In the 190-page long
document, Canberra pledges to increase capital investment in defence
capabilities from the current AU$9.4 billion (US$7.1 billion) to AU$23 billion
(US$17.4 billion) in 2025–26. Most of this investment will be channelled to the
maritime domain. But what does this investment means for Southeast Asia and the
South China Sea?
The 2016 DWP reflects
continuity with the two preceding Defence White Papers in two key ways. First,
the 2016 DWP reiterates the primacy of maritime strategy emphasised in previous
White Papers, with a focus on the sea–air gap along Australia’s north. Maritime
capabilities will be central in this enterprise, especially submarines that can
provide what the 2016 DWP describes as ‘a strategic advantage in terms of
surveillance and protection of our maritime approaches’. Second, the 2016 DWP
echoes the previous two White Papers in highlighting ‘maritime Southeast Asia’
as a region that ‘will always have particular significance to [Australia’s]
security’.
This emphasis on Southeast
Asia is highlighted in the DWP’s list of Australia’s ‘strategic defence
interests’. These interests are the security of Australia’s northern approaches
and proximate sea lines of communications, a secure nearer region encompassing
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and a stable Indo-Pacific
region with a rules-based global order.
What differentiates the 2016
DWP from the previous ones is its selective emphasis on the South China Sea.
While all the strategic defence interests are critical, the 2016 DWP puts great
emphasis on the second. According to the 2016 DWP, ‘Australia’s reliance on
maritime trade with and through South East Asia means the security of our
maritime approaches and trade routes within South East Asia must be protected,
as must freedom of navigation’.
Nowhere is freedom of
navigation being challenged so close to Australia than in the South China Sea.
Although the 2013 DWP called the South China Sea disputes to Australia’s
strategic attention, the blunt emphasis of the 2016 DWP is unparalleled:
‘Australia does not take sides on competing territorial claims in the South
China Sea but we are concerned that land reclamation and construction activity
by claimants raises tensions in the region’, particularly ‘the unprecedented
pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities’.
Such a robust statement
encapsulates the reactionary assertiveness implicit in the 2016 DWP. This new
strategic stance may involve Australia conducting military ‘freedom of
navigation operations’ in the South China Sea, as well as anticipatory measures
against China’s larger military modernisation drives.
Australia’s concerns about
China can partly, if not entirely, explain what Australian Prime Minister
Malcolm Turnbull describes as ‘an historic modernisation’ of Australia’s naval
capabilities, including the acquisition of 12
regionally superior submarines, three additional air warfare
destroyers and nine new anti-submarine warfare frigates.
That the 2016 DWP elicited a
predictably strong criticism from Beijing is not necessarily bad news. A
stronger Australia can give Southeast Asia greater leverage vis-à-vis China in
the South China Sea disputes. Australia’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia
can also create more opportunities for defence cooperation. Regional countries
can selectively draw upon Australia’s unique access to US defence technology
and intelligence to complement their own military modernisations.
Australia’s bilateral and
multilateral defence operations in the region, such as the Five Power Defence
Arrangement, may begin to involve more sophisticated exercise scenarios that
will benefit its Southeast Asian partners. Australia’s middle power status
arguably makes it a politically less sensitive defence partner for Southeast
Asia than major powers, such as the United States.
But despite these
opportunities, Southeast Asia should also be aware of the associated risks that
accompany Australia’s reactionary assertiveness. Given the region’s sensitivity
towards the divisive prospect of major power influence, the 2016 DWP begs the
question of whether Australia’s strategic policies are chiefly based on their
own raison d’etre or are largely a reflection of those of its
principal ally, the United States. While the strategic interests of some ASEAN
countries may align more closely with Australia’s, ASEAN should remain cautious
of being drawn deeper into Sino–American strategic competition, which could
potentially undermine its unity.
At the operational level,
Australia’s reactionary assertiveness might affect Southeast Asian maritime
security with far reaching effects. Sandwiched between Australia and China,
Southeast Asia would likely be the first region affected by a miscalculation
involving Chinese and Australian maritime forces in the South China Sea.
Controlled or orchestrated escalation during freedom of navigation operations
is not foolproof.
Regardless of whether the plans of the
2016 DWP are achievable, they are a bellwether of Australia’s future
strategic policy. Australia’s assertiveness is not tantamount to greater
instability in Southeast Asia but ASEAN should not react idly to Australia’s
new strategic direction. Unless Australia’s reactionary assertiveness takes the
interests of Southeast Asian states into account, it will remain part of the
problem rather than the solution.
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto
is Indonesian Presidential PhD Scholar with the Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre at The Australian National University. He is a former associate research
fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore.