.

Exceptions are Indonesia, Tunisia and Turkey, where the army has returned to the barracks, while Afghanistan is still politically unstable.

Between these two models of democracy, those that emerged from grassroots movements such as in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria, will be more successful than those in countries with an imposed democratic model.

The fact is that the imposed democracies have not outgrown factors that lie at the cause of internal conflict, such as sectarianism. Sectarian conflict in the Middle East will expand to Muslim South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa for the simple fact that the root cause of sectarian division in Islam is political rather than religious.

The potential for deadly sectarian conflict in Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Iran in the face of the suppression grassroots movements for democracy is enormous. History shows that peoples' political movements offer more space for reconciliation and unity than imposed political arrangements.

Since the religious resurgence after the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, impartial scholars and policy advisors on the Muslim world have opined that the best response to religious resurgence is to allow the growth of democracy through peaceful change, through supporting Muslim democrats. But this advice is opposed by both local authoritarian rulers whose legitimacy is challenged and by external supporters whose interests are at stake.

The non-growth of democracy native to the Muslim worldview led to the emergence of violent political Islam, a la Bin Laden, which is now sidelined with the emergence the Arab Spring, which has no external support except in the case of Libya. As a multi-faceted movement, the Arab Spring regards Islam as a mark of identity and political morality. Hence, both the secular and religious parties will compete for office through the polls. The availability of space for political competition is a positive option for socio-economic development. In power, the success or failure of the Muslim parties now depends on meeting the demands of the masses; that result will determine their future role in the politics of the Muslim world.

Furthermore, the ongoing movement for political change will not result in a monolithic model of Muslim democracy but a variety of models befitting local environments and situations. This is evidenced in the cases of Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia and struggling Pakistan.

Meanwhile, as a new democratic government takes power in Tunisia, the economic factor behind the Arab Spring uprising deserves most attention. The new Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali of the Ennahdah Party has promised to solve the severe economic crisis in Tunisia, where the unemployment rate is 20 per cent, combined with poor economic growth.

In spite of ongoing Constituent Assembly elections, the continuing battle between the army and activists, along with reports of sexual harassment of women by the army, tell us that the Egyptian revolution is far from settled.

The role played by women in the Arab revolutions should put to rest the Western notion that Muslim women are oppressed - which is an Orientalist invention. When it comes to the issue of women in the Muslim world, there is a need to distinguish between the forces of tribalism and Islam. Tribalism is still a dominant force in some Muslim countries, where women are subject to the horrors of honour killings and female circumcision. Such practices continue to survive under the guise of religion.

Millions of educated Muslim women are engaged in the struggle for liberation from tribalism disguised as Islam.

All emerging democracies in the Muslim world will have a reference to Islam in their constitutions; this is no different from the spirit of the recent statement by British Prime Minister David Cameron that Britain is a Christian country and there is a need to return to Christian values in order to overcome the state of moral collapse. In fact, all democratic political cultures have a religious reference in some way or another. The challenge before all countries today is to accept religious pluralism amidst diversity, and this may serve as an antidote to sectarianism and sectarian conflicts.

Countries that have an active democratic process, no matter their worldview, are better than those where democracy is an imposed product or is subject to intra-institutional political competition. Democracy based on grassroots movements combined with the aspiration for religious pluralism substantially reduces the danger of inter-sectarian and interreligious conflicts and tragedies.

By Dr Imtiyaz Yusuf professor of Islamics and religion at theGraduate School of Philosophy and Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok. “The Nation”

Fear, Rebellion, Intrigue and Debt Ahead For Asia in 2012, Not the End of the World

2011-12-29T13:46:00.000-08:00

The Mayans were wrong. The world won’t end in 2012, but at times it may feel as if it’s about to. Such is Asia’s lot as Europe’s debt debacle and America’s political paralysis fuse, presenting challenges for leaders from Beijing to Jakarta.

In a less chaotic time, this might have been Asia’s big moment. An eastward shift of power and capital would seem to be a given as Brussels and Washington turn inward. Yet a worsening global environment will interrupt Asia’s path to economic dominance. Here are eight risks that may get in Asia’s way:

Recoupling

Asia steered around the US meltdown in 2008 with remarkable agility. Doing that will be harder in the 12 months ahead as all of the world’s major growth engines stall or go into reverse. Default risks in Europe will increase, America’s funk will persist in an election year, Japan’s malaise will deepen and China will hit a soft patch. With deft fiscal and monetary maneuvering, Asia grew impressively in the three-plus years since Lehman Brothers Holdings imploded. A repeat performance is unlikely.

Pocketbook worries

Consumers will become more dissatisfied with the toxic mix of inflation and widening income inequality. Leaders aren’t doing enough to make sure benefits of growth are shared equitably. As the Gini coefficient — a statistical measure of wealth inequality — rises across Asia, increasing tensions will play out unpredictably in markets and politics.

Occupy Wukan

It’s getting harder for China to keep its 1.3 billion people from hearing about events in a coastal village in Guangdong province. There, thousands of people fed up with land seizures took to the streets and forced out Communist Party officials. This Occupy Wall Street dynamic is a startling contrast to the usual success China has in quashing any hint of public discord. As the New York Times points out, there are at least 625,000 potential Wukans in China. The 12 months ahead will be busy for China’s thought police.

Political intrigue

China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan will pick new leaders. State elections in India will help determine if Rahul Gandhi will soon replace his mother, Sonia Gandhi, as president of the ruling Congress Party. Taiwan’s contest could be a standout — a verdict on President Ma Ying-jeou’s economic policies and drive for better relations with China.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea could bubble over. Violence might break out in Thailand if ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is allowed to return. In Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi’s move to register her party for elections will test the government’s recent steps toward democracy.

The Kim follies

A we get used to Kim Jong-un, not Kim Jong-il as North Korean leader, there’s no telling how things will unfold in Pyongyang. Will young Kim feel obliged to show he means business with missile launches into the South and nuclear tests? Might military generals coveting the top job rebel? The questions hover over all of Asia.

Internet clampdown

Beijing’s great wall of censorship is raising cyber clampdowns to an art form, the latest on Twitter-like services. Yet the Internet is under attack throughout Asia. India is stepping up efforts to require Facebook, Google and other portals to remove content that may be deemed offensive. South Korea and Thailand have been suppressing information. Balancing transparency and state control of information will become harder.

Japan’s debt trap

The conventional take is that Japan is in a liquidity trap, which makes it impossible for zero interest rates to stimulate the economy. The real problem is a debt trap, and the yen is part of it. On the one hand, a strong currency is prompting companies to go shopping overseas to hedge against the country’s aging population, lack of growth and a vulnerability to disasters. On the other, it is further hollowing out Japanese industry. That will lead Japan to add to its debt, the world’s largest, risking further credit downgrades.

China’s bust

It’s a make-or-break year for China’s efforts to defy the economic laws of gravity. A bad-debt hangover from the huge stimulus of recent years is a distinct possibility. Markedly slower growth would be a nightmare for a Communist Party obsessed with social stability.

Should the second-biggest economy join the United States, Europe and Japan in the slow-growth club, Asia would find itself in treacherous territory. It wouldn’t be the end of the world as the Mayans anticipated, but it would be different than the one we’ve come to know.

By William Pesek Bloomberg View columnist

Bearing the consequences of population policy in Thailand

2011-12-29T13:37:00.000-08:00

Thailand went through its fertility transition more quickly than almost any other country, with the average number of children born to the average woman declining from about six to two in little more than two decades, between about 1970 and 1990.

Fertility rates have since gone still lower, now standing at around 30 per cent below replacement level (the level that would lead to long-run population stability). This does not mean that Thailand’s population has stopped increasing.

