Monday, February 25, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Border Crossing from one of our barristers in Aust...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Border Crossing from one of our barristers in Aust...: Border Crossing from one of our barristers in Australia. ...
Border Crossing from one of our barristers in Australia.The information below should be read by everyone, whether you agree to its contents, or not
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Border
Crossing from one of our barristers in Australia.
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Wednesday, February 20, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Written a story, a novel, a memoir or a children’s...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Written a story, a novel, a memoir or a children’s...: Written a story, a novel, a memoir or a children’s book and looking for a book publisher? Sid Harta Publishers in Melbourne Australia ha...
Written a story, a novel, a memoir or a children’s book and looking for a book publisher?
Written
a story, a novel, a memoir or a children’s book and looking for a book
publisher? Sid Harta Publishers in Melbourne Australia has published 650
authors worldwide on all platforms, eBook, print on demand Amazon and
distributes hard copies globally. Go to http://sidharta.com.au and email your manuscript to author@sidharta.com.au
The
world is overlooking the danger of the current West Papuan resolve for
independence from Indonesia. The West Papuan Freedom Movement has now
successfully lodged a request with the United Nations to revisit the flawed
1969 plebiscite. This could bring Australia and Indonesia again into conflict!
Read the new book release “Rockefeller and the Demise of Ibu Pertiwi” eBook and
print on demand all online platforms.
Sunday, February 10, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Why The Philippines Wants To Review Mutual Defence...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Why The Philippines Wants To Review Mutual Defence...: Philippines’ Defence Secretary, Delfin Lorenzana at a press briefing at Camp Aguinaldo in late December last year spoke of the need...
Why The Philippines Wants To Review Mutual Defence Treaty With United States
Philippines’ Defence Secretary, Delfin Lorenzana at a press briefing at
Camp Aguinaldo in late December last year spoke of the need for a review of the
1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) with the United States given the growing
security concerns in the South China Sea. The Defence Secretary had mentioned,
given the ambivalent stand of the United States with respect to the
Philippines’ claim in the West Philippine Sea (as referred to by the
Philippines), “the government had three options after the review: Maintain it,
strengthen it, or scrap it.” The main premise of the MDT is “that
the Philippines and the U.S. would assist each other when either of them is
attacked by a foreign force.”
The MDT between the Philippines and the US was signed on August 30 1951,
in Washington, D.C. After the Philippines gained independence on July 4 1946, a
strong American presence persisted. Under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, a
number of US military bases were set up in the Philippines. Most notable ones
being the Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay (US naval station). The bases
were maintained and operated by the US until 1991 and 1992 respectively.
Philippines has been the oldest treaty ally of the US in Southeast Asia.
Besides the MDT, the two countries have signed other agreements as well like
the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, The Enhanced Defence Cooperation in
2014. After the 1992 withdrawal of the US from Manila, the relationship between
the two countries improved further in the economic, defence and the security
realms. The major thrust of the security relationship rests on the 1951 MDT.
Scholars have even branded the US as the Philippines’ ‘security umbrella’. In
his September 2018 meeting with US Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo,
Lorenzana had said, “Most in our defense establishments agree that the Philippines-US
alliance remains robust based on an enduring history of close engagement and
our unwavering commitment to work together on shared values.”
Therefore, the current statement of Delfin Lorenzana in December last year “that this treaty was signed in the Cold War era, do we still have a Cold
War today? Is it still relevant to our security? Maybe not anymore”
comes as a surprise.
The main point of objection is the absence of an ‘instant retaliatory
clause’ but to go through the constitutional processes, that is the need to
consult the US Congress before taking any retaliatory action. Furthermore,
Article 5 of the Treaty is, “an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed
to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties,
or on the Island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” This clause has again
triggered a lot of debate in Manila as to “what “Pacific” refers to. Does it mean the Pacific Ocean or the Pacific
area of operations which encompasses everything west of the US West Coast up to
the Indian Ocean?”
Philippines is currently facing its biggest external threat in the form
of an expansionist China in the South China Sea according to Filipino analysts
like Richard Heydarian. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague had
awarded the Philippines sovereign rights and defined its maritime entitlements
over three disputed areas in the Spratlys: Panganiban (Mischief) Reef, Ayungin
(Second Thomas) Shoal and Recto (Reed) Bank. Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal off
Zambales was declared as a common fishing ground over which no country has
control. But China had completely ignored the ruling and built fortified
artificial islands in the South China Sea including in the Panganiban Reef. The
Chinese sealed off Panatag and harassed resupply operations to Filipino troops
on Ayungin. The Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin has said in a
statement recently that the Philippines will protest against the Chinese opening
a maritime rescue centre in the Fiery Cross Reef. The territorial
dispute is listed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as the primary
source of the country’s external threat.
This has prompted Manila to demand that the US takes a stronger stand in
the South China Sea issue in favor of its erstwhile treaty ally. Though the US
is undertaking Freedom of Navigation and overflight exercises in the South
China Sea, it still remains non-committal on whether it will defend the
Philippines in times of an armed attack. The US had in the past taken no stand
during the takeover by the Chinese of the Philippines’ claimed Mischief Reef in
1995 and also during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between the
Philippines and China. This has not gone down well in the Filipino defence,
security circles and most importantly the country’s citizens.
However in an address on the eve of Chinese New Year, the leader of the
Philippines said the “friendship and cooperation forged between the Philippines and China” had
led to “greater prosperity and economic growth”. Philippines unlike
in the past where it was too pro- US, is now like most other countries in the
region following a hedging strategy, which means the US needs to do much more
to keep the trust of its treaty ally intact. Under the Trump administration,
US’s Asia Policy has become a dicey one. On one hand, we saw President Trump
pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but on December 31 2018, the
release of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) is focused on the
promotion of American interests in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of defense
and security partnerships. In the ARIA, the US “promotes a joint Indo-Pacific
diplomatic strategy in Asian waters through joint maritime exercises in the
East China Sea and the South China Sea.” It also reaffirms its treaty
commitments to countries like the Thailand and the Philippines. Though the ARIA
mentions about the appropriation of US$150,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region
for each fiscal year from 2019-2023. But at the same time, financial assistance
will be subjected to a budget cut in countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and
US’s closest security ally in ASEAN, the Philippines, due to human rights
issues. According to academics, Academics Gregory Poling and Eric Sayers, “if
the Philippines withdraws from the MDT it would be a severe blow to US
interests in the Indo-Pacific.”
This in a way is reflective of the yearning of smaller countries in this
region for a more proactive role to be played that caters to their interests by
the Big powers like the US. This yearning presents both challenges and
opportunities for the Big Powers. Even countries like the US in the current
times despite the ongoing trade war with China is delicately balancing its relations
with Beijing. So to claim outright that it will take the side of its
treaty ally during a clash with its very crucial trading partner puts the US in
a tough spot. The Scarborough Shoal 2012 standoff had also put the Asia Pivot
policy of the Obama administration under test and many had questioned the
genuineness of the policy when the US maintained a neutral stand in the
standoff. Philippines’ wish for a stronger MDT has again put the US in a
difficult situation. The US-Philippines 2014 Enhanced Defence Co-operation
Agreement (EDCA) also depends on the MDT. That agreement allows the US to
construct facilities and pre-position and store defence equipment, supplies and
material within Philippine military bases and to deploy troops on a rotational
basis there. Given the Philippines’ change in attitude towards China and its
new hedging strategy, according to Poling and Sayers, “continuance of the
treaty and the EDCA is critical to US interests in the region, not necessarily
to those of the Philippines whose relations with China may suffer.”
India is revamping her Indo-Pacific policy through its Act East and
thereby also needs to take cognizance of the demands of the smaller countries
in the Southeast Asian region beside countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore.
The ASEAN has always believed in ‘consensus’ and the visions and desires of all
the member countries will be taken into account when the ‘ASEAN vision or
concept of the Indo-Pacific’ is formulated at the end of the ongoing
deliberations on the Indo-Pacific at the platform of the ASEAN and the East
Asia Summit. The ASEAN countries have propagated for an “inclusive Indo-Pacific
framework”, therefore at the end, picking sides will not be a viable option for
either the Big powers in case of sore issues like the South China Sea and even
for the smaller countries in the emerging dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and the
changing global order. Therefore, these demands of the smaller countries needs
to be tackled by India with a lot of caution and diplomatic acumen.
By Premesha Saha
Observer Research Foundation
ORF was
established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to
influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the
first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for
Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour
of economic reforms.
Saturday, February 9, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Brexit and Southeast Asia: Return Of British Naval...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Brexit and Southeast Asia: Return Of British Naval...: Although it should not be exaggerated, a persistent British naval presence in Southeast Asia should be expected now that commitments ...
Brexit and Southeast Asia: Return Of British Naval Presence?
Although it should not be exaggerated, a persistent
British naval presence in Southeast Asia should be expected now that
commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced.
Sparked by recent comments by the British Foreign Secretary, Jeremy
Hunt, there has been a good deal of excited speculation about the prospect of a
large-scale British military re-appearance in Southeast Asia complete with
aircraft carriers and new bases. Its critics argue that this can be simply
attributed to the country’s desire to reinvent itself after Brexit. Is there a
nostalgic desire to try to return to the days of Empire? In fact, it’s all a
bit more complicated than that.
First of all, the United Kingdom’s intention to increase its engagement
with Southeast Asia has long preceded the Brexit project (although that has
probably accentuated the drive for a ‘global Britain’ that is international by
design); and far from being a harking back to the old days is a response to
some very modern realities and developments. Chief amongst these is the rate of
growth in Southeast Asia and the extent of today’s mutually beneficial linkages
between the economies of the UK and the region.
Less of Shift in Policy
Southeast Asia is the UK’s third largest non-EU export market and the UK
is the second biggest EU investor in the area. Moreover Southeast Asia is the
UK’s third biggest market for defence exports. For all these reasons, the
British, like other Europeans, have concluded that they should try for a more
persistent presence not just in Southeast Asia but in the whole of the
Indo-Pacific region, as part of an ‘All of Asia’ project.
Equally clearly this is not to be part of a plan to compete with, still
less contain, China, which is also an important trading partner. It is,
however, designed to contribute to the defence of the rules-based order.
This is less of a shift in policy than is often realised. Back in the
1970s the ink had hardly dried on the Wilson Government’s controversial
decision to abandon Singapore and its ‘East of Suez’ commitment, than the
British naval staff, with Foreign Office approval, set about organising an
annual series of ‘group deployments’ through the area and shortly after that
established the so-called ‘Beira patrol’.
This was a permanent frigate force off the Gulf which little by little
acted as a fore-runner for the substantial task group and semi-permanent mine
countermeasures force that distinguished itself in the first Gulf War in the
1990s and afterwards.
When combined with the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the ‘Five Eyes’
relationship especially with Australia and New Zealand, the continuing
deployment to Brunei and even the small oiling facility at Sembawang in
Singapore, this all makes it seem less a question of the British ‘coming back’
to the region, more a recognition that they never really left.
More Visible British Naval Presence?
But certainly the expensive land-centric strategic distractions of Iraq
and Afghanistan, together with the effects of great recession of 2008 and the
harsh defence review of 2010 did lead to a significant diminution of the
British naval presence. A more persistent naval presence in the region is now
possible and is being sought.
For this some local logistic support is necessary but nothing like the
old Singapore ‘base’ which would be ruinously expensive, politically highly
controversial and operationally completely unnecessary. Instead the British,
like other navies, not least the Chinese, seek enhanced facilities such as they
have completed in Bahrain and just agreed at Duqm in Oman where ships can be
refuelled, routine maintenance conducted and crews rested or rotated.
Already with most ambitious deployment for many years of three major
assets, including the assault ship HMS Albion and with the Queen
Elizabeth likely to make its operational debut in the region by the
beginning of 2021, a greater British naval footprint is already emerging.
Moreover such an enhanced presence is likely to be conducted with
traditional friends in the area, and this will help too. Relations with the
navies of Southeast Asia are good. Moreover both the Australians and the
Canadians have chosen the Royal Navy’s highly sophisticated Type 26 frigate for
their fleet renewal programmes (and the New Zealanders might follow suit in
some form) and this will greatly increase prospects for naval cooperation in
the years to come.
The UK’s European partners are likewise interested in working with the
Royal Navy, wherever it is, especially in exploring the disciplines of carrier
escort, and of course have their own very similar reasons for wanting a presence
in the Indo-Pacific region.
Challenges Ahead
Nonetheless there are still major challenges ahead, quite apart from the
obvious need to handle local reactions sensitively. The Type 26 programme, the
more modest Type 31 frigate programme, the completion of the carrier and F-35b
fighter project when added to the very high costs of the Successor ballistic
missile firing submarine programme, simultaneously combine into a formidable
charge on the UK Defence budget at a time of Brexit-induced uncertainty.
