Myanmar, Burma, Living in La La Land with Two-Child Policy

Burmese authorities, including President Thein Sein, are living with their collective heads in the clouds. The idea that a government can single out one ethnic minority and restrict their breeding to two children is as obscene as it is illegal, a form of ethnic cleansing that should warrant the attention of prosecutors at the international Criminal Court (ICC).

More so, given the government’s desire to see Burma normalize relations with the rest of the world, which would mean being subjected to the numerous resolutions and agreements struck by the United Nations over the last 60 years or more, when Rangoon was opting to model itself on the likes of North Korea in a bizarre form of military socialism that enriched the leaders and left the overall population destitute.

Even opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, if only briefly, stopped toeing the government line and spoke out against the reinforcement of the two-child policy, first initiated in 1994, for Muslim Rohingyas. However, her comments again seemed to lack the moral backbone that once made her famous.

“If true, this is against the law,” she said.

Much of the violence against Muslims over the past 12-months was launched in the state of Rakhine, where almost 200 people were killed during the bloodiest period in the second half of last year. It is also where a government commission claimed it “found“ that population growth among the Rohingyas was behind the sectarian violence.

Rakhine state spokesman Win Myaing left no doubts about the intentions of the policy, saying that it would be mandatory for all Rohingya, although the government was still determining how to enforce it.

Given the level of well-documented violence in the past year, including rape, torture, beatings and detention, perhaps the idea of Myaing and his cohorts sitting back and mulling over ways to enforce a population control program for people it does not like should not come as a surprise. What’s it to be? Sterilization? Forced abortion?

"This is the best way to control the population explosion which is a threat to our national identity. If no measure is taken to control the population, there is a danger of losing our own identity," said the National Affairs Minister for the Yangon Region Zaw Aye Maung.

He also suggested that the government would be doing the Muslims a favor because the two-child policy would reduce the costs of raising a family.
Much of the ethnic violence in Burma has been blamed on the country’s Buddhist monks, who have broken every conceivable notion of Buddhism as a purely peaceful religion and hold fast to government propaganda that Burmese Muslims are just Bengalis who fled across the border sometime back.
One Buddhist monk from Maungdaw township was, according to Agence-France-Presse, enthusiastic.

"It's a good idea. If the government can really control the Bengali population in the area, the other communities will feel more secure and there will be less violence like what happened in the past," said the monk named Manithara.
Thein Sein has showed himself to be a clever politician, bringing his country in from the cold while allowing the generals, who ruled with an iron fist for than half a century, to don business suits and reinvent themselves as politicians. He might soon be able to add ethnic cleansing and genocide to his list of accomplishments. By Luke Hunt for The Diplomat

Indonesia: Dinamika Kekerasan di Papua (English Language Version here also)

Indonesia: Dinamika Kekerasan di Papua

(English Language Version here also)

Asia Report N°232 9 Aug 2012

RINGKASAN IKHTISAR DAN REKOMENDASI

Serangkaian kekerasan yang terjadi di Papua selama bulan Mei dan Juni 2012 telah mengungkap ketiadaan strategi pemerintah yang koheren dalam menangani konflik multidimensi ini. Peristiwa penembakan terhadap warga non- Papua di Jayapura pada bulan Juni yang kemungkinan melibatkan para militan pro-kemerdekaan, yang kemudian disusul oleh kematian salah seorang militan tersebut di tangan polisi, menyingkap dimensi politik dari masalah ini. Di Wamena, aksi sejumlah tentara yang mengamuk setelah kematian rekan mereka memperlihatkan dalamnya rasa saling tidak percaya antara masyarakat lokal dan Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), dan tidak adanya mekanisme dalam menanggulangi krisis. Kekerasan yang terkait dengan sumber kekayaan alam Papua terkuak dalam peristiwa penembakan di wilayah pertambangan emas terpencil Paniai . Sementara kejadian-kejadian ini masih dalam investigasi, mereka memberi indikasi bahwa apabila pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tidak dapat menangani aspek-aspek yang sangat berbeda dalam masalah keamanan di Papua ini, keadaan mungkin bisa menjadi lebih buruk. Salahsatu solusi yang mungkin bisa menolong adalah perombakan kebijakan keamanan.