Population momentum — resulting from a continued relatively high concentration of people in the childbearing ages – may result in slow population increases for up to 10 more years. But after this Thailand’s population will begin to decline unless fertility rates increase substantially from their current level, or there is net immigration.

What are the issues, then, that Thailand faces in relation to population change? One is rapid population ageing, and another is urbanisation. The latter is concentrated on Bangkok and its surrounds, but increasingly also on regional cities such as Chiang Mai, Korat and Hat Yai. Equally, the international migration balance appears to be lowering the labour force’s average education and skill levels, as Thais moving abroad tend to be better-educated than migrants coming to Thailand from neighbouring Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.

Still, Thailand has profited in recent decades from a demographic dividend, where its earlier decline in fertility has subsequently led to a population age structure in which the proportion of working-age people is very high. Such an age structure is favourable to rapid economic growth, something which Thailand has certainly achieved over recent decades. This demographic dividend is now drawing to a close, and the proportion of working-age people is beginning to decline, albeit slowly.

Thailand is fairly well placed to deal with the additional challenges this transition will pose for economic growth in coming years. Its education system has (rather belatedly) managed to achieve a much higher proportion of students completing their upper-secondary education. But the situation is not yet satisfactory. Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board reported that in 2008 the retention rate in primary education, from entry to the highest grade, and in upper secondary from entry to the highest grade, was 88 per cent and 53 per cent, respectively. A further problem will be Thailand’s ageing labour force, with a declining number and proportion of workers under the age of 29.

Considerable publicity has been given to the ageing issue in Thailand. The proportion of those aged 60 and above will increase from about 13 per cent at present to about 24 per cent in 2030. Most of Thailand’s elderly are healthy and able to look after themselves. Though the proportion living with children is declining, the proportion living with children or in close proximity to children remains quite high — 71 per cent in 2007. Therefore, despite a substantial flow of younger adults to the cities, the proportion of the elderly living alone is not high, and close contact can be maintained with absent children through the ubiquitous cell phone. Material support from children has declined only modestly, some workers are insured under the social security system, and the new National Saving Scheme is designed to provide a government contribution if fund members save until they reach retirement age. The greatest challenge is the provision of long-term care for severely disabled people and those suffering from serious chronic illness, especially in view of the increasing share of never-married Thais in the elderly population — a group that will become more apparent over the next two decades — who will have no children to rely on.

Thailand’s population policy focused on reducing fertility from high levels for almost three decades. Now Thailand must consider following the example of its low-fertility East Asian neighbours — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore — in introducing policies designed to encourage marriage and childbearing. Though the policies elsewhere in East Asia do not appear to have been particularly successful, some have been in place for too short a time to make much impact. At a minimum, Thailand should be considering more generous maternity-leave provisions than are provided at present, more flexible working hours and improved subsidised childcare. Merely copying other countries’ policies is unlikely to serve Thailand well, as its circumstances differ considerably from its neighbours.

Population projections for Thailand suggest that fewer than five million people, and very likely only one million (less than 2 per cent), will be added to the population before growth ceases. Bearing in mind continued population movements from rural to urban areas, this means that some regions will witness a drop in population because the growth of towns and cities in these areas will not fully compensate for rural depopulation. Planning for population decline is important to any country’s future, and Thailand can profit from the experience of European and East Asian countries that have had to manage population decline in rural and regional areas.

By Gavin Jones Head of the Division of Demography and Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences of the ANU and was the Coordinator of the Demography Program of the ANU’s College of Arts and Social Sciences from 1990 to 1996.This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Where is Thailand Headed’

Rethinking the ‘China model’

2011-12-29T13:27:00.000-08:00

The idea that there is a coherent and distinct ‘Chinese model’ of political economy has gained attention in recent years — especially as financial crisis elsewhere has undermined confidence in the (neo)liberal models often associated with Western interests and objectives.

To be sure, there are many in China and elsewhere who argue the crisis has actually highlighted key defects in China’s development model.