Nor is Southeast Asia the only area in which the UK has an interest it
needs to signal. Russian truculence in European waters and the growing
importance of the Far North and the Arctic demand a countervailing attention
and will remain the top strategic priority. The Mediterranean, the Gulf, the
Caribbean and the South Atlantic matter too.
It will be a challenge to meet such a diverse range of commitments with
a frigate and destroyer fleet that has dropped from 32 at the time of the
1997/8 Strategic Defence review to just 19 now.
However, it would seem from last year’s relatively benign Modernising
Defence Review that something of a renaissance is underway. In all probability,
the British will in American revolutionary John Paul Jones’ words ‘be
coming’ unless present intentions are derailed by some disastrous Brexit
outcome or dramatic strategic deterioration in Europe, but in a cautious and
considered way which will depend heavily on the degree of welcome accorded the
UK by friends and partners in the region.
This will be measured by the degree of success achieved by the UK’s bid
to engage with ASEAN through establishing linkages with ADMM+ and the Expert
Working groups. The probable increase in the visibility of the Royal Navy in
Southeast Asian waters after all is just one fairly small part of a much bigger
package of political and economic efforts to engage with the region.
*Professor Geoffrey Till
is an Advisor to the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU),
Singapore.
Friday, February 8, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: West Papuan Independence Movement succeeds in lodg...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: West Papuan Independence Movement succeeds in lodg...: The world is overlooking the danger of the current West Papuan resolve for independence from Indonesia. The West Papuan Freedom Movement...
West Papuan Independence Movement succeeds in lodging a 2 Million signature demand with the United Nations
The
world is overlooking the danger of the current West Papuan resolve for
independence from Indonesia. The West Papuan Freedom Movement has now
successfully lodged a request with the United Nations to revisit the flawed
1969 plebiscite. This could bring Australia and Indonesia again into conflict!
Read the new book release “Rockefeller and the Demise of Ibu Pertiwi” eBook and
print on demand all online platforms.
Thursday, February 7, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Trouble in the Tropics: The Legacy of the Bali Bom...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Trouble in the Tropics: The Legacy of the Bali Bom...: With the elections fast approaching in Indonesia, leaders are hard-pressed to maintain the population’s support despite recent challenge...
Trouble in the Tropics: The Legacy of the Bali Bombings on Indonesian Elections
With the elections fast approaching in Indonesia,
leaders are hard-pressed to maintain the population’s support despite recent
challenges. Religion and terrorism in particular have been thorny issues for
President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, who is seeking re-election on
April 17.
On January
18, the Jokowi administration announced its intentions to release 80 year-old Abu Bakar
Bashir from prison over humanitarian concerns given his age and deteriorating
health. Bashir is the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the militant
group responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, one of Indonesia’s deadliest terrorist
attacks in which 202 individuals were killed, including 88 Australians. JI is
also believed to be a regional branch of the al-Qaeda network. Bashir himself
has never been found to be directly involved in the bombing, but he was
arrested on charges of funding a training camp for Islamic militants
and encouraging extremists to carry out terrorist attacks.
Jokowi’s
preoccupation to improve his image and electability among Muslim communities
before the elections seems to support the idea that his decision regarding
Bashir is politically motivated. Some believe that it is a pre-emptive move to diffuse criticism ahead of the release of
former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Basuki, a Christian of Chinese
origin, was found guilty of blasphemy against Islam after he quoted a verse of
the Qu’ran and insinuated that his opponents had used the passage to trick
Muslims into voting against him.
In an analysis published by the Lowy
Institute, an Australian think tank, regional terrorism expert Sidney Jones
argued that the legal grounds of Jokowi’s decision are unclear. It is neither a
pardon nor an amnesty, because Bashir never requested a pardon and the decision
seems to violate Regulation 99 of 2012 from Indonesia’s Ministry of Law and
Human Rights.
This
stipulates that the release of offenders such as convicted terrorists is
contingent on their willingness to sign a loyalty oath to the Indonesian
government. It was on those grounds that the Jokowi government later
backtracked on their plan. Bashir refused to pledge his allegiance to the
nation and the state ideology of Pancasila, which promotes pluralism. There seems to be no
good reason as to why this requirement should be waived for humanitarian
reasons.
Unfortunately,
the damage has already been done. Domestically, public outrage at Jokowi’s
decision has alienated his supporters, which
include moderates, families of the Bali bombing victims, and the police, the
judiciary and the bureaucracy who were involved in the fight against JI. Along
with the appointment of conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate,
these recent decisions made by Jokowi have contributed to a growing sense among
his supporters that the President is more concerned with courting the
Islamic vote rather than promoting an agenda that addresses social and economic
issues.