Ada dua faktor yang mendorong sebagian dari kekerasan di Papua belakangan ini. Pertama, berbagai ketidakpuasan yang dirasakan oleh masyarakat Papua terhadap pemerintah pusat. Kedua, beberapa aspek dari kebijakan keamanan yang kelihatannya bertentangan dengan niat pemerintah untuk membangun kepercayaan, mempercepat pembangunan dan merealisasikan tujuan dari UU Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus (Otsus) bagi Propinsi Papua. Hingga hari ini, UU Otsus belum menghasilkan manfaat yang nyata bagi kehidupan sebagian besar masyarakat dan belum juga memperbaiki hubungan antara Papua dengan pemerintah pusat. Substansinya selama ini kerap diperlemah oleh Jakarta, meskipun para anggota DPRD Papua juga bertanggungjawab karena gagal menetapkan peraturan-peraturan pelaksana yang diperlukan.

Jika Papua punya institusi politik yang efektif sekalipun, masalah-masalah ini sudah cukup sulit untuk dikelola. Realitanya, pemerintah maupun DPRD di tingkat propinsi dan kabupaten di Papua nyaris tidak berfungsi. Seorang pejabat gubernur telah ditunjuk bulan Juli 2011 namun ketidakefektifannya telah membawa pemerintah propinsi Papua ke dalam keadaan tidak menentu. Sementara, penyelenggaraan pilkada terhambat oleh DPRD Papua yang telah memfokuskan hampir dari seluruh energinya untuk menghalangi gubernur petahana untuk maju dan merebut kontrol KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah) terhadap beberapa bagian dalam proses pilkada melalui jalur hukum. Keadaan juga suram di tingkat kabupaten. Situasi ini membuat pemerintah pusat tak punya mitra yang aktif di Papua dan rakyat Papua tak punya saluran resmi untuk menyampaikan kekhawatiran mereka ke Jakarta.

Peran dari sebuah badan baru bernama Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Di Papua dan Papua Barat (UP4B) yang dibentuk bulan September 2011, semakin lama kelihatannya hanya terbatas menangani urusan ekonomi, dimana unit ini akan mengalami kesulitan memperlihatkan kemajuan yang nyata dalam jangka pendek. Harapan bahwa UP4B mungkin bisa memainkan peran politik di belakang layar dalam mendorong dialog antara rakyat Papua dan pemerintah pusat atau tentang kesusahan di Papua pun semakin memudar, karena kini menjadi semakin jelas bahwa dialog memiliki arti yang berbeda bagi orang yang berbeda. Upaya-upaya untuk membangun sebuah konsensus tentang dialog telah mengalami kemunduran akibat kekerasan yang terjadi, karena pemerintah enggan untuk mengambil langkah apapun yang bisa dilihat sebagai konsesi politik di bawah tekanan – apalagi terhadap daerah sesensitif Papua.

Tantangannya buat pemerintah adalah untuk menemukan sebuah strategi jangka pendek yang dapat mengurangi kekerasan sambil terus mencari sebuah kebijakan yang akan membawa manfaat-manfaat sosial, ekonomi dan politik jangka panjang dan menangani ketidakpuasan yang sudah lama dirasakan. Strategi tersebut harus melibatkan perubahan-perubahan yang jelas dan nyata dalam pengawasan, kontrol dan akuntabilitas terhadap polisi dan TNI. Tentu, aparat keamanan bukan satu-satunya masalah. Polisi dan tentara juga tidak selalu menjadi pelaku kekerasan; banyak dari mereka juga telah menjadi korban. Tapi mereka telah menjadi simbol atas segala sesuatu yang salah dengan penanganan Jakarta terhadap konflik Papua. Oleh karena itu, sebuah perubahan dalam kebijakan keamanan menyodorkan harapan paling baik bagi sebuah “quick win” yang dapat memperbaiki dinamika politik dan menghentikan Papua merosot ke arah kekerasan lebih lanjut.

REKOMENDASI-REKOMENDASI

Kepada Pemerintah Indonesia:

1.  Mengembangkan sebuah mekanisme pembuatan kebijakan yang lebih terintegrasi mengenai Papua di tingkat nasional dan propinsi untuk menjamin bahwa:

a) Program-program yang dirancang untuk memberikan manfaat-manfaat konkrit bagi rakyat Papua dan membangun kepercayaan tidak diperlemah secara tidak sengaja oleh keputusan-keputusan atau tindakan-tindakan yang diambil dalam Kementerian Dalam Negeri atau oleh badan intelijen dan keamanan;

b) Sebuah mekanisme pelaporan keamanan yang lebih terpadu dibentuk dibawah Kapolda Papua untuk menjamin bahwa unsur-unsur aparat TNI dan intel tidak melakukan operasi yang hanya dilaporkan ke Jakarta dan tidak dikoordinasikan dengan instansi lain di Papua.

c) Program-program pengawasan yang ketat tidak hanya terbatas di bidang pembangunan tapi juga mencakup kebijakan keamanan, termasuk audit yang rutin dan independen terhadap penghasilan TNI dan Polri dari kegiatan mereka di Papua.

d) Perspektif rakyat Papua diikutsertakan lewat partisipasi gubernur terpilih atau ketua MRP.

Kepada Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Polri)

2.  Meningkatkan sosialisasi dan pelatihan mengenai Peraturan Kapolri Nomor 8/2009 tentang Implementasi Prinsip dan Standar Hak Asasi Manusia dalam penyelenggaraan tugas kepolisian, dengan perhatian khusus pada:

a) Pasal 10(e) tidak boleh mentolerir tindakan penyiksaan dan perlakuan atau hukuman lain yang kejam, tidak manusiawi atau merendahkan martabat manusia, bahkan dibawah perintah atasan sekalipun atau dalam keadaan luar biasa;

b) Pasal 10 (f) menjamin kesehatan orang-orang yang berada dalam tahanan dan segera mengambil langkah untuk memberikan pelayanan medis bilamana diperlukan;

c) Pasal 10 (g) tidak boleh melakukan korupsi maupun penyalahgunaan kekuasaan dalam bentuk apapun;

d) Pasal 17 mengenai prosedur penangkapan;

e) Pasal 40 melarang anggota Polri untuk bertindak dengan cara yang menimbulkan antipati masyarakat, termasuk dengan meminta imbalan tidak resmi dan sengaja menutupi kesalahan pihak yang perkaranya sedang ditangani;

f) Pasal 42-44 mengenai perlindungan HAM dalam kerusuhan massal; dan

g) Pasal 45-49 mengenai penggunaan kekuatan/tindakan keras dan senjata api, terutama ketentuan bahwa metode-metode tanpa kekerasan (non-violent) harus diusahakan terlebih dahulu dan penggunaan kekuatan, senjata atau alat dalam penerapan tindakan represi harus berimbang dengan ancaman yang dihadapi.

3.  Meninjau kembali kebijakan dalam penggunaan peluru tajam dengan maksud untuk membatasi penggunaannya hanya pada situasi-situasi tertentu dan menjamin bahwa perlengkapan non-lethal (yang tidak mematikan) untuk menangani kerusuhan sipil dipasok secara memadai.

4.  Menjamin bahwa polisi diperlengkapi secara penuh dengan rompi anti-peluru dan perlengkapan pelindung diri lain ketika ditugaskan ke wilayah-wilayah yang rawan atau ketika menghadapi kerusuhan sipil sehingga mengurangi insentif untuk menembak lebih dulu.

5.  Meninjau kembali kebutuhan pelatihan untuk menjamin bahwa siapapun yang ditugaskan di kabupaten tertentu di Papua menerima briefing (pengarahan) yang menyeluruh dan mendetil dari mereka yang pernah bertugas disitu mengenai kondisi setempat, dinamika konflik dan hubungan dengan pemerintah dan tokoh masyarakat setempat, dan bahwa siapapun yang baru selesai bertugas di wilayah tertentu menjalani de-briefing (wawancara paska tugas) yang juga menyeluruh sehingga pengetahuan dan pelajaran-pelajaran yang didapat bisa diinstitusionalisasikan.

6.  Merancang kembali struktur tunjangan dan insentif sehingga polisi yang ditugaskan ke daerah-daerah sulit dan terpencil didorong untuk membangun hubungan yang lebih kuat dengan masyarakat setempat.

Kepada TNI dan Polri:

7.  Membuat komitmen yang tegas untuk mengakhiri impunitas (kekebalan hukum) atas penggunaan kekuatan eksesif dan penyiksaan, dan untuk menegakkan hukuman yang lebih kredibel terhadap yang bertanggungjawab atas tindakan-tindakan seperti itu dengan cara yang kasat mata dan terpublikasi sehingga rakyat Papua bisa melihat bahwa keadilan sedang ditegakkan.

8.  Secara khusus menjamin bahwa ada kebijakan zero-tolerance yang dimulai dari akademi-akademi militer dan polisi terhadap tindakan penendangan, pemukulan dengan instrumen apapun termasuk popor senapan atau tindakan penyiksaan dalam bentuk apapun dalam tahanan, interogasi atau hukuman ditempat atas dugaan pelanggaran.