The argument that there is an unsustainable reliance on exports — and investment — to generate growth seems widely accepted, even if it is less clear how a ‘rebalancing’ can be achieved. Still, the possibility that an identifiable Chinese model exists is not just the source of considerable interest, but also a degree of national pride.

But rather than highlighting a contradiction in thinking, these apparently divergent responses point to what most observers suggest is a key component of the model; it is flexible, pragmatic and responsive, as it is built around experimentation and doing what works, rather than basing itself on rigid ideological and/or policy prescriptions. This not only means doing different things as conditions change at home and abroad, but also having different models for different parts of the country. While it might not be possible for other developing countries to do what China has done, the essence of this understanding is that they should not search for blueprints, but should instead do whatever works for them.

In this respect, the Chinese model is less important for what it is as what it is not. It is not big-bang reform and shock therapy; it is not a process where economic liberalisation necessarily leads to democratisation; it is not jettisoning state control over key sectors or full (neo)liberalisation (particularly in financial sectors); it is not the Western way of doing things; and it is not following a model or a prescription, or being told what to do by others. And unlike other communist-party states, all this has taken place under regime continuity. While the successes of China’s economic experience are clearly important in promoting this idea, so too are the failings of the neoliberal ‘other’ against which China is being compared.

Within this ‘no-model model’ approach, we have the seeds of other ways of thinking. In defining the model, different people tend to focus on different aspects that reinforce their pre-existing thinking. For example, for those who focus on regime continuity, the model is sometimes reduced to rapid economic growth combined with strong state authoritarian politics. For at least some within China, such understandings focus only on the positives of what has happened, and ignore the myriad social and economic challenges that exist alongside the ‘miracles’.

Similarly, for those who focus on the lack of liberalisation and the state’s dominance, the importance of early stages of marketisation and the relative retreat of the state are often under-emphasised. Many also focus on the managed process of integration with the global economy and globalisation that China is carrying out on its own terms — understandings which do not sit easily with earlier studies of how the process of opening up had much to do with acceding to the interests of global finance and production.

This is partly explained by the dualistic nature of China’s international economic relations. While liberalisation has been promoted to encourage investment to produce exports, key domestic actors and sectors have remained relatively protected and supported by the state. And here there seem to be commonalities between what is happening in China today and what has happened in developmental states previously — not just in terms of trade, but in the state’s organisation of capitalism more generally. Of course there are many country- and context-specific differences, but there are at least some characteristics that link China, not just with the East Asian developmental states of the post-World War II era, but with the renaissance of the post-Meiji Japanese economy and Germany’s Bismarkian development in the 19th century.

In some respects, it does not matter if the Chinese model is indeed a new and discrete entity; if people think there is a China model and act accordingly, the model exists. But debating the genealogy of models is more important than just an exercise in semantics. If the China model is thought of as new and different, this suggests it represents a distinctive deviation from the ‘norm’. But rather than being abnormal, China seems to provide the latest example in a relatively long line of cases of strong state developmentalism that have been ‘successful’ in generating GDP growth (in early stages of industrialisation and national infrastructure construction at least). In this respect, rather than thinking in terms of a China model, it is perhaps more correct to talk of 有中国特色的新李斯特式发展型国家 — a strong state developmentalism developmental state with Chinese characteristics — and to rethink what is normal and what is a deviation.

By Professor Shaun Breslin Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, and Associate Fellow at the Chatham House Asia Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs. East Asia Forum

America’s Uzbekistan Problem

2011-12-28T12:01:00.000-08:00

There is perhaps no country on earth surrounded by more difficult neighbors than Afghanistan. When the U.S. wants to ship matériel to its troops there, it can’t go through Tajikistan because the roads are so poor; it can’t go through Turkmenistan because that country maintains an isolationist neutrality; and, for obvious reasons, it can’t go through Iran.