At the same
time, the reversal of Jokowi’s initial plan to release Bashir has also angered
conservative Muslims who accused the President of making empty promises. There
was no clear guarantee that this decision would help Jokowi change the minds of
conservative Muslims and effectively gain their support.
Many people
who opposed the release of Bashir have also threatened not to vote for Jokowi.
In Indonesia, voters can choose to cast a blank vote, or an abstention from
voting. This practice, called golput, is usually
interpreted as a sign that the electorate does not believe that the candidates
deserve their votes. Golput was used a symbol of protest in Suharto’s
authoritarian New Order regime, at a time when the winner was already
determined before the election and alternative parties were either banned or
tightly controlled.
Recently, pro-golput voices were heard following the first presidential debate
and the announcement of Jokowi’s plan to release Bashir. Jokowi supporters have
begun to waver, and may choose the golput option on their ballots given
that most do not see Prabowo Subianto, the incumbent’s opponent, as a possible
alternative. However, opting for golput in 2019 could potentially mean
surrendering the political future of the country to Prabowo and his authoritarian tendencies.
Much more
seems to be at risk now. Bashir’s lawyer Muhammad Mahendradatta has threatened to take legal action to
demand the release of the religious leader based on his health conditions.
Mahendradatta maintains that Bashir has never been found guilty for any
bombing, and that the regulation requiring him to sign a pact of allegiance to Pancasila
should not apply given that it was passed in 2012 and cannot be
retroactive. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a legal advisor to Jokowi’s re-election
campaign, has warned that “if [Bashir] is
entitled to parole and that right is not given, the government could be sued
and lose.”
Even worse,
although Bashir’s influence has waned over the years, anti-terrorism experts
suspect that the timing of this incident will help burnish his image as a hero of militant Islamism among hardliners.
What does
this incident say about Indonesia’s elections? For one, these elections may be
more unpredictable than they seem. Even if Jokowi has a substantial lead over
his opponent Prabowo, it would not take much more than a political scandal to
potentially turn the tables. Furthermore, Jokowi’s failed political gamble
demonstrates the need for leaders to be careful when pulling the religion card,
which could easily do more harm than good.
Published By : Patricia Sibal
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author
and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Studies
or the Political Science Students’ Association.
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: It is not just those at the top. Recently an ANZ G...
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: It is not just those at the top. Recently an ANZ G...: It is not just those at the top. Recently an ANZ Glen Waverley staff member revealed our private banking information without authority ca...
It is not just those at the top. Recently an ANZ Glen Waverley staff member revealed our private banking information without authority causing huge headaches. The employee was then promoted.
It is not just those at the top. Recently an ANZ Glen Waverley staff member revealed our private banking information without authority causing huge headaches. The employee was then promoted.
Wednesday, February 6, 2019
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: The 12-Step Method of Regime Change
Kerry B. Collison Asia News: The 12-Step Method of Regime Change: The 12-Step Method of Regime Change On 15 September 1970, US President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger au...
The 12-Step Method of Regime Change
The 12-Step Method of Regime Change
On 15 September 1970, US President Richard Nixon
and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger authorised the US government to
do everything possible to undermine the incoming government of the socialist
president of Chile, Salvador Allende. Nixon and Kissinger, according to the
notes kept by CIA Director Richard Helms, wanted to ‘make the economy scream’
in Chile; they were ‘not concerned [about the] risks involved’. War was
acceptable to them as long as Allende’s government was removed from power. The
CIA started Project FUBELT, with $10 million as a first instalment to begin the
covert destabilisation of the country.
US business firms, such as the telecommunication giant ITT, the soft
drink maker Pepsi Cola and copper monopolies such as Anaconda and Kennecott,
put pressure on the US government once Allende nationalised the copper sector
on 11 July 1971. Chileans celebrated this day as the Day of National Dignity
(Dia de la Dignidad Nacional). The CIA began to make contact with sections of
the military seen to be against Allende. Three years later, on 11 September
1973, these military men moved against Allende, who died in the regime change
operation. The US ‘created the conditions’ as US National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger put it, to which US President Richard Nixon answered, ‘that is
the way it is going to be played’. Such is the mood of international gangsterism.