9.  Menjelaskan secara tegas bahwa “emosi” tidak bisa dipakai sebagai pembenaran untuk memakai kekuatan secara berlebihan, terutama dalam bereaksi terhadap serangan oleh kelompok-kelompok Papua.

10.  Melakukan pengawasan lebih sistematis terhadap  pemasukan dan pengeluaran di polres, polsek, kodim dan koramil, apalagi yang dekat daerah penambangan, dengan tujuan mencegah pungutan liar terhadap transportasi barang dan jasa. 

Kepada Unit Percepatan Pembangunan di Papua dan Papua Barat (UP4B):

11.  Bekerja sama dengan pemerintah propinsi dan kabupaten di Papua dan juga kementerian di tingkat nasional untuk mengidentifikasi kesenjangan dalam pengimplementasian UU Otsus dan mengembangkan strategi-strategi untuk menanganinya.

Kepada Komisi Pemilu (KPU):

12.  Mengingat Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menyetujui praktek pemungutan suara secara aklamasi dengan menggunakan sistem noken di Papua, KPU hendaknya bekerja sama dengan KPUD Papua untuk mengembangkan pedoman yang jelas yang akan menjamin penghitungan dan rekapitulasi suara setidaknya mencapai standar minimum untuk mencegah kecurangan pemilu dan meningkatkan upaya-upaya pendidikan pemilih yang sesuai.

Kepada DPRD Propinsi Papua dan Gubernur Terpilih:

13.  Memberi prioritas tertinggi untuk menetapkan sekitar dua lusin peraturan yang diperlukan untuk menjamin otonomi khusus dapat diimplementasikan secara penuh.