Until Nov. 26, the U.S. military shipped about a third of its supplies through Pakistan, but after an American attack killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the country cut off NATO’s access to the border, and there is little indication that officials in Islamabad intend to change their minds. The U.S. military ships another third of its cargo to Afghanistan by air, but that costs so much more than shipping by land that to expand those operations would be prohibitively expensive. That leaves Uzbekistan.

Anticipating problems with Pakistan, Pentagon planners began putting together the Northern Distribution Network, a series of transit routes from Europe through the former Soviet Union. Nearly all of those routes converge at Termez, Uzbekistan, whose sleepy, dusty streets belie its strategic location: 75 percent of the network’s traffic passes through the town and across the Soviet-built “Friendship Bridge” into Afghanistan. Now, the U.S. will have to ship even more military cargo through Uzbekistan, one of Washington’s least likeable allies.

Ruled since the Soviet era by President Islam Karimov, it is the fifth-most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International, and in Freedom House’s rankings of political and civil freedoms it is tied for last.

“The challenge for the United States is to strike a balance between its short-term, war-fighting needs and long-term interests in promoting a stable, prosperous and democratic Central Asia,” John Kerry wrote in the introduction to a report released on Dec. 19 by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled “Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan.”

This is a difficult needle to thread, but Washington has so far largely succeeded.

The U.S. has kept the supply lines running while compromising little on its principles. The yearly State Department human rights reports have remained consistently critical, even as military cooperation has blossomed. Human rights advocates in Uzbekistan — a small, beleaguered community — still say that, for the most part, they feel like the U.S. Embassy is an ally.

But this balance is difficult to maintain, and lately there have been signs that America may be wavering. The defense budget authorization act passed on Dec. 15 by Congress removed restrictions on military aid to Uzbekistan that had been in place since 2004 because of the country’s odious human rights record. Asked about that decision, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said there had been “progress” on human rights and political freedoms, which, while not a realistic assessment of the situation, technically speaking is true.

The Kerry report makes the same claim and as evidence reaches back nearly four years to note only one such bit of progress: that the government began allowing the Red Cross to visit prisoners in 2008. But the overall picture is grim, and, if anything, getting worse.

When Clinton visited Tashkent in October, a State Department official told the reporters accompanying her that “President Karimov commented that he wants to make progress on liberalization and democratization, and he said that he wants to leave a legacy of that for his — both his kids and his grandchildren.” Pressed by an incredulous reporter, the official added, “Yeah. I do believe him.”

This new, more accommodating rhetoric is embarrassing. If Clinton were to say: “No, we don’t agree with how Uzbekistan’s government runs its country. But we need their help in Afghanistan, and so we’re temporarily putting our differences aside,” would anyone object? That is obviously the bargain being struck, and one that few in the U.S. or Uzbekistan would take issue with.

Wikileaked cables reporting on U.S. negotiations with Karimov over the past few years reveal a president who doesn’t seem to care much about how the U.S. sees his government, but just doesn’t want what he calls American “pressure and diktats” to reform.

Though the U.S. has consistently hectored Uzbekistan on human rights over the past two decades, the country has become more oppressive. The U.S.-Uzbekistan military relationship has had its ups and downs — the U.S. operated an air base there from 2001 to 2005 — and through it all, Karimov hasn’t changed.

There is no question that as long as the U.S. is in Afghanistan, it will need to engage with Uzbekistan. But how it chooses to engage can make all the difference. “Achieving our security goals and promoting good governance and human rights are not mutually exclusive,” the Kerry report says. “In fact, security and political engagement are complementary strategies that are more likely to be effective when pursued together.”

The report doesn’t back up that assertion, and in the case of Uzbekistan it plainly isn’t true. No sort of political engagement will work, and the irony is that the more U.S. officials believe it, the more likely they are to compromise their principles. In this case, saying nothing may be the best way for the U.S. to stay true to what it believes.

By Joshua Kucera freelance reporter based in Washington who writes frequently on Central Asia.