Chile entered the dark night of a military dictatorship that turned over
the country to US monopoly firms. US advisors rushed in to strengthen the nerve
of General Augusto Pinochet’s cabinet.
What happened to Chile in 1973 is precisely what the United States has
attempted to do in many other countries of the Global South. The most recent
target for the US government – and Western big business – is Venezuela. But
what is happening to Venezuela is nothing unique. It faces an onslaught from
the United States and its allies that is familiar to countries as far afield as
Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The formula is clichéd. It is
commonplace, a twelve-step plan to produce a coup climate, to create a world
under the heel of the West and of Western big business.
Step One: Colonialism’s Traps.
Most of the Global South remains trapped by the structures put in place
by colonialism. Colonial boundaries encircled states that had the misfortune of
being single commodity producers – either sugar for Cuba or oil for Venezuela.
The inability to diversify their economies meant that these countries earned
the bulk of their export revenues from their singular commodities (98% of
Venezuela’s export revenues come from oil). As long as the prices of the
commodities remained high, the export revenues were secure. When the prices
fell, revenue suffered. This was a legacy of colonialism. Oil prices dropped
from $160.72 per barrel (June 2008) to $51.99 per barrel (January 2019).
Venezuela’s export revenues collapsed in this decade.
Step Two: The Defeat of the New International
Economic Order.
In 1974, the countries of the Global South attempted to redo the
architecture of the world economy. They called for the creation of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) that would allow them to pivot away from
the colonial reliance upon one commodity and diversify their economies. Cartels
of raw materials – such as oil and bauxite – were to be built so that the
one-commodity country could have some control over prices of the products that
they relied upon. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
founded in 1960, was a pioneer of these commodity cartels. Others were not
permitted to be formed. With the defeat of OPEC over the past three decades,
its members – such as Venezuela (which has the world’s largest proven oil
reserves) – have not been able to control oil prices. They are at the mercy of
the powerful countries of the world.
Step Three: The Death of Southern Agriculture.
In November 2001, there were about three billion small farmers and
landless peasants in the world. That month, the World Trade Organisation met in
Doha (Qatar) to unleash the productivity of Northern agri-business against the
billions of small farmers and landless peasants of the Global South.
Mechanisation and large, industrial-scale farms in North America and Europe had
raised productivity to about 1 to 2 million kilogrammes of cereals per farmer.
The small farmers and landless peasants in the rest of the world struggled to
grow 1,000 kilogrammes of cereals per farmer. They were nowhere near as
productive. The Doha decision, as Samir Amin wrote,
presages the annihilation of the small farmer and landless peasant. What are
these men and women to do? The production per hectare is higher in the West,
but the corporate take-over of agriculture (as Tricontinental: Institute for
Social Research Senior Fellow P. Sainath shows) leads to increased hunger as it
pushes peasants off their land and leaves them to starve.
Step Four: Culture of Plunder.
Emboldened by Western domination, monopoly firms act with disregard for
the law. As Kambale Musavuli
and I write of the Democratic Republic of Congo, its annual budget
of $6 billion is routinely robbed of at least $500 by monopoly mining firms,
mostly from Canada – the country now leading the charge against Venezuela.
Mispricing and tax avoidance schemes allow these large firms (Canada’s Agrium,
Barrick and Suncor) to routinely steal billions of dollars from impoverished
states.
Step Five: Debt as a Way of Life.
Unable to raise money from commodity sales, hemmed in by a broken world
agricultural system and victim of a culture of plunder, countries of the Global
South have been forced to go hat in hand to commercial lenders for finance.
Over the past decade, debt held by the Global South states has increased, while
debt payments have ballooned by 60%. When commodity prices rose between 2000
and 2010, debt in the Global South decreased. As commodity prices began to fall
from 2010, debts have risen. The IMF points out that of the 67 impoverished
countries that they follow, 30 are in debt distress, a number that has doubled
since 2013. More than 55.4% of Angola’s export revenue is paid to service its
debt. And Angola, like Venezuela, is an oil exporter. Other oil exporters such
as Ghana, Chad, Gabon and Venezuela suffer high debt to GDP ratios. Two out of
five low-income countries are in deep financial distress.
Step Six: Public Finances Go to Hell.
With little incoming revenue and low tax collection rates, public
finances in the Global South has gone into crisis. As the UN Conference on
Trade and Development points out, ‘public finances have continued to be suffocated’.
States simply cannot put together the funds needed to maintain basic state
functions. Balanced budget rules make borrowing difficult, which is compounded
by the fact that banks charge high rates for money, citing the risks of lending
to indebted countries.
Step Seven: Deep Cuts in Social Spending.
Impossible to raise funds, trapped by the fickleness of international
finance, governments are forced to make deep cuts in social spending. Education
and health, food sovereignty and economic diversification – all this goes by
the wayside. International agencies such as the IMF force countries to conduct
‘reforms’, a word that means extermination of independence. Those countries
that hold out face immense international pressure to submit under pain of extinction,
as the Communist Manifesto (1848) put it.
Step Eight: Social Distress Leads to Migration.
The total number of migrants in the world is now at least 68.5 million.
That makes the country called Migration the 21st largest country in the world
after Thailand and ahead of the United Kingdom. Migration has become a global
reaction to the collapse of countries from one end of the planet to the other.
The migration out of Venezuela is not unique to that country but is now merely
the normal reaction to the global crisis. Migrants from Honduras who go
northward to the United States or migrants from West Africa who go towards
Europe through Libya are part of this global exodus.
Step Nine: Who Controls the Narrative?
The monopoly corporate media takes its orders from the elite. There is
no sympathy for the structural crisis faced by governments from Afghanistan to
Venezuela. Those leaders who cave to Western pressure are given a free pass by
the media. As long as they conduct ‘reforms’, they are safe. Those countries
that argue against the ‘reforms’ are vulnerable to being attacked. Their
leaders become ‘dictators’, their people hostages. A contested election in
Bangladesh or in the Democratic Republic of Congo or in the United States is
not cause for regime change. That special treatment is left for Venezuela.
Step Ten: Who’s the Real President?
Regime change operations begin when the imperialists question the
legitimacy of the government in power: by putting the weight of the United
States behind an unelected person, calling him the new president and creating a
situation where the elected leader’s authority is undermined. The coup takes
place when a powerful country decides – without an election – to anoint its own
proxy. That person – in Venezuela’s case Juan Guaidó – rapidly has to make it
clear that he will bend to the authority of the United States. His kitchen
cabinet – made up of former government officials with intimate ties to the US
(such as Harvard University’s Ricardo Hausmann and Carnegie’s Moisés Naím) –
will make it clear that they want to privatise everything and sell out the
Venezuelan people in the name of the Venezuelan people.
Step Eleven: Make the Economy Scream.
Venezuela has faced harsh US sanctions since 2014, when the US Congress
started down this road. The next year, US President Barack Obama declared
Venezuela a ‘threat to national security’. The economy started to scream. In
recent days, the United States and the United Kingdom brazenly stole billions
of dollars of Venezuelan money, placed the shackles of sanctions on its only
revenue generating sector (oil) and watched the pain flood through the country.
This is what the US did to Iran and this is what they did to Cuba. The UN says
that the US sanctions on Cuba have cost the small island $130 billion.
Venezuela lost $6 billion for the first year of Trump’s sanctions, since they
began in August 2017. More is to be lost as the days unfold. No wonder that the
United Nations Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy says that ‘sanctions which can
lead to starvation and medical shortages are not the answer to the crisis in
Venezuela’. He said that sanctions are ‘not a foundation for the peaceful
settlement of disputes’. Further, Jazairy said, ‘I am especially concerned to
hear reports that these sanctions are aimed at changing the government of
Venezuela’. He called for ‘compassion’ for the people of Venezuela.
Step Twelve: Go to War.
US National Security Advisor John Bolton held a yellow pad with the
words 5,000 troops in Colombia written on it. These are US troops, already
deployed in Venezuela’s neighbour. The US Southern Command is ready. They are
egging on Colombia and Brazil to do their bit. As the coup climate is created,
a nudge will be necessary. They will go to war.
None of this is inevitable. It was not inevitable to Titina Silá, a
commander of the Partido Africano para a Independència da Guiné e Cabo Verde
(PAIGC) who was murdered on 30 January 1973. She fought to free her country. It
is not inevitable to the people of Venezuela, who continue to fight to defend
their revolution. It is not inevitable to our friends at CodePink: Women for
Peace, whose Medea Benjamin walked into a meeting of the Organisation of
American States and said – No!
It is time to say No to regime change intervention. There is no middle
ground.
Vijay
Prashad is the George and Martha Kellner Chair of South Asian History and
Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT. Prashad is
the author of seventeen books. He can be reached at: vijay.prashad@trincoll.edu