Jakarta/Brussels, 9 Agustus 2012

Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua

Asia Report N°232 9 Aug 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A spate of violence in Papua in May and June 2012 exposed the lack of a coherent government strategy to address this multidimensional conflict. Shootings of non-Papuans in the provincial capital Jayapura in June, likely involving pro-independence militants, were followed by the death of one of those militants at police hands, highlighting the political dimension of the problem. In Wamena, a rampage by soldiers after the death of a comrade shows the depth of distrust between local communities and the army, and the absence of mechanisms to deal with crises. The shooting of five Papuans by newly arrived members of a paramilitary police unit (Brigade Mobile, Brimob) in a remote gold-mining area of Paniai highlights the violence linked to Papua’s vast resource wealth and rent-seeking by the security apparatus with little oversight from Jakarta. While these events are still under investigation, they signal that unless the Yudhoyono government can address these very different aspects of the conflict, things may get worse. An overhaul of security policy would help.
Two factors are driving much of the violence: a wide range of Papuan grievances toward the Indonesian state and a security policy that seems to run directly counter to the government’s professed desire to build trust, accelerate development and ensure that a 2001 special autonomy law for Papua yields concrete benefits. To date the law has failed to produce either improvement in the lives of most Papuans or better relations with the central government. Its substance has been frequently undercut by Jakarta, although provincial lawmakers also bear responsibility for failing to enact key implementing regulations. One of the last measures to prompt accusations in Papua of Jakarta’s bad faith was the 2011 division into two of the Papuan People’s Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP), an institution set up under the law to safeguard Papuan values and culture that was supposed to be a single body, covering all of Papua. In many ways the MRP was the keystone of special autonomy but it has been plagued by problems since its much-delayed establishment; the division, with Jakarta’s active endorsement, has further reduced its effectiveness.
These problems would be hard enough to manage if Papua had functioning political institutions, but it does not. An ineffectual caretaker governor appointed in July 2011 has left the Papuan provincial government in limbo. Meanwhile, the organisation of a new election has been stymied by a provincial legislature that has focused most of its energy on blocking the former governor from running and vying in national courts with the local election commission for control over parts of the electoral process. The picture is just as grim at district level. This leaves the central government without an engaged partner in Papua, and Papuans without a formal channel for conveying concerns to Jakarta.
The role of a new policy unit – the Unit for Accelerated Development in Papua and West Papua, known by its Indonesian abbreviation of UP4B – established in September 2011, increasingly appears limited to economic affairs, where it will struggle to show visible progress in the short term. Hopes that it might play a behind-the-scenes political role in fostering dialogue on Papuan grievances are fading, as it becomes increasingly clear that dialogue means different things to different people. Efforts to hammer out some consensus on terms and objectives have been set back by the violence, as the government is reluctant to take any steps that might be perceived as making concessions under pressure.
The challenge for the government is to find a short-term strategy that can reduce violence while continuing to work out a policy that will bring long-term social, economic and political benefits and address longstanding grievances. That strategy must involve clear and visible changes in the administration, control and accountability of both the police and military. The security apparatus is not the only problem, nor are police and soldiers always the perpetrators of violence; many have been victims as well. But they have come to symbolise everything that has gone wrong with Jakarta’s handling of the Papuan conflict. It therefore follows that a change in security policy is the best hope for a “quick win” that can transform the political dynamics and halt the slide toward further violence.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Indonesia:
1.  Develop a more integrated policymaking mechanism on Papua at the national and provincial levels to ensure that:
a) programs designed to deliver concrete benefits to Papuans and build trust are not inadvertently undercut by decisions or actions taken in home affairs or by intelligence and security agencies;
b) a more unified security reporting mechanism is created under the Papuan regional police commander to ensure that elements of the military and intelligence apparatus do not undertake operations that report only to Jakarta and are not coordinated with other relevant authorities in Papua.
c) strict oversight of programs is not restricted to the development sphere but encompasses security policy, including examination of income-generating programs of the security forces; and
d) Papuan perspectives are included, either by participation of elected governors or the head of the MRP.
To the Indonesian National Police:
2.  Improve dissemination of and training in Police Regulation N°8/2009 on Implementation of Human Rights Standards and Principles in Carrying Out Police Tasks, with particular attention to:
a) Article 10(e) prohibiting any form of torture and inhumane or humiliating treatment, even in the face of an order from a superior or extraordinary circumstances;
b) Article 10(f) guaranteeing the health of those in custody and providing medical care as needed;
c) Article 10(g) prohibiting corruption and abuse of authority;
d) Article 17 on procedures for arrest;
e) Article 40 prohibiting police from acting in a way that generates antipathy in the community, including by asking for unauthorised fees and covering up mistakes;
f) Articles 42-44 on protecting human rights in a situation of mass unrest; and
g) Articles 45-49 on use of firearms, particularly the provision that non-violent methods should always be used first and firearms should only be used in a way that is proportional to the threat faced.
3.  Review policy on use of live ammunition with a view to restricting its use to specific situations and ensuring an adequate supply of non-lethal equipment for handling civil unrest.
4.  Ensure that police are fully equipped with protective body equipment when assigned to insecure areas or when facing civil unrest so as to reduce the incentive to shoot first.
5.  Reassess training needs, to ensure that anyone posted to a particular kabupaten (district) in Papua receives a thorough and detailed briefing from those who have served in the area about local conditions, conflict dynamics and relations with local government and community leaders, and that anyone finishing a tour of duty undergoes an equally thorough debriefing so that knowl­edge and lessons learned can be institutionalised.
6.  Redesign allowances and incentive structures so that police are rewarded rather than penalised for taking posts in isolated and difficult areas and encouraged to build stronger links with local communities.
To the Indonesian National Army and the Indonesian National Police:
7.  Make a clear commitment to ending impunity for inappropriate use of force and torture and to enforcing more credible sanctions against individuals responsible for such behaviour in a visible and public manner so that Papuans can see that justice is being done.
8.  Ensure in particular that there is a policy – rigorously implemented – of zero tolerance that begins in police and military academies for kicking, beating with any instrument including rifle butts or other forms of physical violence in the course of detention, interrogation or on-the-spot punishment for alleged offences.
9.  Make clear that “emotion” can never be used to justify excessive use of force, especially in reacting to attacks by Papuan groups.
10.  Provide more systematic oversight and scrutiny of income and expenditures in district and sub-district-level commands, particularly in those close to mining sites, with a view to ending illegal levies on the trans­port of goods and services.
To the Unit for Accelerated Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B):
11.  Work with the provincial and district-level governments in Papua as well as ministries at national level to identify gaps in implementation of special autonomy legislation and develop strategies for addressing them.
To the National Elections Commission (KPU):
12.  In light of the Constitutional Court’s upholding of the practice of voting by acclamation (using the noken system), work with the provincial-level elections commission (KPUD Papua) to develop clear guidelines that will ensure tabulating these votes includes at least minimum standards against electoral fraud and conduct increased voter education efforts accordingly.
To Papuan Provincial Legislators and the Elected Governor (when one is in place):
13.  Give top priority to enacting the some two dozen regulations necessary to ensure that special autonomy is fully implemented.
Jakarta/Brussels, 9 August 2012

To Connect Southeast Asia to Central Asia, Passage to India and Pakistan Vital

The 21st century cannot truly be the Asian century if some parts of Asia remain mired in instability and declining growth

China and India are two important regional powers. Any development involving their co-operation or rivalry impacts on the evolving strategic matrix of the region. Indonesia, given its own historical links with India and China on political, cultural and religious matters, is keeping watch on how the two countries are addressing their historical differences.

Indonesia, in itself a rising power, wants these two powers to move in tandem as development and trade partners with Southeast Asia — not as rivals.

So it is no wonder that Indonesian leaders and media want China and India to seek trust not only between themselves but also by expanding relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states.

In this context, the trip earlier this month of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to New Delhi and Islamabad, the capitals of India and Pakistan, was prominently reported in the media.

Indonesia wants to work with China across the South China Sea to keep the region tension-free, ensuring progress in negotiations between China and Asean to establish guidelines to settle disputes peacefully.

It welcomes the strengthening of economic corridors running from China through India and Bangladesh, and another through Myanmar, as economic links between East Asia and South Asia.
Indonesian media rightly focused on Li’s visit to India. For Indonesia, China and India are large markets for commodities exports. Trade between Indonesia and China sits at about $51 billion a year and trade with India at $17 billion.

China is Indonesia’s biggest coal importer and India takes 80 percent of its crude palm oil exports. Combined, these countries are a mass of 2.5 billion people — 35 percent of the world’s population. India and China are leading investors in Indonesia. Both countries have significant commercial, political and security interests in Southeast Asia.

Pakistan views growing China-India relations as a stabilizing influence in its immediate neighborhood.

In this context, Li’s visits were a relief. If the proposed regional trade agreement between India and China, with the possible inclusion of other South Asian countries, takes place, it will strengthen economic interests. This development will militate against a relapse into the mutual suspicion that guided interstate relations in the 1960s and 1970s.

Twice former prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif emerged in elections earlier this month as the new leader of Pakistan. He is known to be a pragmatic politician interested in building bridges of friendship and fraternity with India, and consolidating the existing strategic partnership with China.

The way his electoral win has been received in both countries is propitious for peace and stability in the region. On Monday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sent a special envoy to meet Sharif in Lahore. Earlier, Sharif had a friendly meeting with Li in Islamabad.

Under the sagacious leadership of Sharif, the new government — after having resolved some urgent bilateral issues with India — may embark upon trilateral economic initiatives to kickstart economic development, including power generation, infrastructure projects and the payment of foreign debt.

The 21st century cannot truly be the Asian century if some parts of Asia remain mired in instability and declining growth. China, as Li’s visits to India and Pakistan indicate, recognizes that peace is a precursor to the development of Asia as a whole.

While in India, Li spoke of the economic corridors involving China, India, Myanmar and Bangladesh; in Pakistan he agreed to set up an economic corridor to further connect their two economies. On the South Asia visit, Li sealed 11 co-operation agreements on trade, technology and culture.

Pakistan and Asean have recently discussed how Pakistan can help connect Southeast Asia to Central Asia, a region that includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Both sides hope that Southeast Asia will soon be effectively connected with Central Asia. The two economic corridors can provide the basis to connect Southeast Asia with the Central Asia through Pakistan.

In this pursuit, quadrilateral co-operation among India, China, Pakistan and Indonesia can play a central role. The idea is based on more than a mere desire. All these countries have the wherewithal and economic power to connect these two regions for trade, investment and manufacturing.

China borders Central Asia. India and Pakistan have decided to relax their trade regime. Both have signed agreements to facilitate Afghanistan’s trade with India. Pakistan provides the shortest and cheapest link to landlocked Central Asian states. Indonesia cherishes happy relations with China and Pakistan.

Wise leaders in these countries are ready to implement their vision for sustained growth in Asia. Healthy economies can provide the right environment to connect Southeast Asia with Central Asia.

Realism is needed given the risk of serious problems in the integration. But Indonesia, being the 19th largest economy and harboring abundant natural resources — including oil, gold, coal, gas, lumber, rubber, palm oil, nickel and zinc — can persuade Asean states to connect with South Asia and onward to Central Asia.

The whole exercise could complement World Trade Organization mechanisms currently under discussion. Sanaullah is the ambassador of Pakistan to Indonesia. .Jakarta Globe (JG Illustration)